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1.1 Topic: Environmental protection, CSR and the role of NGOs 
The overall issue of my thesis generates from a crossing point between two general and 
widely examined topics: Environmental politics and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
These two topics contain many interesting and current debates: Environmental politics has 
over the last decade become exceedingly central, and how to deal with the climate crisis is 
one of the most important contemporary global matters. While writing this thesis, 
fundamental changes in international politics of regulation are being internationally discussed 
in order to find solutions to the climate crisis. CSR might be a more limited debate, and often 
concentrates around how possible or desirable it can be for actors in the market (private 
sphere) to take social responsibility. Connected to the environmental challenges we 
experience today, the regulation (or self-regulation) of polluting industries towards more 
sustainable, environmentally friendly production is essential.  
Thereby, these two topics concern fundamental normative questions which are underlying this 
thesis and the political discussion on environmental protection. First, the most basically 
question is if humans really should make efforts on protecting the environment, especially if it 
can hinder human development. This discussion will be reflected in the development of 
ideologies, where the environment on most of them (but to a more or less degree) is perceived 
as a tool for humans and that thereby human development is more important. Second, if the 
answer on the first normative question is yes, the next normative question is what actors 
should have the responsibilities of carrying out the protection of the environment, should it be 
the government, the companies, NGOs or individuals? This question will be underlying the 
discussion on regulative mechanisms and responsibility. 
 
However, it is not the normative questions that are the main issue for my investigation, but I 
will instead attempt to take a more descriptive focus on actors involved. Concerning 
academically contributions on these two matters, my impression so far is that they focus either 
on the state as the regulatory agent, or the companies and corporations as self-regulating 
bodies (when addressing CSR). My approach will have a different base, not on the state or a 
large corporation, but on how environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) can 
be significant actors in the important environmental task of regulating harmful environmental 
industry. As a further limitation of the thesis, I have chosen to look closer at two Norwegian 
NGOs/interest organizations, namely the World Wildlife Foundation-Norway (WWF) and the 
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Rainforest Foundation-Norway (RF). Both of these have agendas towards private industry, 
and attempt to regulate and influence companies with diverse means. In this way, my goal is 
not to discuss the two matters mentioned above at a general level, but to find out more about 
limited empirical details of NGO involvement: What are the roles, approaches and effects of 
these two NGOs in this picture?  
 
1.2 Research question 
NGOs have often been seen as significant for creating political changes, and especially 
environmental protection is often conceived as an outcome of pressure from NGOs, civil 
society or new social movements. But ever since environmental protection became a political 
issue; contexts, ideologies, discourses, relations between actors and ways of carrying out 
environmental politics as well as regulation have developed and advanced. Many researchers 
have studied these developments, and some have also investigated how such changes have 
created more complex possibilities and restrictions for environmental NGOs. An empirical 
pre-assumption is that NGOs also have become fragmented and differentiated, and not simply 
carry out protest actions against governments, but additionally make use of various strategies 
like engaging more directly in the regulation of industry. 
Primarily, my main aim with the thesis was to find out how two Norwegian environmental 
NGOs can have influenced and taken part of the regulation of private industry, in order to 
make companies adopt more environmentally friendly attitudes and/or methods. After 
studying theories and empirical matters, I developed a more specified research question, 
taking both strategies and contexts into account:  
How can political contexts and the choices of strategies NGOs make, shape conditions and 
restrictions for them to intervene in the regulation of environmental harmful industries?  
 
I will in this manner perceive the NGOs as one of many actors that can take part in regulation, 
and carry out two case studies on how two NGOs have taken part in the regulation of different 
industries. By regulation I consider both state regulation and self-regulation of industries, and 
a broader theoretical account on regulation will be given in chapter 3. My aim in answering 
the research question is not primary to investigate what effects the NGOs can have had on the 
industries, but to look closer at more general conditions that enable NGOs to intervene in 
regulation. Both the strategies they have chosen and the political context that surrounds them 
can help explain their conditions, possibilities and restrictions for intervention. 
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The research question will guide the gathering of empirical material and theories that can be 
connected to it. Empirically, I will therefore have a focus on the NGOs, what choices they 
make, how they relate to other actors and their thoughts and ideas on the issue of regulating 
industry. Comparing the NGOs strategies, the differences and similarities between them will 
give some accounts on what possibilities and restrictions the two strategies inhabit. The 
reactions from the different industries they approach will also be given attention. 
Theoretically, I will have to investigate different ways of understanding and conceptualizing 
regulation, and not only the most classical way connected to state and legislation. Therefore, a 
more nuanced model for regulative approaches and strategies for NGOs will be outlined, 
which will guide my research when I investigate and compare the two cases. In my case 
studies, the research and analysis will take a closer look at how these choices of approach and 
conditions can influence the outcome of NGO practices. My empirical investigation will 
thereby also take up how the NGOs react to the contexts influencing them, especially the 
institutions of the state and market at both global and national level. But before going into 
research strategy, theoretical assumptions and empirical material, I will shortly explain why I 
have chosen this topic and its relevance. 
 
1.3 Relevance of the topic: 
My initial reason for choosing the topic was that environmental politics always has been an 
interest for me. There should be little doubt that the environmental question again is a highly 
central theme in politics, local, national and international, especially since the UN report 
release on climate change. But not only politicians are concerned with these question, there 
can also be said to be a “green trend” in business life and amongst consumers and producers. 
It is interesting to view the topic of CSR from the NGOs vantage points and how they relate 
to the green trend, and even if this is not the main focus in my thesis, the philosophical 
problems underlying that concept will become evident in the information 
Questioning the NGOs as actors on the matter of environmental protection is essential since 
they historically have been amongst the main actors bringing the issue on the agenda. Their 
roles, attitudes and importance might have changed over the years. Furthermore, NGOs are 
interesting objects of study, because of the special connection and the legitimating powers 
they have in general society, and their relation to the state. In connection to my department, 
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this thesis can consequently be conceived as a study of organizations and how they relate to 
other organizations and changing contexts. 
The theoretical implications I will address are connected to the discussion about different 
forms of governance and regulation (on the environmental politics field), which is large 
internationally. My limitation is on environmental NGOs in Norway, where a Norwegian 
political context might have an important impact. However, my cases might be elaborated in 
further research, and connected and compared to cases in other countries. 
Besides, how to address environmental protection and how to find out different solutions with 
different actors is as mentioned earlier an important topic in international, domestic and local 
politics. In addition to taking up some complex practical environmental problems like the 
protection of the rainforests and marine protection, the dilemmas on how to establish political 
solutions will be apparent. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis: 
While writing the thesis, the decisions I made on structure are also worth mentioning. The 
chapter following the introduction will give an outline on metrological choices and research 
strategy. My reasons for putting the methodical outline before the context and theory chapters 
is that I consider the connections between them as strong, and that my research strategy also 
includes an explanation on choice of theories. The theoretical chapters will first discuss 
various regulation theories, and then outline a theoretical framework for analysing and 
comparing my two cases. A small chapter on noteworthy Norwegian contexts will be added 
before going into the empirical case studies. The empirical information will be presented in 
chapter 6, where a presentation of each of the NGOs, their choice of strategies and some 
practical campaigns they have carried out will be given. Lastly, the analysis and conclusions 
in chapter 7 will first compare the strategies of the two NGOs with each other and with the 
prior theoretical model, thereafter include a more general discussion on theories and 






2. Research strategies: 
2.1 The research process 
In my view, methodology is not only a tool for collecting empirical data, but is about choices 
on both empirical material and theoretical framework. This chapter will therefore both give an 
outline on how I plan to combine the empiric data and theory in order to answer my research 
question, and what methods for the collection of empirical data I will use. Based on the idea 
that writing a master thesis should be a process where theory and empirical data is collected 
and connected in a fluid way, I found that “Adaptive theory”, presented by Derek Layder 
(1998) seemed fitting. Adaptive theory can be described as something in between deductive 
(theory-testing), and inductive (theory-generating) approaches (Layder 1998:5). Influenced by 
different inquiry strategies, this can represent an alternative which combines the use of theory 
to lend order and pattern to research data, while simultaneously adapting to the order and 
pattern contained in this emerging data (Layder 1998:1). For example, adaptive theory 
combines ideas from “grounded theory”, which is concerned with generating theory from 
ongoing analysis of data, “with middle-ranged theory”, which focuses on prior ideas and 
models guiding research (Layder 1998:146-147)1. Thereby, Adaptive theory can further be 
defined as a methodological approach where the use of pre-existing theory, and theory 
generated from data analysis in the formulation and actual conduct of empirical research, is 
combined (Layder 1998:1) The process of research goes both ways: theory adapts to and is 
shaped by incoming evidence, while data also is filtered and adapted to theoretical material 
(ibid: 3). Thereby, adaptive theory gives more flexibility to the process of writing a thesis, 
especially in the process of going back and fourth between collecting empirical data and 
choosing theoretical perspectives. More practical, this approach is about generating models 
from the social reality that is subject of research, but often prior theories create a base for the 
model generating. I will therefore made use of pre-existing theories and models as guidance 
for collecting data, but left room for later alternations.  
Especially since theories connected to my research field are generated from different subjects 
and areas, but there on the other hand not exist much empirical research about these two 
NGOs in Norway, this approach seems appropriate. The open-ended characteristics of 
adaptive theory as well involve that no prior hypothesis (to test theoretical assumptions) needs 
to be formed, because intentions are more descriptive and explanatory (Layder 1998: 175). 
                     
1 Many other theories and approaches are discussed in Layders outline of Adaptive Theory, but that discussion 
will not be taken up further in this essay.  
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Combined with descriptive and explanatory approaches, case studies can be practical research 
solutions in order to get closer information about a phenomenon. 
 
2.2 Comparative case study 
Approaching this issue in a Norwegian context, I found some important quantitative data in a 
report from the CMI institute (Lange, Spissøy, Brudvik 2000), where an overview of 
partnerships between NGOs and industry in Norway is given. This report inspired and further 
triggered my curiosity about how such relationships works, which results they can give and 
their implications for the wider society. In order to find answers to my main question, I 
decided to go deeper into two NGOs and investigate how they try to regulate private industry. 
Case studies can be exploratory, descriptive and explanatory, thereby answering “how” 
questions (Yin 2003:3), and are also fitting with an adaptive theory approach. 
I therefore decided not to make another quantitative outline like this report, but to choose two 
of the NGOs mentioned in the overview, as cases studies (Yin 2003). This gives the 
opportunity to investigate more in detail how NGOs try to interfere in the regulation of 
businesses, and how they strategically take part in or establish networks. Since my research 
question is “how”, a closer in-depth study of the phenomenon is necessary. A technical 
definition is that a cases study is an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003: 13). My cases can according to this definition 
be seen as examples of the phenomenon of different actors intervening in regulation of the 
environment and industry (e.g. prompting network or self regulation). More specifically, cases 
where environmental NGOs direct their actions towards businesses and not necessarily only 
the state, a phenomenon which can be said to be relatively unstudied in Norway. My study 
will investigate the NGOs in the period from 2004 until 2008, and the context surrounding the 
cases will be given much attention in chapter 5, and will also be taken into account in the 
discussion in the last section. 
 
Choice of cases: Going into two or more cases is described as a “multiple-case design” (Yin 
2003:46)2. Advantages of multiple case studies are that they can give more general 
conclusions, but disadvantages are that they might not go as deep as single case studies (Yin 
2003). By choosing two quite similar but also different NGOs, my multiple case study might 
                     
2 By some writers (like Eckstein 1975, Lijphart 1975), multiple-case (comparative) studies has been viewed as a 
different methodology than single case study (Yin 2003:46). 
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therefore give some general indications. In the investigation, I looked closer at these two 
NGOs ideas/principles about collaboration and their campaigns. This gave opportunities to 
compare the two, and to find differences and similarities. I assumed that there were 
complexity and differences between NGOs, and that this might indicate that power can be 
created in diverse ways, with different approaches, discourses and methods. This might also 
mirror the complex civil society. Therefore, the two cases may show examples of how the 
phenomenon of NGOs participating in the regulation of industry, and how they describe 
conditions, strategies and effects. A clear general view on how such processes unfold cannot 
be given, but the similarities might say something about more generalized tendencies.  
The choice of the two NGOs was more or less coincidence. Before the decision, I collected 
information about many Norwegian environmental NGOs, and searched for some with 
apparently different approaches. I thereafter contacted some of these NGOs, made pilot 
interviews with three of them, and finally decided on two of them. The final choice was not 
only because these two NGOs actually were interested in my research and took the time to 
talk with me, but also because they apparently both contained interesting similarities and 
differences. These will be elaborated later, but shortly described they had some similar 
practical basis (in size, duration – both young NGOs, international approach etc), but different 
ideologies, means and aims. 
 
2.3 Collecting data 
Empirical data for case studies can be generated from different data collection methods. Both 
qualitative data and quantitative data can be used, but interviews are the most important 
source of information in case studies (Yin 2003:89). My primary data was collected from 
interviews with informants from the two NGOs. There was not much written material about 
these cases, and interviews were therefore necessary to collect information. Because of this, 
my interviews were informal and open-ended, signifying that only a few questions are asked 
and informants can talk without much restraint, elaborating information they find relevant 
(Silverman 2006:110). Compared to survey interviews, open-ended interviews gives the 
informants space and time to reflect upon the topic, and important information can appear 
(ibid:114). Problematic features are evidently that the informants may come up with irrelevant 
information, that the interviewer misunderstands the informant, or that the data which is 
selected from the interview is not representative. Another setback is that my informants are 
supposed to speak on the behalf of their organization, thereby representing not only their 
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individual reflections. Since my research is not mainly aimed at describe identity issues of 
individuals and identity (as open interviews used in research often are) but more at 
understanding an organization, I will have to use the interviews with the employees as 
representing the whole organization. 
 
An ambition is that my thesis should be empirically driven, and I therefore started the 
collection of date at an early stage. The process of empirical collection therefore went in 
several rounds. Pilot interviews can be important to get into the empirical situation at an early 
stage; to refine further data collection plans (Yin 2003: 79). Consequently, I contacted 
different NGOs, and got appointments for pilot-interviews with representatives from WWF 
and RF. I sent them a mail with six questions before the interviews, so that they could prepare 
themselves, and the interviews lasted for two hours. The informants were happy to speak 
about their organization, and told a lot about their thoughts on the issue of CSR. Both of the 
NGOs gave me one example of a campaign or project directed at regulating an industry where 
they felt they had succeeded. These examples gave me some information about how they both 
are part of build networks, which other actors they see as relevant, and of course how they try 
to regulate industry/ companies.  
After the pilot interviews I conducted some more interviews with the two NGOs, and asked 
them to give an example of a campaign or project where they didn’t succeed. That 
information was useful to give some ideas about conditions for network governance in these 
cases. The first four interviews were conducted by visiting the two NGOs and talking to them 
directly. The latter interviews I had to conduct by telephone, which functioned fine, especially 
since my research issue and questions not are sensitive and personal. I had to do several 
interviews with the two NGOs, not only in order to pick up more information and make sure 
that I have understood things more correctly, but also to confront them with information I had 
conducted elsewhere. 
Thereafter, and in order for my data to be unbiased, I carried out a third round of interviews, 
with both the NGOs and with other informants connected to the cases. I made several 
telephone interviews with some of the different companies/industrial actors or other actors 
that the NGOs have contacted and attempted to influence, to listen to their side of the story.  
I also talked to actors which not directly were involved in the case, like journalists and 
organisations somehow connected to the businesses.  
In addition to the interviews I made use of some written empirical material, especially annual 
reports, policy documents and other reports from the NGOs, industrial organizations and 
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companies. Moreover, I found much information on web pages, like statements and comments 
in press releases, which were useful especially when it was hard to get interviews with some 
actors (like e.g. boat companies). Even if the use of web pages can be academically 
questioned because they can change fast, they can be sources of information because they are 
essential communication channels for the actors. Additionally, how the information is 
presented and what information is stressed on the different actor’s web-pages is interesting in 
order to understand how they want to communicate their message, because web-pages are the 
organizations or companies “face to the world”. In order to make the web-sites revisable, I 
have arranged them and added as much details as possible in the reference list, but it was not 
always possible to find the authors of the web-articles. 
 
2.4 Methodological dilemmas 
First, they way that I have made use of the empirical data can be questioned. Qualitative 
interviews are mostly supposed to bring information on thoughts, feelings and interpretations 
on matters, in order to get a deeper understanding on why phenomenon occur (Silverman 
2006). In my case, I have sometimes made use of the interviews in a more quantitative way, 
as practical information sources. The main reason for that is there is not much written 
information on the matters I wanted to investigate. For the same reason, I made use of web-
pages, which as well might be highly questionable as academically reliable sources (as 
mentioned earlier).  
 
A problem I encountered with the objectives of study perceived as examples of a 
contemporary phenomenon, was that is was hard not to take too many contextual features into 
account. When conducting the data, I almost felt a journalist, investigating a case by finding 
and following different information through various sources (Silverman 2006: 395). This mix 
of methods for collecting data can be criticised for being unplanned, but for me it was 
reasonable because I had to follow up the information that appeared. Moreover, going deeper 
into the material and finding different information sources is important for a case study. The 
problematic feature is of course the reliability of the research, implying that others researchers 
should be able to find similarly answer when conducting the same investigation (Silverman 
2006:282). However, this issue is always difficult when applying qualitative or mixed 
methods. Researches grounded on qualitative data, can often be criticized for being subjective 
and lacking reliability and validity. To construct validity and reliability of case studies when 
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collecting data, three principles should be taken into consideration: Using multiple sources of 
evidence, create a Case study database, and maintain a chain of evidence (Yin 2003: 97-105). 
The first, using multiple sources will be taken into account in my thesis by finding existing 
documents in addition to interviews. Second, I have organized and filed the transcribed 
interviews in a personal database which can be inspected. And third, I attempted to maintain a 
chain of evidence, beginning with pilot-interviews with representatives from the NGOs.  
 
To keep a critical distance might also appear as problematical, and it is important to clarify 
about my role as a student in this topic. I have to admit that environmental protection always 
has been an interest of mine, and I have worked as volunteer in environmental NGOs myself 
(not RF or WWF). Because of this practical experience, I have some established knowledge 
about the field of environmental politics. Although I have not worked with the topic of 
industry regulation directly, my insights and close connection to NGOs can influence my 
interpretations and understandings in the interviews. This fact can present a reliability 
problem, and has to be taken into account when reading this thesis. I have however tried to 
avoid answering the normative questions on if we should take responsibility and protect the 
environment and furthermore, who should have the main responsibilities for carrying out the 
protection. My informants had clear normative ideas on how this should work out, but I will 
try presenting their arguments and at the same time try to keep a critical distance. 
 
2.5 Analysis approach: 
The choice of analysis approach is a crucial matter. According to Yin, “Data analysis consists 
of examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing or otherwise recombining both quantitative 
and qualitative evidence to address the initial propositions of a study” (Yin 2003:109). But 
there are still many ways of carrying this task out. Yin suggests three different strategies: 
“relying on theoretical propositions, setting up framework based on rival explanations and 
developing case descriptions” (ibid). Of these, the last strategy of developing case 
descriptions seemed to be most fitting for my thesis, even if Yin is sceptical towards this 
strategy and claim that it is less preferable than the other two strategies (Yin 2003:114). 
However, the actual process of writing the thesis alternated between these strategies, because 
the process of writing did not start with in one end but the theoretical propositions the 
framework and the case description developed together and adapted to each other. By 
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developing a descriptive framework for analysing the case study, this strategy is largely in 
line with the descriptive and explanatory approaches of adaptive theory.  
An alternative analysis strategy could have been to formulate a discourse analysis3. Open 
ended interviews do not only give practical information, but also information about ideas, 
thoughts and discourses surrounding the NGOs. In the first instance, the process of discourse 
analysis might be too much for my thesis. After an information collection process, I found 
that a lot of work goes into finding, examining, mapping and categorizing empirical 
information from the two cases, and I that this process should be my first priority. 
 
In order to answer my initial proposition and research question, the analysis chapter will be 
divided in two parts where empirical material and theoretical assumptions will be confronted 
with each other. The first part will answer the research question on how the NGOs can 
intervene in the regulation by examining their strategies that have been explained in the 
empirical chapter, and combining this data with the theories on NGO strategies described in 
chapter 3 and 4. Hence, I will also trial if the categories proposed in the theoretical chapter 
will fit with my empirical data. However, it must be stressed that the purpose of going into 
two cases is not to compare to find which approach or strategy is “the best” or give advices 
for further strategies for the NGOs. What actual results the campaigns the NGOs actually 
have created is difficult to measure, since results can be both changes in values and actually 
practical changes. Instead, the different results, implications, problems and possibilities the 
different strategies give will be the focus. Moreover, the goal will not be to fit the cases into 
established models (e.g. partnership and watchdog), but rather to get more indebt empirical 
information on their special features. A general impression I have on literature in the matters 
of my thesis is that there is more focus on theoretical discussions, establishing models and 
definitions, than close empirical studies.   
Additionally, I will describe how the NGOs can intervene by taking more general contexts 
into account, and compare the indications in the context chapter with the actual findings. 
Since this study is a (comparative) case study, describing the contexts where the phenomenon 
(case) takes place is significant in order to understand how the case can work out. 
  
                     
3 Especially since I discussed discourses in environmental politics at an earlier assignment, this approach was 
tempting. As I see it, it is almost impossible to overlook the importance of discourses and how language 
constructs realities and in this way can generate power. Why things happen has to do with different processes at 
both global and local level, but also with how people think and understand the processes, and this implicates that 
discourses can arise or become connected when networks or webs of dialogue are established. 
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3 Environmental policy and regulation theories  
I will start this chapter with a short historical introduction on how ideas on environmental 
protection and regulation mechanisms might have changed over time. This will lay the ground 
for a deeper theoretical discussion on regulation and regulative mechanisms. Since regulation 
is a central element of my initial research question, a discussion on different theories and 
viewpoints on regulation in environmental politics will be taken into account.  
Regulation is the most widely used instrument of environmental policy, because the 
regulation on both individuals and especially companies are vital to protect the environment 
(Carter 2007: 323). The “tragedy of the commons” is a pessimistically and well cited theory 
(and Hobbisan inspired) that argues that a strict regulation of humans is important in order to 
preserve natural resources (Hardin 1968). The discussion on regulation of individuals will not 
be taken further in this thesis. Instead, the focus will be set on how regulation of industry is 
understood, different regulatory mechanisms, how regulation on environmental harmful 
industry occurs and what actors are involved in the shaping of regulation. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explain and underline theoretical reasons for why it is relevant to investigate 
NGOs as regulative actors.  
 
3.1 Environmental ideologies: From conservation to ecological modernization 
Before going into the discussion on regulation connected to environmental protection, I will 
first give a short presentation on ideologies influencing the political field of environmental 
protection. This is important to take into account, both because they are often referred to, and 
because the understandings of problems and solutions that the ideologies inhabit can influence 
the actor’s choices of strategies.  
Much has been written on ideologies and discourses that shape and informs environmental 
politics. Firstly, the utilitarian discourse use-maximizing (with roots in the philosophy of 
Bentham) which evolved in the beginning of the 1900s changed human relations to nature and 
the perspectives that view nature as a resource for humans, as can be seen in the usage of 
expressions like ”natural resources” instead of simply “nature” (J. Scott 1998:321,13). At the 
same time, a “high modernist ideology” with a strong belief in modern technological 
development resulted in efforts to maximize the usage of the forest through “scientific 
forestry” (ibid: 21). To” tame the nature” and adapt it to human development became the most 
important project for high modernists (ibid: 95). Conservation of nature in its own right was 
not a major issue in this period, except for some efforts to create National parks. 
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Jansen (1989) describes how environmental issues are formed as policy areas for the 
Norwegian State (Jansen 1989:9). His outline includes five ideologies that have shaped and 
organized environmental politics: Classical environmental conservation, protection of cultural 
heritage, public health ideology, growth with conservation and ecological ideologies (ibid: 51). 
The first three traditional ideologies shaped environmental politics in the beginning of the 
1900s, and resulted in some reputational laws on protected areas of nature. “Growth with 
Conservation” was based on a liberal ideology, and combined two commonly polarized 
concepts. Still, the individual was in the centre, and growth was important to secure individual 
possibilities of freedom (ibid: 64). Since the issue of protection/conservation part puts some 
limitations to growth, this ideology is not completely in line with a utilitarian discourse. 
However, Social Economics, who are essential professions in state institutions, embraced this 
ideology since it fitted with their professional logic (ibid: 69).  
In the 1960s, a central shift appeared in ideologies concerning environmental politics in 
western states. After the publication of “Silent Spring” by Rachel Carson, there was a 
transition from the primarily economic motivation, to a conservationist motivation for 
environmental regulation (Braitwaite & Drahos 2000: 157). It triggered the growth of 
“Ecological Ideologies”, which contrary to the other ideologies mentioned, didn’t view the 
humans as the centre of attention and above nature (Jansen 1989: 70). In Norway, such 
ideologies were popular for a period, most noticeably with philosophers like Arne Næss and 
Eric Damman and new environmental movements/NGOs (like “Framtiden I Våre Hender”) 
(Jansen 1989). However, the ecological ideologies now give the impression to be limited to 
small sub-groupings, while the concept of “sustainable development” (similar to “growth with 
conservation”) appears to be the most widely accepted, with an underlying liberalistic logic 
that the natural environment should be conserved for the sake of the humans. Even if 
conservation of the natural environment and economic growth often is understood as 
polarities, which can hardly be united, the concept of sustainable development can be 
conceptualized as a discourse coalition (Arts 2002:34). Much because of the broadness of the 
term, it has been adopted by several actors, from states and local activists to international 
corporations (Bendell 2000:18).  
The concept of sustainable development increased the importance of regulating the industry 
and business towards more sustainable production. But these ideas developed in different 
directions, and the idea that economical growth and environmental gains could unite gave 
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growth to the newer discourse of “Ecological Modernization” (Hajer 1995:3)4. Here, 
“environmental management is seen as a positive-sum game: pollution pays” (Hajer 1995:3). 
This discourse inhabits the idea that developing new technology is the main key to solving 
environmental problems, and that business can profit by protecting the environment (Carter 
2007:227). Contrasted with sustainable development, this concept contains the presumption 
that (economic) development has to restrict itself to a lesser degree. Ecological modernization 
is therefore a popular concept among business leaders and economists who have realized that 
modern environmentally friendly business and technologies can become economically viable 
in the future. The obvious problematic aspect of this discourse is that every problem cannot be 
solved through technological innovations. 
This short outline indicate a movement towards a stronger connection between environmental 
protection and economic development, and as will be taken up in next section, the idea that 
economical actors also can (and must) be significant actors. Moreover, the growth of 
ideologies can also be connected to the escalation of specialized environmental NGOs 
(Princen & Finger 1994: 1). 
 
3.2 Regulating environmental harmful industry: Towards self-regulation   
3.2.1 From command-control to voluntarism  
As I shortly have outlined above, the ideologies on environmental protection have changed, 
and in the same vein the usage of political means for conserving the environment might have 
developed as well. Traditionally, the central policy mechanism invoked by governments has 
been the law, and the favoured mechanism has been “command and control” government 
regulation (Gunningham 1993:133). The governmental command and control model or a 
coercive model for regulation” has further been essential in creating environmental policy 
(Carter 2007: 323). This model “involves the government specifying the standards of pollution 
control that a process or product has to meet, and then using state officials, backed up by a 
legal system, to enforce this rules” (ibid). Two assumptions connected to this model seem to 
be that the central actors of regulation are the government and the state officials, and that the 
state “has power and can use it”. These assumptions will be discussed more in-dept later, but 
first one must recognize that this model was the reigning conception that guided policy 
making for many years but that it has changed the last decades (Gunningham 1993:133). 
Especially in the 1970s governments responded to the public environmental concern and 
                     
4 The Ecological Modernization perspective that Hajer (1995) initiated has generated many academically 
discussions, see e.g: Braitwaite & Drahos 2000: 268, Carter 2007:227 
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introduced a myriad of regulations, designed to prohibit or restrict environmentally harmful 
activities (Gunningham et.al. 1998: 38). Such regulations could be carried out by establishing 
standards and uniform requirements implemented by e.g. giving permits and licenses (ibid: 
41). Clearly, such regulations have been vital for the protection of the environment in many 
cases, like in curbing aspects of pollution, outlawing extremely hazardous substances and in 
the protection of endangered species (ibid:42). 
During the 1980s, along with the development of the “ecological modernization” discourse, 
the belief on such direct governmental regulation changed. Due to globalization and the fast 
development of technology in industry, it became a more difficult task for governments and 
regulators to identify problematic issues and where they emerged from, and to set uniform 
standards. Moreover, neo-liberal discourses in this period influenced changes in ideals in 
government organization and the relation between the states and the market. The focus was on 
less state regulation and more market freedom, and the idea of voluntary self-regulation by the 
companies became increasingly popular (Bastmeijer and Verchuuren 2005: 315). Moreover, 
for being economically inefficient, adversarial and administrative troublesome, the “command 
and control” model for environmental regulation was reconsidered (ibid). As the state no 
longer was able- or willing to manage society from above, other actors would have to take 
their own public responsibility, replacing direct state regulation. Thereby, voluntary initiatives 
and individual and corporate responsibility became more important in policy-making in many 
states (Arts 2002:29). In this period, management strategies like “Total Quality Management”, 
and “New Public Management” on public administrations developed and became popular, and 
several organizations developed environmental management strategies that focused on 
strategy formulation and implementation with an emphasis on rational planning and top down 
initiatives (Hoffman & Ventresca 2002). Also, new technologies and comprehensive 
management structures and systems, like the International Organization for Standardization’s 
certification (ISO 14001)5, was developed in order to address environmental problems 
(Forbes & Jerimer 2002:195).  
 
3.2.2 Industry self-regulation and CSR  
The developments described above point towards a voluntary self-regulation instead of 
command and control. Self-regulation can be defined as a process whereby an organized 
group regulates the behaviour of its members (Gunningham et.al 1998:50). Evidently, the 
                     
5 More about ISO: B& D, Bendell. http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm 
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notion of self-regulation is connected to a liberalistic ideology, and reminds us of Foucault’s 
notion of “governance of the self”/ “governing at a distance” or “govern-mentality”, where 
the dominant technique of power in the liberal state is that individuals regulate themselves 
according to discourses (Foucault 2002). In clarifying the case, it is important to distinguish 
between individual-, group-, economic- and social self-regulation (Gunningham and Rees 
1997: 364). What I am looking at in this instance is not individual self-regulation, but the self-
regulation of companies, thereby group and economic regulation. Compared to command and 
control regulation, self-regulation is often favoured for being more efficient and low-cost, 
flexible and sensitive to market circumstances (ibid: 52).  
Industrial self-regulation contains similar features as the much debated concept “Corporate 
Social Responsibility” (CSR), where private companies decide to implement a policy that 
regulates the company according to important values in society. A definition of CSR is “the 
company’s attitudes and responsibility towards society for social, ethical and environmental 
issues, included sustainable development” (Demirag 2005:11). Moreover, it is also termed 
civil regulation and soft regulation, and political scientists have characterized it as a process 
of global regulatory privatization (Vogel 2005:9).  
Ideally, corporations should (in line with this CSR definition) feel responsible for their impact 
on society and the environment, and voluntarily regulate their own activities towards 
sustainability (for instance pollution reduction measures). This concept has gained great 
attention in the last years, and many corporations and companies have established 
environmental visions and publish their own CSR reports. In line with the positive-sum game 
assumption of Hajer (1995), companies see the comparative advantage of linking themselves 
to the moral understandings in society (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 268) “Instead of seeing 
environmental protection as a burden upon the economy the ecological modernist sees it as a 
potential source for future growth” (Weale 1992: 76). Comparative advantage is a principle 
important in business life, and having a good reputation among consumers by trying to be 
environmental friendly can be an important gain. Because the conservation of the 
environment is not merely the responsibility of the government any more, CSR can be seen as 
a privatization of environmental regulation (Bendell 2000: 248). Since the 1990s, for example 
the EU has in the altered their view on legislation and command–control as the only 
governance instruments, and given attention to other policy instruments such as voluntary 
agreements, certification and emissions trade (Bastmeijer and Verchuuren 2005: 315). It will 
later be discussed how CSR also is relevant for Norway.  
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Some are optimistic in regard to this development, and argue that developing a green culture 
is essential in supporting sustainable development (Forbes & Jerimer 2002:196). But a critical 
question is to what extent institutionalized “organizational greening” corresponds with 
authentic environmentalism (ibid). A much used expression when criticising CSR is the 
“greening of business”. When industries “green” their products in order to appear 
environmentally friendly, the natural environment has become a key strategic issue (ibid: 195). 
The environmental friendly managements the companies set up (especially those set up 
without much involvement from a third part), can in many cases function as a “green 
ceremonial facade”, and serve to “green-wash” their business (ibid: 196). Formal 
organizations respond to pressures of legitimacy by attempting to project images of rationality 
to various stakeholders 6(ibid: 196). Pressure from civil society might have contributed to that 
corporations, which in the 1970s viewed environmentalism as an external threat to established 
business practices and profit, now have changed their thoughts (Hoffman & Ventresca 
2002:2). Environmental considerations are now a routine strategic consideration of major 
corporations (ibid). Of course, there exists a wide variety and seriousness of “greening”. For 
example, establishing own environmental projects or adapting to different types of 
standardized certification possibilities, which serve as proof of environmental friendliness, 
have become increasingly popular with both industry and consumers. ISO 9000/14001 is one 
example; other examples are the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) (which will be taken into account later) (Gulbrandsen 2005). 
 
The problematic feature of “green facades” is linked to the challenging tension between 
environmental protection and economic development embedded the concept of Sustainable 
Development. Generally, companies in the private sphere have profit-maximizing as their 
primary objective, and environmental protection does not easily combine with that principle. 
This might be seen as a classical tension in the understanding of the difference between the 
public spheres (where values, ethics and moral are discussed) and the private sphere (where 
the market allows room for private utilitarianism). Hence there are many critical voices to the 
concept of CSR; and many questions about fundamental ethics are being raised. Companies 
who state that they will take social or environmental responsibility are often criticized for 
only doing it for the symbolic and legitimizing value of it, and that they are not really 
changing their production methods (Carter 2007:235). Examining the results of industry self- 
                     
6 Forbes & Jerimer (2002) suggest a “Symbolic Organization Theory” for investigate greening of industries, but 
this theory will not be taken up in this thesis. 
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regulation, the weaknesses are easy to spot because of empirical variation in successes 
(Gunningham & Rees 1997: 380). A significant problem for companies thereby lies in 
institutionalizing the self-regulatory aspects (ibid). Self-regulation of industry and CSR has 
been heavily criticized, because self-regulatory standards are usually weak, enforcement is 
ineffective and punishment is secret and weak, and because it often lacks vital sides like 
visibility, credibility and accountability (Gunningham et.al. 1998:53).  
Last but not least, the legitimacy of command and control seems to be higher than self-
regulation among citizens. Surveys (from ISSP) indicate that citizens in many states agree on 
that there should be stronger government control over activities of multinational companies, 
and show that there is ten times the citizen support for legal regulation of the environment 
than for industry self-regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 609). 
 
The division of state regulation and CSR (volunteer regulation/self-regulation) does not mean 
that government and civil regulation operates in different spheres, sometimes civil regulation 
has expanded government regulation, and in some cases governments also promote CRS as 
indirect forms of regulation (Vogel 2005:10). 
 
3.2.3 Actors regulating and implementing CSR 
A key approach in my thesis is to focus on actors, and the alliances and cooperation between 
NGOs and other actors. In the classical regulation model of command and control, the main 
focus was on the relation between the government and companies. In this model, the role of 
the NGO was limited, primarily focused on influencing the legislation through lobbying and 
working towards state structures. Further, the relationships between NGOs and companies in 
this picture, was dominated by confrontation and keeping them at a distance (Bastmeijer & 
Verchuuren 2005: 315). However, by the dissimilation of the command and control 
mechanism, the relationship between governments and companies changed, and more diverse 
instruments for regulating companies’ activities appeared (ibid). These changes can be argued 
to have made the NGOs more influential in a different way, by opening for new possibilities 
(ibid). Academics increasingly focus on the meaning of evolutionary networks between 
market, states and civil society, through processes of learning and communication between 
stakeholders in the search of better governance mechanisms; this will be elaborated upon in 
the next section. 
Even though CSR/self-regulation and command & control regulation often is set up against 
each other, the public actors also contribute to the growth of industries implementing CSR. 
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The main actors in the process of developing and implementing CSR in private industry are 
the state(government), NGO and private industry, which can be referred to as the “governance 
triangle” (Bastmeijer and Verchuuren 2005:314). Naturally, the one main actor should be the 
private industry, while the state and the NGOs could act as advisors or regulators. 
Governments are clearly also significant, but it is indicated that “in the assessment of 
sustainable development in business, the relationship between states (governments), 
companies and NGOs is changing; governments seem to loose the grip, and relationships 
between NGOs and companies become increasingly important” (ibid: 315). The relationship 
between companies and NGOs is a major issue in this thesis and will be discussed more 
comprehensively in next chapter. However it can already be mentioned that many NGOs now 
seem to work more towards private industry, either to regulate them directly or make them 
regulate themselves, instead of trying to push the state to regulate them. The presumption that 
“state regulation and good governance is not enough to pressure companies towards a 
sustainable development and social responsibility” has gained popularity (Demirag 2005:12).  
However, the “governance triangle” might also have been extended in other ways, and more 
actors could be included. How the NGOs can participate in pushing CSR and self regulation 
into industries will discussed more comprehensively in next chapter. 
 
3.2.4 The global dimension 
However, it must be noted that globalization has contributed to the diversity of regulative 
mechanisms and actors involved. Although my empirical cases are restricted to the Norway, 
globalization of environmental politics must also be taken into account. Actually Vogel (1995) 
argues that “it is no longer possible to understand the making of environmental and consumer 
regulation exclusively in national terms” (Vogel 1995:1). 
From a focus on creating national parks and conserving species within Norway, 
environmental politics are now far more concerned with global issues like global warming, 
and global solutions along with international agreements are crucial. Not only has the issue of 
environmental politics been globalized, but also the three main actors (the governance triangle) 
in promoting sustainable business are more and more affected by the global level, and they 
are all parts of international networks: Companies operate on a global level and are often part 
of international corporations or have industries in different countries, NGOs are often parts of 
international movements or have “sister NGOs”, and states are to a greater extent subject to 
international legislation. There have been many critics on globalization form environmental 
communities, claiming that economic liberalisation would lead to a lowering of regulatory 
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standard7 (Vogel & Kagan 2004:1). Vogel on the other hand, arguments that “under certain 
circumstances, global economic integration can actually lead to the strengthening of 
consumer and environmental standards” (ibid). He argues thereby in a similar as Braithwaite 
and Drahos that globalization does not necessarily create a regulatory “race to the bottom” as 
many critics have presumed (Vogel & Kagan 2004:29). 
In global environmental regulation, the most important events have occurred since 1970’s, for 
instance when OECD started to organize meetings to establish guidelines and international 
treaties of regulation (for example of chemicals) (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 258). In the 
well known case of the CFC emissions causing ozone layer problems in the 1980s, the 
international regulations that were established to reduce these emissions, after pressure from 
diverse actors, are generally viewed as successful8 (ibid 264-265).  
In addition to the three actors mentioned in the last section, it must be emphasized that a great 
variation of actors can be included in global business regulation (states, NGOs and Green 
Civil Society, Business actors, individuals, International organizations and other actors), and 
the picture gets more complex (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 9). By detailed case studies of 
global regulation of different matters, the environment being one of them, Braithwaite & 
Drahos conceptualize regulatory globalization as” a process in which different types of actors 
use various mechanisms to push for or against principles” (ibid 2000:9). Globalization is 
thereby seen as a contest of principles that guide conduct (ibid: 7). For Transnational 
Corporations, the most important contest of principle is between the principle of “lowest-cost 
location” and the principle of the “worlds best practice” (ibid: 279). When the last contest on 
being the best company is in play, environmental NGOs can strategically cooperate with the 
actor’s best places to raise global standards (this will be elaborated later…) (ibid: 279). What 
is needed is that NGOs campaign to lift standards globally rather than country by country 
(ibid 610). Also today, the contest of which principles should guide the global agreements on 
how to face the climate change is highly relevant. After the climate negotiations in Bali in 
2007, a regulatory agreement is still not in place, largely because the principle debate is still 
not completed.  
On the private sphere there now seems to be a contest between the corporations (and nations) 
of establishing the best principles and establish the most environmentally friendly policy, and 
                     
7 The globalization debate is comprehensive, but in this thesis I will not take that discussion further and instead 
settle with Vogel and Braithwaite & Drahos understandings of globalization and their optimistic approaches. 
8 However, compared to the problems of climate change that now is the issue, the ozone layer problem was 
easier to solve because it was only some special emissions from some industries that had to be regulated. CO2 
emissions on the other hand emerges from so many sources that it might be impossible to regulate only through a 
simple legislation.  
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there is also an increasing amount of appraisements and awards being handed out to the best 
corporations who are taking action in reference to CSR. The problem with this is of course 
that the corporations might promise more than they achieve in reality. However, my aim is not 
really to discuss what gives the best effects of state regulation versus CSR and self regulation, 
but to investigate how different forms and mechanisms of regulation might come into play 
and overlap, and what perceptions the NGOs have on regulation. But before theoretically 
outlining how NGOs can participate in regulation, a more in-depth discussion on theories of 
regulation and what problematic issues they contain will be taken up.  
 
3.3 A closer look on regulation and network governance theories 
The fields pointed out in last section describe different conceptions of environmental politics 
and the roles of the actors. Connected to the changing roles and the importance of NGOs and 
civil society, are theories about network governance and regulation. And since my initial 
research question points at regulation aspect for NGOs, a deeper discussion on regulation will 
be taken into account in this chapter, and make an outline on how the NGOs can interfere. 
Especially the recent more complex ways of understanding governance and regulation and 




Regulation can be perceived as a more direct outcome of governance, and since the 
governance concept is underlying my thesis it will be discussed here. The concept of 
governance can in a simplified manner be connected to the work of the government. However, 
as described in prior sections, in the recent years the role of the government has become 
exceedingly vague. This is also reflected in a wide academic discussion about the concept of 
governance, described for example by Rhodes (1997):  
“Current uses of the term governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, 
referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or a new 
method by which society is governed” (Rhodes 1997:46).  
With a focus on the British government, he gives a critical outline of the governance 
discussion. He describes six separate uses of governance: “the minimal state, corporate 
governance, the new public management, good governance, a socio-cybernetic system or self-
organizing networks” (ibid: 47). After some discussion, concludes that governance should 
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refer to self-organizing, inter-organizational networks (ibid: 53). This definition involves a 
change from a system of local government into a system of local governance, involving 
complex sets of organizations drawn from the public and private sectors (Rhodes 1997:51). 
Networks can further be seen as alternatives to, not hybrids of markets and hierarchies, and 
they span the boundaries of the public, private and non-profit voluntary sectors (ibid: 52). The 
“governance triangle” for implementing CSR can be portrayed as such a network, including 
actors from government, NGOs and private industry. The development of network 
governance can therefore be understood as a response to government failures and the 
hierarchy ineffectiveness. Furthermore, the definitions of governance as self-organizing 
networks give a limited role to the government.  
Because they are difficult to map and analyse, such governance networks have many 
problematic features, especially for researchers and those who try to understand them from 
the outside. An important aspect is the self-governing feature of networks, is that they contain 
autonomy and can resist steering, and that they because of this develop own policies (Rhodes 
1997: 52). Thereby, a critical problem connected to democratic rule, is that the networks don’t 
have the same accountability and transparently that governments do (ibid: 58). Networks are 
often loosely organized, and it is unclear where decisions are made. Rhodes points out that 
governance as self-organizing networks become autonomous and resist central guidance, and 
that they because of this become the prime example of governing without government 
(Rhodes 1997:59).  
 
Another definition of governance is that “Governance is the management of the course of 
events in a social system” (Burris, Drahos, Shearing 2005:30). According to this definition, 
“governance directs attention to the mechanisms (institutions, social norms, social practices) 
through which these undoubted social goods may be instantiated in social systems, from 
smallest community to the global trade regime” 9 (ibid: 31). In comparison with Rhodes 
outline of governance, these definitions focus more on possibilities that a plurality of 
mechanism can generate, and not so much on the problematic feature of the role of 
government. Opposing views to Rhodes problematic issue emphasizes that network 
governance can empower civil society. Citizens could regain control of government through 
participation in networks as users and governors, creating a “post-modern public 
                     
9 Further, a theoretical tool to investigate networks and their governance and regulative power, namely “nodal 
governance” is developed (Burris, Drahos, Shearing 2005:33). But this theory will not be elaborated in this essay. 
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administration” (Fox and Miller cited in Rhodes 1997:58). Where Rhodes finds it problematic 
that they resist steering from the government, others see this as opportunities. As well, 
Rosenau and Czempiel argues in the book “Governance without government” (1992) that 
since governance is increasingly operative without government gives more informal lines of 
authority which can empower citizens (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992: 291).  
In line with these assumptions, networks can further create collective learning between public 
and private actors, and this issue will be discussed more thoroughly in next chapter. Because 
networks connect actors together in different ways, and might thereby open for new 
possibilities, new solutions and new ideas to appear. These latest theories indicate that 
research on regulation and governance should focus more on how these networks are 
constituted and related. 
 
3.3.2 Transcending the regulation-deregulation dichotomy: webs of dialogue  
After reviewing literature on the two different concepts of governance and regulation, it 
seems that they often are treated quite similarly, and are both given increasingly broader 
definitions. As I understand it, the difference between them is that regulation is more 
connected to rule making. In accordance with this understanding, regulation is often defined 
in a very limited manner, e.g. as “any direct (command and control) attempt by the 
government to influence the behaviour of business or citizens by setting environmental 
standards enforced via legislation” (Carter 2007:8). With this definition, the government is 
assumed to be the main actor carrying out regulation, and are thereby confronting with the 
discussions above arguing that governments are not being able to carry out regulation in that 
way any more. A specification might be that the command part creating legislation and setting 
standards is perceived as the most important, but that the control part is more difficult to carry 
out. Additionally, globalization of business has further eroded governmental command and 
control potential and international regulation and legislation is more significant for many 
fields. Global business regulation can loosely be defined as limits imposed on the behaviour 
of economic actors, contained in rules and standards (Pattberg 2006:1). With this definition, 
there are no defined actors, and this opens for perceiving various mechanisms of regulation 
and actors participating. 
A common discussion on the topic of regulation is between those who favour strong state 
regulation and those who believe in deregulation and a free market (Ayres & Braithwaite 
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1992:3)10. Because of this dualism, de-regulation is often confused with privatization, even 
though privatization often is accomplished by an increase in regulation (ibid: 11). Many 
theorists have indicated hybrid or indirect strategies of regulation, and these might be termed 
a new generation of regulatory theories (like Ayers & Braithwaite1992, Pattberg 2006, 
Gunninham et.al 1998) (Black 2003: 260). E.g. instead of a dualism it can be focused on the 
symbiosis and mix between two forms of regulation: state-regulation (public regulation) and 
self-regulation (private regulation – by industry associations, by firms, by peers and by 
individual consciences) (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). In broadening the understanding of 
regulation, the dichotomy between regulation and de-regulation might be transcended. 
Inspired by Ayers & Braithwaite, Gunningham suggest that a legal pluralism approach that 
recognizes that “most regulation already is in the hands not of government officials but in 
myriad individuals employed in the private sector “(Gunninham et.al 1998: 12). Moreover, he 
advocates a “legal pluralism” approach, because “scholars within a legal pluralism focus on 
the interaction between state law and private forms of social control and conflict resolution, 
and recognize that law is just one element in a web of constraint on behaviour, some of whose 
stands are barely discernible, and many which are non-governmental. (Gunningham 
et.al.1998:12).  
By these means, regulation is perceived in a more nuanced way, and this enables the 
opportunity to investigate various regulation mechanisms where the state might be one among 
other actors. In addition to the control and command mechanism, Gunningham adds a more 
detailed list of different regulatory mechanisms that have evolved:  
“standards developed by the private sector, self-regulation, monitoring strategies (such as 
environmental audit), economic mechanisms ( for example pollution charges, tax differentials, 
tradable emission rights); insurance based strategies; mechanisms to facilitate public 
involvement; information based strategies (such as communities right to know legislation); 
mechanisms to empower NGOs to scrutinise both regulated entities and regulator; liability 
rules; and citizen suites”. 
(Gunningham1993:142).  
This list underlines the complexity of the situation and the regulatory mix of our time. The 
role of the government within these regulation mechanisms varies, as many of them are 
developed in the private sphere. But even though many regulation mechanisms occur without 
state intervention, it is emphasized that governments should interact. Moreover, crucial 
important for a good policy analysis is not to choose between these two main forms, but to 
                     
10 To perceive state regulation and free market as diametrical opposites might also be seen as the base for the 
difference between the right and the left side in party politics, where generally said the left parties trust in more 
state regulation and the right on the free market. 
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understand the interplay and relation between public and private regulation (Ayers & 
Braithwaite 1992:3, Gunningham & Rees 1997:406). By not taking a stand condemning either 
private or public regulation forms, it will be easier to study how these regulations might work, 
and even supply each other, and that there might exist many vital actors. 
Additionally, the increased interest for regulation can be linked to different changes in society. 
In modernized society, the need for regulation has not decreased; it has rather increased, as for 
instance described by Ulrich Becks “risk society”11. Similarly, Ayres & Braithwaite claim that 
“we are not living in an era of huge deregulation, but in an era where administrative and 
regulatory practices is in a state of flux in which responsive regulatory innovations are 
politically feasible” (Ayers & Braithwaite 1992: 4, 7). This is related to the tendency in the 
1980s when state moved from command and control (top-down policy making and direct 
regulation approaches) to voluntary regulation, and other forms of regulation. These 
statements indicate that a wider understanding of regulation is essential for my thesis, since 
my research question is how the NGOs can influence regulation. First it must allow for the 
including of more actors than the government, and secondly it must acknowledge 
supplementary forms of regulation in addition to “command and control”. Substantially 
covered in the chapter on CSR and self-regulation, it is clear that the ways of conceiving 
business regulations have changed and become more differentiated.  
 
The discussion on governance and regulation demonstrate that there is a large contemporary 
discussion on how these conceptions should be understood. I now have spent much time on 
this discussion because it explains how a wider conception makes it relevant for me to 
investigate the NGOs as actors. Moreover “by focusing on actors, capacities and inter-
relationships, it forces the categorisations of state or self-regulation to be broken down, and a 
more fine grained analysis on the regulatory capacities actors to be formulated” (Black 2003: 
282). Since the NGOs can act in between state and self regulation, their effort might be 
targeting both of these regulation forms and possible other regulation mechanisms. 
 
Moreover, since there is a multitude of mechanisms, business regulation is more complicated 
than a game between two players/actors (the regulatory agency and the firm). In Global 
Business Regulation, Braithwaite & Drahos (2000) describes this multitude of actors involved 
in the regulation of different subjects. It is important to underline that I will not interpret my 
                     
11 Which shortly described emphasises that the new modernity has increased the sensitivity of risk in society, and 
regulation of risks is therefore one of the most important political agendas of our time (Beck 1992) 
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question about how NGOs work towards business as a simple two-sided relation, but I will 
additionally take a closer look on what networks the different actors are part of or have 
created. 
Network regulation theories reminds of Rhodes definition of governance as self-regulative 
networks. Critical voices of such regulation, like for instance Meyer (inspired by Rhodes and 
Powell) draws attention to some general problems of network regulation; “the evolution of 
networks which may challenge the balance needed for successful co-operation, the 
interpersonal relationships between the negotiators that may lead to clique building and 
estrangement from organizational members, and the fact that networks may not always be the 
most efficient“(Meyer in Demirag 2005:13, 41-55).  
The uncertainty and complexity of networks makes it hard to predict and explain outcomes of 
policies and models shaped in networks, and there are probably several empirical examples 
where such issues have yielded negative results. It seems to me that theoretical discussion on 
network governance and regulation tends to be divided between those who focus on the issues 
of democratic decision-making and the nation states (Rhodes), and those who keep an 
international focus and on the redistribution of power creating new possibilities for civil 
society (Rosenau 1992, Bratihwaite & Drahos 2000 etc.). Although states still must be seen as 
the main actors, the NGOs and Green Civil Societies can play central roles. In most literature 
the possibility that government could delegate some of its regulatory tasks and empower 
public interests groups or NGOs is mentioned (Ayers & Braithwaite 1992:158, Gunningham 
1993: 147). E.g. in the field of pollution control, alternative regulatory devices have the 
potential to take the heat off command and control regulations, offer more cost-efficient 
means, improve corporation with companies and provide better compliance information (ibid: 
142).  
The discussions about consequences for states and democracy are important, but not the main 
focus for my thesis. Instead, I want to look more descriptive on how both direct and indirect 
regulation of industry occurs and what the conditions are for weaker actors to interfere. The 
approach emphasizing that regulation of business is not shaped by single actors, but through 
webs of influences, seems fitting to the approach in my thesis.  
 
3.4 Summing up: Regulation of industry affecting the environment 
This chapter has concentrated on general discussions of regulation connected to 
environmental protection. As described earlier, regulation of industry (and individuals) is the 
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most widely used instrument of environmental policy. Historically and theoretically, my 
discussion has taken up different approaches on regulative mechanisms. 
With the broad understanding of regulation that some of the theories have suggested, there 
might be a myriad of diverse actors and mechanisms involved in the regulation of this area. 
Globally, the main actors engaged in environmental regulation of business are the National 
states, the NGOs and Green Civil Society, the business actors and the international 
organizations (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 270-279).  
 
This theoretical chapter has thereby described the current conditions enabling environmental 
NGOs to involve in the regulation of business, and provided arguments for investigate 
different actors. Above all, because of the different ideologies, the changes in regulation 
mechanisms (from command and control to a mix of mechanisms), and the different levels of 
decision making and regulation, new possibilities for involvement of different actors occur. 
Firstly, the changes in ideology towards ecological modernization and concepts of CSR, and 
the weakening of the role of the state, makes regulation of polluting industries a natural 
mission/task for the NGOs. Secondly, the tendency of a more fragmented and networked 
governance and regulation generates possibilities for different actors to find ways of 
intervening. Especially the dissimilation of the command and control mechanism that changed 
the relationship between governments and companies might make the NGOs more influential 
in a different ways. Lastly, the contribution by Braithwaite & Drahos (2000) illustrate that 
globalization might also have altered the roles of the actors and opened for new possibilities 
for NGOs. A closer discussion on exactly what advantages and limitations NGOs can have in 













4. NGOs as regulative actors 
So far, I have focused on discussing new concepts of regulation, and how a wider 
understanding can give room for including more actors. My main aim for the thesis is 
however to look especially close at how NGOs can act directly towards companies and 
industries, and the potential of these groups to act as informal instruments of social control 
(Gunningham et.al. 1998:99). The campaigns I will describe are often initiated by the NGOs 
because the governments are unable or unwilling to act, and the government will therefore not 
be an important actor in my cases, however its position in the background will be taken into 
account.  
So how can I conceptualize the possibilities for NGOs to intervene in direct regulation of 
industry? Before I will describe an outline on strategies for NGOs, I take a closer look at their 
power base compared to the other actors in the game. Giving some consideration as to how 
NGOs generate power is difficult without elaborating the power conceptions dominating this 
thesis. Since my theoretical framework is drawing on contributions from different 
academically traditions (especially economics, organization theory, law, political science and 
sociology), and might entail different conceptions of power, a clarification is necessary. 
Moreover, an insight into what environmental NGOs are, different understandings how they 
function and how they can be conceptualized as actors must first be given. 
This is important to investigate, especially since it can be argued that NGOs are increasingly 
assuming governance functions traditionally conducted by the state, such as standard setting, 
compliance monitoring, and application of sanction to their members (Harrison 2001: 237). 
Gunninhams proposition in “smart Regulation” is that it will be crucial for governments to 
harness resources outside the public sector in furtherance of government policy (Gunninham 
et.al.1998:10). The NGOs might be seen as “third party regulators” in that picture (ibid).  
 
4.1 Approaches describing environmental NGOs 
Globally, there is a tremendous growth in environmental NGOs, and their actions are often 
conceived as essential to most international environmental achievements. Because they are 
differencet in size, duration, range and scope of activities, ideology, cultural background, 
organizational culture and legal status, it is clearly problematic to conceptualize NGOs 
(Princen & Finger 1994:6-8). Such differences will be taken into account when examining the 
two NGOs (the cases) I have chosen.  
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In much literature on NGOs, they are often generalized and described in a social action or 
social movement perspective (Princen & Finger 1994: 1). This could be misleading, and a 
more nuanced and contingent perception of environmental policy-making might be necessary 
in order to discover questions which would not emerge from the perspectives of traditional 
international relations, domestic interest group politics or social movements. At a general 
level, the main theoretical perspectives generally often covers two dominant approaches; top- 
down; which emphasises traditional diplomacy and the states as main actors, and bottom-up 
which emphasises grass roots organizing, participatory decision-making and local self 
reliance (Princen 1994: 29). A limitation to the top–down approach, is that it contains the 
presumption that major states will take the lead in setting the environmental agenda, even if 
evidence suggest the contrary (ibid). Because of the traditional concerns like international 
relations are military security, trade, and monetary relations, sates can even be obstacles to 
change (ibid: 31). Bottom-up approaches also suffer from weaknesses, especially since studies 
with such an approach often are scattered and limited to local projects, and thereby does little 
to arrest larger economic and political forces (ibid: 32). Over time, they may become major 
forces, “but in the environmental area, with synergistic and threshold effects, there is little 
assurance that the magnitude or rates of aggregated change will correspond meaningfully to 
the rates of biopsycial change” (ibid: 33).  
 
The bottom-up perspective is frequently applied in studies of NGO actions, and in line with 
that perspective environmental NGOs are in general being described as part of a “green social 
movement” (e.g. in Bortne, Selle, Strømnes 2002). According to Princten & Finger (1994), 
most social movement theories are based on a Marxist inspiration assuming that the goal for a 
social movement should be to strive for power at the nation-state level, or that their function is 
to strengthen a political system (Finger 1994: 53). Such assumptions do not seem to fit with 
the case of many modern environmental NGOs and with the current political situations where 
the nation-states role is blurred. Moreover, social movement theories are embedded in a 
traditional concept of politics, where citizens were to become enlightened participants in a 
thriving democracy, where social movements functioned as medium to reach this goal (ibid: 
60). The image in the post-modern era reflects incoherence and absence of direction; it is 
unclear where the continuation of this process of post-modernization leads to, and which 
actors have the legitimacy to define its orientation (Finger 1994: 61).” In addition, the global 
crisis has reinforced and accelerated this process towards post-modernism, and this has led 
to more fragmentation, further eroded collective projects and contributed to the 
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multiplication of social environmental actors” (Finger 1994: 61). Given the complexity of 
environmental problems, it seems naturally that there now exist a plurality of environmental 
NGOs with dissimilar goals and approaches instead of a united movement. Carter presents 
typology of four organisational styles environmental NGOs choose: Public interest groups, 
participatory protest organization, professional protest organization and participatory pressure 
groups (Carter 2007:147). This typology will not be a main issue in this thesis, but indicate 
that some NGOs are more professionalized and some more connected to the public.  
In addition, many of the NGOs goals might be more realistically directed at problem-solving, 
instead of creating a movement in order to pressure the nation states towards new policy 
making. The label “new social movements” might be more appropriate (Dryzek 2003: 11-12). 
 
Another effect of a classical approach is that it can miss the link between the local and the 
international, the evolving governance structures, and the role that non-state actors can play 
(Princen 1994: 29). The diplomatic nice NGO occupy neither strictly bottom-up nor top-down 
approaches, but can have roles forging links between the two levels (Princen 1994: 33). For 
example, neither WWF nor Greenpeace are grass-roots organizations (despite their 
promotional claims), or group agents of top-down management (ibid: 33). Still, they resemble 
more a bottom-up than a top-down approach, especially since they do not have top-down 
enforcement power.  
Conceiving the NGOs as parts bottom-up green movement is by this means not appropriate 
approach for my thesis. Another framework for conceptualizing international environmental 
NGOs is to conceive them as “agents for social learning” (Finger 1994: 60). The social 
learning aspect implies that environmental problems are complex problems, which cannot be 
dealt with easily or solved by mode study or more practical data in a top-down manner. 
Instead, societies must “learn their way out of the environmental crisis”, and this learning 
process calls not just for education, but for development of new forms of politics (Princen & 
Finger 1994:10). An assumption connected to this is that NGOs (although not alone) can be 
key actors for such change. Compared with social movements, NGOs are more organized 
(legal, financial and political), and can function as independent actors in relation to 
states/international institutions and local communities (ibid: 11). Another important reason 
why “NGOs assume the critical role of agents of social learning is that governments tend not 
to promote fundamental change, especially change in an economic system dependent on ever-
increasing throughput of resources” (Princen & Finger 1994:11). In this manner, NGOs 
certainly are important actors in global environmental politics, but it must be emphasized that 
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they are not the “solution to environmental crisis”. A premise underlying this is that they 
practice a different kind of politics, in for instance that they disseminate important 
information, which is not necessarily politically neutral (ibid: 12). Basically and instead of 
focusing on traditional politics, environmental NGOs build communities, set examples, and 
increasingly substitute for traditional political action, and by this, they become agents for 
social learning (instead for solely political change like social movements) (ibid: 65).  
 
4.2 The power base of NGOs  
4.2.1 Translation theory of power 
What power base can NGOs have compared to other actors when they interfere as third part 
actors in regulation? In emphasizing network regulation, a “translation theory of power”, 
where power is seen as a process of enrolment of other actors, seems appropriate for 
conceptualizing power possibilities for NGOs (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 275). Behind this 
theory lies the widely recognized idea that power is not something you can possess, but 
something that is created socially (inspired by e.g. Foucault). Compared with “command and 
control regulation” of government, “government exercise rule, governance uses power; with 
each party trying to induce or to force the other party to do certain things it otherwise would 
not have done” (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992: 250). In other words, it is more connected to the 
process where ideas and self-regulatory ideas are formed in social settings or in active 
relations between different actors, instead of the state enforced implementing of an already 
formed rule/law. 
In line with the translation theory, power is instead exercised by “enrolling the capacities of 
others to our purposes” (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 482). The translation part and the 
communication between the actors are therefore central. Consequently, “power is conceived 
in terms of networks and alliances whereby centres of calculation exercise governance at a 
distance” (ibid: 482). 
By building and engaging in networks with other actors, NGOs can in line with this theory 
enrol their agendas and discourses in the networks, and thereby influence other actors. This 
theory seems similar to what Selznick defines as cooptation: “cooptation is the process of 
absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determine structure of an organization 
as a means of adverting threats to its stability or existence” (Selznick 1948:34). However, 
cooptation seems to signify situations where organizations interpret elements that more in-
depth change their structure and meaning, while enrolling agendas might not change the 
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organization to the same degree. Moreover, while co-optation seem to be a danger for the 
weakest parts of unendingly adopt internal changes, enrolling gives more association to 
possibilities for parts to actively fitting own goals into a broader network, so that other actors 
might absorb these goals. Thereby, co-opting seems to be a more appropriate concept when 
there are only two actors confronting each other, not a network of different actors. However, 
the problems dangers of co-opting, and the problem of who is enrolling what, have to be taken 
into account when studying relations between actors.  
 
4.2.2 Mapping networks of regulation: Enrolment analysis:  
Further, in an enrolment analysis, the dimensions of distribution of regulatory functions 
between the actors, and the character of enrolment should be studied (Black 2003:273). An 
example of enrolment of both governmental and other actors in the regulatory process is in the 
function of standard setting (ibid). Moreover, actors might be enrolled in the regulatory 
process at different stages; in the information gathering process, in the information dispersal 
and verification, in the function of imposing sanctions and in performing the regulatory 
functions (ibid: 274-275). NGOs might therefore be included both as information giving and 
verifying actors (e.g about environmentally friendly processes), or/and as third party 
regulators or sanctioning actors. Further, a number of different relationships may be involved; 
mutual dependency, networks hierarchical, contracting, or a combination (Black 2003:275).  
In addition to engaging at different stages and establishing various relationships, there exist 
various types of regulatory tools: written norms (legal and non-legal) and accompanying 
sanctions, economic or market based instruments, social norms and accompanying sanctions, 
technologies and processes12 (Black 2003: 256-258).  
However, Black argues that an enrolment analysis is better equipped to study the complexity 
of regulation than the standard “toolkit analysis” (ibid: 256): “With a decentralized 
perception of regulation, an enrolment analysis provides a mapping device which facilitates a 
more nuanced analysis of regulatory fragmentation” (Black 2003: 253). Such an enrolment 
analysis focuses on actors, their regulatory capacities, the regulatory functions which they 
could perform, their interrelationships, and the way in which they are or could be enrolled 
                     
12 The first three tools are familiar categories of regulatory tools, together with their accompanying sanctions 
(Black 2003: 258). Technologies (inspired by Rose & Miller) and processes is on the other hand less familiar, 
technology meaning “the specialist understanding of and ability to employ, manipulate, calculate, measure or 
alter the physical, economic or human environment and the products of understanding” ( ibid: 258). Process is a 
category where the process might be a goal in itself, when for instance it is important that certain dictions are 
made by certain actors and not necessarily what decision they make (ibid: 259). 
 
 33 
within a regulatory system (Black 2003:253, 262). It asks what regulatory capacities they 
possess, how those might change over time, and thus what regulatory functions they might be 
best placed to perform (ibid:262). In addition it facilitates both pragmatic and normative 
assessments of a regulatory system (ibid: 262). The main actors of interest in this thesis are 
the two NGOs. What regulatory capacities they might have, and they way they try to enrol 
into a regulatory system will therefore be a starting point in the analysis. But first, more 
theoretical interpretations on what role the NGOs might have compared to other actors will be 
outlined. 
 
4.4.3 NGOs capacity compared to other actors: 
Already in the 1980s it was stated that initiatives for international cooperation on 
environmental issues have almost invariably arisen outside governmental bureaucracies 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000:271). Even if it is not necessarily the international cooperation I 
am looking at in the first place, this observation implies that civil society has an important 
role. 
When it comes to the relation between NGOs and companies, the power relation between 
them seems quite asymmetrical at first sight. Generally, the basis for business power is that 
they control the money, while the bases for government’s power are that they control the law 
and the guns (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 611). On the other hand, the political power the 
NGOs control classically comes directly from the sovereignty of citizens and their legitimacy 
in society (ibid: 611). Still, even if NGOs seems to be the weakest elements in the web of 
influences that shape business behaviour, it must be kept in mind that no single player or 
mechanism ever brings out global regulatory change alone (ibid: 612). As outlined in the 
different chapters above, the organizing of environmental politics is constantly changing, and 
creating new links and new possibilities. Describing that regulation of business works through 
webs of regulation and not only through the main actors of governments, gives the NGOs the 
opportunity to have an impact.  
One way of conceptualizing and comparing the NGOs to other actors, is to illustrate their 
regulatory capacities. Regulatory capacity is the actual or potential possession of resources 
which according to Black are; information, expertise, financial resources, authority and 
legitimacy, strategic position and organizational capacity (Black 2003:263). Following this, a 
short outline on NGOs regulatory capacities will be given: 
- Financial recourses: NGOs are not profit seeking like companies, and the income is always 
uncertain because it depends on the willingness of other actors to donate money: state 
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(governmental support), society (membership payments and donations) or business 
(sponsorships, donations). Their financial resources are therefore usually limited, uncertain 
and much smaller that other significant actors 
- Legitimacy: is often claimed that legitimacy is one of the most central issues to modern 
NGO assets (Princten & Finger 1994: 34, Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 611). The legitimacy 
NGOs has in society is high, for instance, a German study showed that society puts more trust 
in Greenpeace than in political parties, media or the church (Beck 2004:148). Their legitimacy 
is seen in connection with the autonomy they have in taking clear positions on environmental 
matters and that they can have a have single issued focus (Princten & Finger 1994: 35). NGOs 
do obviously not have much formal authority compared to states, and the authority they 
possess might be based on their other capacities like their specialised knowledge.  
- Organizational capacity: The transnational character of NGOs is another important aspect, 
which can be connected to the organizational capacity. The advance of being part of 
international networks in an environmental in talking about global environmental problems, 
as they do not have to be constrained by national interests (Princten & Finger 1994: 36).  
- Expertise: The regulative resource of possessing knowledge and create communication 
needs more discussion. Historically, the capacity to control and use knowledge, is a basis for 
the strong dominating the weak (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 5). For the NGOs to engage in 
regulation and act towards powerful actors, their knowledge base must be professional. 
Professionalization of NGOs has given the NGOs strong knowledge bases, and knowledge is 
often understood to be an important power resource. It might even be claimed, that the power 
and legitimacy base of the NGOs from has changed from grass-root mobilization power to 
knowledge power. This makes it possible for them to become parts of knowledge networks 
and through them engage in regulation of business, and their acknowledgement from other 
actors (especially states and companies) might therefore be based on the acknowledgement of 
the knowledge they possess, and not only the classical sovereignty of society. It seems that 
from being a civil green movement, “green civil society” has evolved towards plural NGOs as 
expert and interests organizations. Contrasted with experts working in government institutions 
(like for example the Ministry of Environment), the experts working for environmental NGOs 
might have more autonomy to collect and develop knowledge, without steering from above. 
The expertise and knowledge the NGOs possess can vary, from detailed natural science on 
example threatened species, to knowledge about society, political processes and legislation.  
- Strategic position: A bargaining tool that is more based on knowledge is that NGO can 
provide important information and knowledge via their research or their ties to indigenous and 
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agricultural communities (Princten & Finger 1994: 34). Such knowledge can be vital for both 
states, international institutions and business, and they often turn to NGOs for comments or 
expertise on special topics. The ‘bargain’ leverage that defines their political niche is used to 
gain access to decision- making – governmental, intergovernmental and corporate – and 
second to engage directly in the formation and reform of international institutions (Princen & 
Finger 1994:36). The NGOs can assert influence on corporations by prepared proposals, and 
if they have additional asserts to offer – expertise, grass-root support, a transnational base or 
network, the ability to rectify information imbalances, and above all, legitimacy – they carry 
even more weight; they can actually bargain (ibid:37). Their bargaining tools are not building 
on traditional power resources. Instead, a powerful and common tool for the NGO is for 
example to command media attention (Princten & Finger 1994: 34). NGOs have often better 
chances for media coverage than big public organizations, through for example illustrative 
actions, and this way they can deliberate their opinions to society. A second tool for is to 
NGO promote communication and muster support, or opposition for environmental politics, 
and for example create lobby networks (ibid: 34). Both this two first tools shows that the 
NGOs, even if not conceived as social movements, still have a special connection to society 
and still can mobilize and muster support. In connection to power in communication, NGOs 
capacity to make use of new technologies and internet is also a significant (Bendell 2000:21). 
 
4.2.4 Modelling and creating social learning in webs of regulation:  
Clearly the NGOs do not have the same resources than the most visual regulative actors (the 
State and companies) and are in many cases weak actors. But when considering their strategic 
positions, expertise and autonomy of taking stands into account, these capacities increase the 
chances for enrolling other actors into their agenda. Thereby, according to Princen & Finger 
(1994), they can contribute to shape regulation and create learning by:  
1) Framing environmental issues, by help establishing a common language or world-views  
2) Building communities, by organizing and involving citizens in concrete projects at a local 
level.  
3) Building coalitions/networks among communities and across regions and actions and 
setting examples and substituting for governmental action 
(Princen & Finger1994: 226-228).  
 
How the NGOs contribute to social learning by enrolling new ideas and models in global 
networks of regulation is in a similar vein described by Braitwaite & Drahos (2000) 
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discussion on webs of influence13  (ibid: 7). Dialogic webs include for example mechanisms 
like dialogue in professional associations, self-regulatory dialogue in industry associations 
and naming and shaming of irresponsible corporate practices by NGOs (Braithwaite & 
Drahos 2000: 553). The last mechanism is a classical way of NGOs to influence corporations, 
by for example naming the worst companies in media, threatening with boycott campaigns, 
whereby they might also increase competition between companies. On the other hand, there 
has lately been much literature focusing on dialogue, not only because dialogue can give 
outcomes, but because it can strengthen both the knowledge base and trust among the actors 
participating: “Through dialogic webs actors discover the state of their relations with others, 
as well as information about relations between others, reduce uncertainty, and heighten the 
probability that the norms established by means of the web will be internalized by actors who 
are part of the web “(ibid: 562, 563).  
The social learning aspect (emphasised by Princten & finger 1994) seems to be significant 
here, in addition to reducing risks.  
One way for the NGOs to enrol actors into their purposes, is to create models which they 
propose to different networks or regimes. Especially for NGOs which have meagre resources 
a rational strategy is to run many campaigns with half-baked off-shore models (Braithwaite & 
Drahos 2000:588). Similarly to viewing the strengths of NGOs their ability to create social 
learning, modelling also contains an innovative element, because it contains observational 
learning with a symbolic content, not just an imitation (ibid: 580). “Modelling is therefore 
defined as actions that constitute a process of displaying, symbolically interpreting and 
copying conceptions of action. A model is a conception of action that is put in display during 
such a process of modelling” (ibid: 581).  
The power of a model is that when taken seriously can sets the framework of the debate and it 
can thereby influence regulatory outcomes indirectly. Moreover, because models are 
information, can be distributed quickly and at little cost (ibid: 588) 
 
In the field of global environmental regulation, NGOs can according to Braithwaite & Drahos 
act as “model mongers, hawking models of environmental change from one bureaucracy to 
another, from one state to another, until they capture a powerful bureaucracy which will 
champion their model” (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 271). Especially if disasters strike (for 
                     
13 They differentiate between webs of coercion and dialogic webs, but in this thesis the dialogic webs are the 
most crucial since webs of reward and coercion (like ex military or economic coercion) are less preferred as 
webs of dialogue by most actors, and mostly considered when dialogue fails (ibid: 557). 
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example oil spills) which mobilizes concern among public, ready frameworks or models for 
solutions created by NGOs can play a significant role (ibid: 272). Connected to climate 
change whereby disasters might strike more frequently, quick solutions are vital.  
But also because of competition between states or between companies of being the most 
environmental conscious and taking the lead, they are more likely to adopt models created by 
environmental NGOs. Model mongering is an effective strategy for weaker groups in global 
regulation politics, because it minimizes development costs and maximises reform 
opportunities by transmitting many models through political networks (ibid: 589). “Model 
mongering minimises development costs and maximises reform opportunities by transmitting 
many models through political networks” (ibid: 589). Because of the NGOs specialized 
knowledge and their connections to local and international society, it can thereby be assumed 
that the models they create are different than those of a state.  
Furthermore, NGOs can enhance the transparently of dominant actors; states, 
intergovernmental organizations and transnational corporations, by monitoring them and 
publishing information about them (Princen 1994: 35). E.g. have many NGOs and research 
centres have launched “business watch institutes” which monitor corporations globally 14 
 
The theoretical contributions discussed so far are mainly directed at the NGOs as actors 
towards national or international legislation, and intervene in the regulation process more 
indirectly. However, I believe the learning and creating models aspect also is important when 
acting towards companies. For example, in a relation between a NGO and a company, the 
company might have economical recourses, but the NGO can have political, cultural and 
knowledge-based power (Arts 2002: 32). Strength for the NGOs can be their capability of 
communicating their values to a larger public, and their strong knowledge of environmental 
issues (ibid: 32). Especially connected to the professionalizing, centralizing and 
bureaucratizing which entail the less mass mobilization potency, this perspective seems fitting. 
Moreover, it seems to be in line with the theories which emphasizing more fragmented actor 
models of governance and regulation through networks.  
Because the NGOs can take part and enrol their agendas in various regulative processes, it can 
be argued that NGOs have the possibility to act as surrogate/third party regulators or co-
                     
14. The most well known might be “Publish What You Pay”, which is a “coalition of over 300 NGOs worldwide, 
which calls for the mandatory disclosure of the payments made by oil, gas and mining companies to all 
governments for the extraction of natural resources, and in addition calls on resource-rich developing country 
governments to publish full details on revenues”  
(www.publishwhatyoupay.org)  
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regulators (Gunninham et.al 1998: 94-95). The contributions that are listed here are: 
“educating the community, providing information to regulators and regulatees, fulfilling the 
watchdog role, acting as private enforces, seeking compensation or preventing harm, and 
reforming the law” (Gunningham et.al.1998:95) 
 
4.3 NGOs direct strategies towards industry and companies:  
Historically, an alteration of the role of NGOs essential to my thesis is that they are 
increasingly involving themselves directly with private business (some of them cooperate 
more with companies than with the state). As pointed out by Hanf & Jansen, NGOs classically 
used to work towards the public administration and institutions to reach their aims, and their 
relation towards private industry was either to keep it at a distance (not get to much involved) 
or confrontation (Bastmeijer and Verchuuren 2005: 315). Since the trend now is industrial self 
regulation (as shown in last chapter), it seems that many NGOs now concentrate more on 
intervening with industry directly. This development can be perceived in different ways, one 
is that the relation between NGOs and private industry can play an important role in all the 
elements in the regulative chain of environmental politics: norm setting, implementation, 
monitoring, enforcement and dispute resolution (ibid: 326). Further, by interacting directly, 
the NGOs seem to take a role which public institutions should have played, even if their 
capacities obviously not are the same (ibid: 327). Monitoring or policing the code as a 
complement or alternative to government involvement, and it is actually arguable that self-
regulation is rarely effective without such involvement (Gunningham & Reeds 1997: 402). 
 
More specifically, how can environmental NGOs practically interact in the self-regulation of 
business? NGOs may contribute directly in regulation, through involvement in administration 
of the code itself, or taking direct action against firms that breach the regulatory program 
(Gunningham & Reeds 1997: 403).  
Returning to my cases, different models describing how NGOs act directly towards 
companies will give a more empirical related framework to study how they generate power, 
regulate and create learning. In connection to the new governance and regulation mechanisms 
discussed, a deeper outline about such mechanisms is needed. A prior model for the different 
relations which between NGOs and companies (mentioned in section 3.2), is that NGOs as 
actors can take either a watchdog or a partnership approach: 
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4.3.1 The Watchdog strategy:  
Monitoring of the companies: This approach can be said to be more fundamental and classical, 
keeping business at a distance, and working more towards pressuring state and legislation to 
create change. This strategy includes tactics like boycott campaigns, publishing of critical 
research (naming and shaming), strikes, court action, and lobbying for legislation (Bendell 
2000: 243). All of these tactics are highly confrontational towards the companies, and are 
clearly expressing scepticism regarding their motives. Historically, companies have been 
considered as “the bad guys“ by the environmental movement and clashes between them 
occurred (Arts 2002:26) A well known example is the Brent Spar case in 1995 where 
Greenpeace demonstrated heavily against the dumping of this oil platform planned by Shell 
(ibid). Obviously, this approach is largely operating outside the market, and might therefore 
have to rely on voluntary donations of time, resources and money. Keeping a critical eye on 
the operations of business, “naming and shaming” of irresponsible corporate practices is a 
significant tactic where NGOs take advantage of the expectations of CSR (Vogel 2005:9).  By 
increasing transparency and publishing material this strategy might enrol the NGOs aims into 
a wider society, where a variety of actors agree on the moral assumption that companies 
should take more responsibility. When a large amount of actors and consumers have taken up 
this normative stand, the pressure towards companies increase, and they might feel forced to 
change.  
 
4.3.2 The Partnerships strategy  
Partnerships are basically collaborations between NGOs and companies in order to generate 
sustainable business. This approach includes tactics like negotiation agreements with 
corporate management, advising companies on best practices, endorsing or promoting best 
practices, conducting and publishing helpful research, or jointly developing new products or 
techniques (Bendell 2000: 244). They can be defined as “collaborative partnerships between 
environmental NGOs and business that pursue mutually beneficial ecological goals” (Arts 
2002: 28). A goal for that strategy is thereby that NGO make use of its expertise and advice 
the company towards a more environmentally friendly management and methods of 
production. This more recent approach absents interference of the government, and matches 
with the tendency pluralistic and private self-governance (Arts 2002: 30). While the NGO 
may achieve more environmental gains than through cooperating with government, the 
reasons for such alliances for companies is to raise new business opportunities, improve 
performance and enhance their reputation (ibid: 28). Cooperation can help the best companies 
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by giving them a strategic advantage, and raising the bar for other companies to improve 
accordingly (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 279). Due to the prevailing disappointment of 
government’s efforts by both NGO and business, there is a constant emergence of green 
alliances. For environmental NGOs, governments are not efficient enough, too bureaucratic, 
are giving vague frameworks for the industries and display a lack of implementation (Arts 
2002: 28). Companies, on the other hand, consider state regulations as inefficient, to broadly 
formulated, to costly and hindering innovation (ibid: 28). Partnerships are therefore good 
alternatives for businesses, both because they are themselves partly designing the policies 
they implement (which give more efficiency), and because legitimacy and credibility is 
granted by the NGOs (ibid: 28).  
By this strategy, the NGO can enrol industrial actors into their agenda more directly, by 
encouraging companies and setting a friendlier tone.  
 
4.3.3 A nuanced view at the model:  
NGOs can move from a confrontational approach to dialogue and partnerships. The example 
with Brent Spar is illustrating, where Greenpeace went into dialogue with Shell after the 
confrontation (Arts 2002:27). Many partnerships have actually developed from confrontation 
to dialogue and proceed with project-based cooperation (ibid: 33).  
Academically, there seems to be a great interest for the partnership approach. After revising 
literature on the relationship between NGOs and business/companies, it seems that a lot of 
recent contributions embrace the partnership tendency and give advice to further partnership 
projects (like in Lange, Spissøy, Brudvik 2000: 44). A very optimistic perception of this 
tendency can be seen the statement from 1989 by the economist Elkington: “because of the 
positive green development in the market, the 1990s will surely become the green century” 
(Elkington 1989: 285) 15. More moderate but optimistic16  perspectives on such alliances 
embraces them as promising alternatives to state regulative, with a business angle on the 
flexibility and cost-effectiveness (Arts 2002: 28). Sometimes, the academically contributions 
tend to focus mainly on how such partnerships work out for companies, and do not look at 
consequences for the NGOs, the state or environmental conservation17.  However, it has been 
                     
15 Economist working for SustaiAbility, collaborating with Bendell 
 
17Noticeably, there is some confusion in definitions and usages of concepts. The definitions by Lange, Spissøy, 
Brudvik 2000, on the word “partnership” can be questioned, as it was understood differently by the NGOs. Also, 
their use of the term “voluntary organizations” is not so fitting for all NGOs, because some of them, like Bellona, 
WWF and RF, are foundations and are not really based on voluntary membership. Instead, they can be termed 
“interest organizations”. 
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concluded that partnerships between NGOs and companies in many cases are not real 
collaboration projects, but only function as sponsorships of NGOs (Lange, Spissøy, Brudvik 
2000: 43). This implies that there is not one standard way of organizing partnerships, and that 
their success varies to a great extent. Probably, in a partnership where the company only 
sponsors the NGO and dialogue is more or less absent, the partnership will not produce 
significant changes within the company structure towards more environmentally sustainable 
practices. 
Pessimistic commentators do not consider partnerships as possible substitutes for government 
regulation, and focuses on issues like bottlenecks in coalition formation, power relations, rules 
of the game and discourses in green alliances (Arts 2002: 28). The problematic feature of 
“Green Washing” is large when NGOs morally support companies. Moreover, too close 
partnerships with companies can be dangerous for the survival of a NGO, and can lead loss of 
legitimacy. Furthermore, if all environmental NGOs were to engage in partnerships, would 
not the watchdog role then disappear? Because they might depend on each other, both 
approaches are probably equally necessary, thus it is vital that both are respected and 
conserved.  
 
Civil regulation, certification and using market tactics  
There are many different models trying to conceptualize the relation between NGOs and 
industries. Elaborating on the main separation of collaboration or confrontation, Bendell 
(2000:243) establish a model for how NGOs can change corporate behaviour by mobilizing 
consumer politics. The model is inspired by Rosenaus thoughts on governance, Bendell 
employ the term “civil regulation”, suggesting that “NGO campaigns are constructing a new 
emerging form of regulation for international corporations” (Bendell 2000:246). This 
assumption seems to be in line with the wide conception of regulation where NGOs can 
intervene in at various stages but also create new models. 
The model that Bendell suggests includes four tactics: forcing, promoting, facilitating and 
producing change (Bendell 2000). Being divided between four directions; inside or outside 
markets, confrontational or collaborative style, all these include activities that mobilize 
consumer politics in order to change corporate practices (ibid: 243). This model seems to fit 
with the model described in last section, but might be elaborating, suggestion also a third 
strategy; facilitating or providing change in the market by providing alternative production 
systems. Operating inside the market, the third approach would be for NGOs to provide 
services that facilitate change (ibid: 244). One example is to provide consultancy services that 
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aim to help corporations with processes of change. Another well discussed example is to run 
certification systems, such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)18 which sets standards for 
“sustainable timber” through a multi-stakeholder processes (ibid: 244). This strategy might 
therefore be labelled “green alliances”, including many actors both in the market and in 
society. The entry point for relations are often forcing change, but the trend of facilitating 
change is strong, particularly with the trend of establishing multi stakeholder accreditation 
councils (ibid).  
This approach might be placed in between watchdog and partnership, because it is not a two 
sided partnership between a company and a NGO, but it includes dialogue between many 
actors, both in the market and in civil society. However, naming and shaming campaigns also 
contain the civil regulation aspect by threatening with consumer boycotts. An important point, 
that also many NGOs seem to agree with, is that green alliances can be innovative, but that 
after some time, government should get involved19.  
 
Last and not least, the indications that regulations often are taking place at a global level must 
also be taken into account. As already have been indicated, NGOs can play significant roles 
also in global regulations, both because of their strategic positions and international networks. 
As noted by Vogel & Kagan (2004), in most cases it is dominant governments that push other 
states to implement stricter regulations, but in some cases: “the pressure for diffusion of 
regulatory standards come solely through NGOs, using international forums to generate 
normative expectations that regulatory laggards feel politically obligated to meet” (Vogen & 
Kagan 2005:36). This reminds of how Braithwaite & Drahos (2000) described that NGOs can 
act as model mongers, creating alternative innovative models pushed forward in global 
competitive situations. 
 
4.4 Summary of theoretical implications: conditions for NGO involvement 
The contextual changes in environmental politics have also shaped inter-organisational 
changes within NGOs, making them increasingly specialized, knowledge based and 
internationally adapted. An organizational structure which to a lesser degree is hierarchical 
                     
18 Many academically articles seem to have used FSC as case, see e.g. : (Bendell 2000: 24, 26, 244, Arts 2002: 
31-32, Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 282, Hoffamn & Ventresca 2002, Guldbarndsen 2005:397) 
 
19 In Norway this has been some discussion on certification, and many assume that the government has to take 
part see e.g.  Stokke, Olav Schram, Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Alf Håkon Hoel and Jonette Braathen (2004) 
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and democratic, can give the organizations flexibility, innovative advantages and a more 
direct problem-solving capability. Compared to other actors, the NGOs are weak when it 
comes to practical resources, and their power lies more in their ability to create and push 
forward models and create learning that shape the regulatory outcomes. 
The main research question was asking how NGOs can have some influence on regulation of 
industry. After the theoretical discussion, a more nuanced model for regulative approaches 
has occurred, and this model has guided my research. This model regarding strategies presents 
mainly two different options for NGOs to intervene with regulations. The first option is to 
intervene directly (partnerships), by becoming central “third parties” in the self-regulating of 
the companies, and enrol the discourse of environmental protection into the company based 
on their knowledge and legitimacy. The second option is to maintain a distance, build 
pressure networks, and create own models of protection. However, the theoretical discussions 
have also indicated that there might be other strategies, and that the line between the two main 
strategies not always is to clear. Moreover, the fact that NGOs probably can make uses of 
more than one strategy, and enclose different understandings and implications of the strategies 
is also included in the study. Since my thesis is a comparative case study, the special features 
and the interpretations the indebt study will give is more significant than placing the cases 



















5 The Norwegian context and Norwegian NGOs 
The two theoretical chapters presenting a wide conception of regulation strategies gives me 
the possibility to investigate alternative strategies that NGOs apply in addition to lobbyism 
towards the state. However, there are two problematic implications with the theories I have 
chosen to take into account: First, the theories originate from various disciplines, like 
sociology, and law, and they thereby might present various perspectives.  
Second, most of the theories have developed in other countries that Norway. This last issue 
will now be taken into account, and I will underline the Norwegian context for environmental 
politics, with a special focus on the relations and characters of the Norwegian state, business 
and NGOs. These features might provide a different context for NGOs to intervene than 
assumed in the theories developed with empirical focus on other countries. Even if they 
approach global environmental issues, the Norwegian political context can shape their 
relations to state and market and thereby provide some particular conditions and limitations. 
How environmental conservation is interpreted and organized is affected by historical 
contexts and changes in ideology/discourses, in the organization of state and interest 
organizations in Norway, and in relations between business, states, civil society and global 
politics.  
 
5.1 The organization of Environmental politics  
The Norwegian State is often described as strong, and the government has for a long period 
been engaged in environmental protection. In Hanf and Jansens ”Governance and 
Environment in Western Europe” (1998), a historical outline is drawn on how environmental 
politics became important policy fields for governments in Europe. In Norway, the roots of 
environmental politics can be traced back to the beginning of the 1900s, with traditions of 
nature conservation and protection of cultural heritage and public health (Jansen & 
Mydske1998:182). The earliest environmentally concerned political entrepreneurs were 
scientists and historians, who initiated and activated interest organizations and persuaded the 
government to develop policies (ibid: 182). Establishing laws that restricted the use of nature, 
like establishing national parks was a central environmental task, and these establishments 
where carried out as governmental command and control mechanisms.  
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Political interest for environmental protection has been periodical. As a political subject for 
the state, a key year was 1972, when the Norwegian Ministry of Environment 
(Miljøverndepartementet) was established (ibid: 183). The tasks were to: “Co-ordinate 
policies for pollution control, psychical –economic planning, nature conservation and open 
air recreation, and international environmental co-operation within the general policy of 
“growth with conservation” (Jansen & Mydske1998: 183). Thereby, the ministry would 
function as a control mechanism with public officials controlling that legislation got 
implemented, and naturally giving expertise advice to government about environmental 
matters, but also function as a link between interest groups and government. 
Simultaneously with the establishment of the Ministry, the Norwegian state became an 
important international actor for the case of environmental protection (at least symbolically) 
(ibid 196). From the 1980s, there was an increase in attention given to environmental matters, 
much due to the “Brundtland Commission’s” report “Our Common Future” which 
emphasised the policy of “sustainable development” (Jansen & Mydske1998: 185). Since the 
publishing of this report, Norwegian politicians have repeatedly declared Norway to be a 
“driving force” for global environmental negotiations, although many environmental NGOs 
would strongly disagree.  
A key conclusion on the role of the Ministry of Environment in Norway is that its powers are 
downplayed by other ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Oil 
and Energy (Jansen & Mydske1998: 202). Because the logics of economical and resource 
developments that these ministries embody are heavily institutionalized, they tend to be more 
recognized by the politicians and perceived as central to national politics (ibid: 202). 
Consequently, the balance between economic development and environmental protection is 
grid-locked; the politicians tend to prioritize economic development (ibid: 202). This implies 
that the state’s implementation of the important principle “sustainable development” is not 
taken seriously if it collides with principles of economic growth (or, the principle is reduced 
to “economic development with some sustainability”). This is evident in the problematic issue 
of oil production. Oil industry is one of Norway’s most important income sources, at the same 
time one of the most harmful industries for the environment. On this issue, the 
environmentalist’s potential for mobilization was reduced since a dominant coalition between 
government and industry20 gave room for political manoeuvrings and avoided confrontation 
(Hanf & Jansen 1998:283). Moreover, the Ministry of Environment might have been reduced  
                     
20 The coalition included the Labour government, the Labour Party and the Confederation of Trade Unions 
together with the Conservative Party and the Confederation of Industries (Hanf & Jansen 1998:283). 
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since the end of the 1980s because the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Oil and Energy 
have had a larger say on environmental matters in which Norway’s petroleum resources are 
involved (Jansen & Mydske1998:189).  
 
Another critique of the Ministry of Environment is that it functions as a buffer between 
environmental interest groups and the government. This problem can be linked to a 
description of the Norwegian political arena as a corporatist and segmented. The thesis about 
the segmented state describe how actors with similarly interest (e.g. ministries, interest 
organizations and industries) have organized politically together as a segment, getting 
political hegemony over the sector of their interest (Rommetvedt 2002 (he disagrees)). If 
political actors only relate to their segment, they will not have influence and the chance to 
control other segments. The problem with environmental protection is that it concerns many 
areas, and when organized in an own ministry, the issues that are organized into other 
departments (like oil and energy), might avoid being affected by the Ministry of Environment. 
For my thesis, a main problematical issue with the Ministry of Environment is that it can 
become a buffer for environmental NGOs, because since they relate mostly to this ministry 
they might not gain influence on significant areas like oil and energy that are connected to 
other ministries. 
 
5.2 Norwegian NGOs: in the arms of the state? 
Compared to other countries, the membership number of the environmental NGOs is low and 
the “environmental movement” has no clear core that connects the NGOs together (Strømsnes 
& Selle 1996:266). Thereby, the environmental NGOs cannot be said to be parts of a “mass 
environmental movement” (ibid). There exist 34 national environmental interest 
organizations21. Certainly, the difference in size, age, organizational structure, ideology base 
and approach varies to a great extent. Historically, they can be divided in tree categories, 
classical environmental protection organizations concerned with issues like preservation of 
nature, organizations that emerged in the 1970s when “new social movements” building on 
eco-philosophy, and organizations that emerged in the 1980s and 90s with a more 
professionalized approach that were solution oriented towards issues like air-pollution 
(Strømnes & Selle 1996).  
                     




In Norwegian environmental politics, NGOs have played significant roles as initiative takers 
and as experts in the establishment of the Ministry of Environment, and many still work 
closely with (or towards) the public institutions (Jansen & Mydske 1998:183). However, as 
the Ministry of Environment became the central actor in setting the framework conditions of 
environmental protection, the NGOs efforts changed from demanding standards towards 
adjusting the conditions that the government decided (Strømsnes & Selle 1996:276). The 
close cooperation the Norwegian NGOs have had and still have with governmental 
institutions can have given different implications for both their achievements and their 
organizational formations:  
 
First, it can be argued that the active inclusive Norwegian state may have co-opted the 
environmental cases and movement. The political culture in Norway can be characterised by a 
consensus-corporatist style of policy making, and this can also be seen in the environmental 
policy field (Jansen and Mydske 1998:188). Moreover, Norwegian society can be 
characterized ad “state friendly”, leading to that organizations turn towards the government 
and not away from it, and that diverse issues relatively fast gets connected to or co-opted by 
the public institutions (Strømsnes & Selle 1996:275). By this means, the relationship between 
the State and civil society in Norway has traditions of being cooperative, and there have not 
been many clashes between environmental activists and state compared to many other 
countries (Dryzek, Downes, Hunold, Schlosberg and Hernes 2003). The Norwegian State can 
be conceived as corporatist, active and inclusive towards societal interest since public officials 
actively include interests groups in governmental processes by e.g. inviting them to take part 
in committees (Dryzek et.al. 2003:8). This features can be interpreted as positive democratic 
elements, and it might be linked to what Gunningham describes as a vital strategy for 
governments to achieve “smart regulation” (Gunningham et.al. 1998).  
But the problematical features are both the danger for NGOs to become co-opted by the state 
and thereby loosing their autonomy, and that it can be hard to start a social movement in since 
the State usually gets there first (Dryzek et.al. 2003: 8). An illustrating case of the active state 
is made in a PHD dissertation, where the Ministry of Environment initiated project of 
voluntary recycling which was implemented in a top-down manner into a group of citizens, in 
order to raise their environmental awareness (Bregnballe 2005).  
 
Compared to the US, the environmental arena in Norway is dominated by a smaller number of 
groups, all pursuing highly co-operative relationships with the state (Dryzek et.al 2003: 18). 
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This could be a reason why there has not been a very active mobilization and protests 
campaigns against governmental projects, except for the protests against the Marøla dam and 
the Alta dam in 1970s ( ibid: 25). Since the Norwegian state been cooperative with the oil 
industry, Dryzek finds it odd that environmental NGOs not have demonstrated more. Here he 
might have overlooked the fact that there were heavy demonstrations against the oil drilling in 
the North Sea, but these demonstrations were directed at the oil companies and not the 
government which were the ones giving licence to the companies. 
The constraints that a close cooperative relationships with the state can generate are basically 
less radicalism and a more moderate movement, and it seems that Norwegian 
environmentalists are not even aware this problems (Dryzek et.al 2003:87).  
Another problem linked to an active government is that it can decide which committees the 
NGOs can participate in; thereby giving guidelines for what interests the NGOs should take 
into account. One might thereby imagine that the government can exclude the NGOs from 
important environmental cases by distracting them with other tasks, especially when it seems 
that the NGOs to a certain degree have been ignored in the questions about oil industry. 
 
Secondly, the NGOs have also changed their internal organizational structures. Also 
Norwegian NGOs can fit to the tendency that many have described as a centralization, 
bureaucratization and professionalization of environmental NGOs (Carter 2007:144, Jansen & 
Mydske 1998:187, Strømnes & Selle 1996). It can be conceived as a paradox that while the 
NGOs succeeded in making environmental authorities in Norway accept their policy and 
points of view, their platform for mobilization eroded (Jansen & Mydske1998: 187). A reason 
for the bureaucratization and professionalization can be that since they in a greater manner 
concentrated on negotiating with the Public Administration, they modelled themselves after 
characteristics inherent in the administrations they interacted with (Hanf & Jansen 1998:188). 
Many NGOs tended towards a more formalized approach, and members became less 
important. In this way they distanced themselves from the grass root level, and to describe 
them as a part of a green social movement is therefore inappropriate.  
On the other hand, the professionalization might have given them directions for problem-
solving and thereby a clearer appearance externally. Additionally, in the context of what often 
is referred to as the “knowledge society”, specialized and formalized knowledge is vital for 
the legitimacy of any political organization. “Scientific legitimating” seems to be extra 
important to the environmental field, and simultaneously as organizations employ ever more 
scientific experts, there is an increased tendency to refer to “what the science says” 
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(Strømsnes & Selle 1996:268). Another change in the internal organizational features of 
NGOs is that they tend organize as foundations and not as democratic organizations with 
elected members (Bortne, Selle, Strømnes 2002: 117, 133)22.  
 
5.3 Norwegian industries and NGO relations 
There is not so much literature on how CSR is carried out in Norway and how the relation 
between NGOs and companies function in this picture. In a short review, Munkelien and 
Goyer (2005) argue that there is little knowledge among companies on the CRS issue, and 
that it is perceived that the government should take a lead on that issue (Munkelien and Goyer 
2005: 188). The interviews with companies in that review signified that the representatives 
from the corporations missed a stronger and clearer governmental engagement covering the 
entire CSR agenda (ibid: 194). Moreover, CRS often is perceived to be mostly relevant when 
doing business in developing countries (ibid). The environmental part of CSR, what 
responsibility the companies have for taking care of the pollution they cause, was not much 
outspoken.  
Nevertheless, there seems to be a “green trend” /CSR trend in business life and also in 
Norway, investors and companies are to a greater extent exposing and advertising them selves 
as environmental friendly. Some of largest Norwegian companies are talking warmly about 
the environmental responsibility they take on their web pages and include CSR efforts in their 
annual reports. Undoubtedly, many Norwegian companies are making great efforts on 
adapting CSR policies, and are often contacting NGOs in order to develop partnerships or get 
advice (Lange, Spissøy, Brudvik 2000:21). When it comes to the relation between NGOs and 
companies, it is confirmed that there also in Norway is a tendency of more positive 
connotations between NGOs and companies resulting in more cooperation and 
partnership/sponsorship building (Lange, Spissøy, Brudvik 2000). Based on quantitative 
surveys, the report presents a table of Norwegian NGOs with business partnerships, where 
Bellona is the Norwegian environmental NGO which has the most experience, and both 
WWF and RF are also mentioned (ibid: 14). However, there are also many NGOs which 
continue taking the Watchdog role and trying to distance themselves from industry. It seems 
that many NGOs conceive it as unproblematic to cooperate with the government, and are 
                     
22 Concerned with the issue of democracy, this aspect can be conceived as problematic because the NGOs 
should/could function as “schools in democracy”. In both my cases, the NGOs are organized as foundations, but 
the possible implications that might have for democracy will not be elaborated in this thesis. 
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opposing to cooperation with industry and companies. The fact that some NGOs have chosen 
different approaches has created discussions and debates amongst the NGOs and might have 
divided the environmental movement into different fractions23 (Bortne, Strømnes, Selle 
2002:215). On the other hand, it can be argued that even though alliances between NGOs and 
private industries and non-state governance projects (like eco-labelling and voluntary 
certification schemes) are evolving, the Norwegian state is still the most significant actor that 
both the NGOs and industries have to relate to (Gulbrandsen 2006: 477). 
 
5.4 Context summary: Command & Control or other mechanisms in Norway? 
As emphasised in the discussion of a case study design, the context where the phenomenon / 
case appear is vital to the in-depth investigation. Thereby, a brief summary of the most 
important contextual features will be presented here:  
Much of the material here has shown that the state in Norway has been, and still is essential in 
the regulation of environmental protection. In addition to the consequences a active and 
inclusive government can have for the NGOs and civil society, this might implicate that the 
command and control mechanism for regulating might be more stable in Norway than in other 
states where neo-liberalism had a stronger impact. An active and inclusive Norwegian state 
might give NGOs both possibilities and limitations to intervene in regulation. The positive 
side is that the government then listens to the advice of NGOs, and it might be easier for them 
to make the government change standards. A problem for the Norwegian NGOs might be that 
they are too cooperative with the state, and because of this loose their independent watchdog 
role. Additionally, when the government chooses where they want to listen to the NGOs 
advice, they can also exclude them from areas like the oil industry. 
Because of these indications, the tendency of CSR might not be as strong as in other states, 
since the Norwegian state can be viewed as more active and inclusive, resulting in that the 
state have strong ties to society and market (Dryzek et.al. 2003). Even if it is quite obvious 
that the interest for environmental damage has increased both with consumers and producers 
the last years, making CSR an important case to study also in a Norwegian context, the role of 
the state and its connections to the other actors seems impossible to ignore.  
                     
23 A well known feud has been between Norges Naturvernforbund (NNV) and Miljøvernforbundet: NNV, 
which has strong ties to the Ministry of Environment, accused miljøvernforbundet for being co-opted by industry. 
On the other hand, Miljøvernforbundet accused NNV for being co-opted by the state, functioning as an 
bureaucratic arm of the ministry of the environment and thereby neutralizing environmental engagement 
(Oddekalv, K, cited in Strømsnes & Selle 1996:215, 219) 
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6. The two NGOs and their strategies 
I will in this chapter present the empirical investigations I have made on the two NGOs and 
how they have attempted to intervene in regulation of industry. The main weight will be put 
on describing how they have related to various actors, how other actors have responded to 
RFs efforts. This presentation will in that way be characterized by a focus on actual 
happenings and not so much on personal interpretations. The empirical material presented 
here is generated from interviews with employees at the NGOs, companies and other relevant 
organizations, web pages, articles and reports. For the most part, the information is presented 
by the NGOs themselves, but comments from other actors are also included. I have asked the 
two NGOs similar core questions and attempted to make a parallel layout of the presentations, 
so that it will be easier to compare in hindsight. First a general outline about the organization 
and their focus areas will be given, in addition to their own comments on choices of 
strategies/approaches towards different agents. The second half will go deeper into some 
practical campaigns or projects where the NGOs have targeted three different industries each. 
After the first information round with interviews, I have chosen to pursue some of the cases 
the organizations presented me and gathered information from interviews and documents 
from the industries targeted and other relevant actors. Since measuring the exact effects of the 
two strategies is a complex task, my main aim is instead to make the empirical material give 
indications of which opportunities, limitations and challenges the different strategies contain 
or result in. This will point towards NGOs conditions for enrolling their agenda, which will be 
discussed further in the analysis chapter.  
Because the two NGOs are focused on different areas/issues, and WWF area is broader, I 
have limited the investigation of WWF to their engagement on the marine sector. Thereby, I 
will focus on RFs concern of protecting endangered forests, while WWFs on the protection of 







6.1 The Rainforest Foundation Norway (Regskogsfondet) (RF) 
6.1.1 Structure and history 
The international Rainforest Foundation was founded in 1989, and in Norway a national fund-
raising started the same year, but was not until 1997 the Rainforest Foundation established 
itself as an independent organization (regnskog.no1).  
RF does not have a Norwegian volunteer membership base directly, but is supported by five 
other Norwegian environmental NGOs24 (RF årsmelding 2006:3). Still, the organizations 
encompass various links to society by e. g. establishing contacts and projects with other 
voluntary organizations or school children, which collaborate with RF on school projects 
regarding rainforests (RF interview 1). At the office in Oslo there are about 20 employees, all 
with higher education and most of them in the fields of Social Science and Social 
Anthropology. The organizations funding is based mainly on support by the state run 
NORAD (the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation), but also support from 
individual supportive members, or “rainforest sponsors”. RF has further taken a stand against 
receiving financial support or sponsoring by private business or corporations (RF interview 1). 
 
Focus issue: Conservation of Rainforests: By having protection of the rainforests as the centre 
of attention, RF is specialized on a relatively limited environmental issue compared to other 
environmental NGOs. However, as stated in their own definition of the organization, RFs is 
not only an environmental organization with the mission of improving the environmental 
situation, but also an aid organization defending the rights of the indigenous people who live 
in rainforests. Actually, one of their slogan is “securing rights, saving forest”, implicating that 
it might be the rights of the indigenous people that is of most significance for the organization 
(RF interview 1).  
This implicates that the organization/foundation could be conceptualized as humanitarian in 
addition to environmental. Moreover, since RF has an international focus aiming to conserve 
and protect forests in Latin America, Asia and Africa, they also depart from classical 
Norwegian NGOs concentrating on conservation of Norwegian traditions and nature.  
 
The issue of conserving the rainforest is quite well known. RF describes the environmental 
worries in short terms that the world's remaining rainforests are the battlefield for the most 
serious environmental problems of our time: the irreversible loss of biodiversity, and the 
                     
24 Norges Naturvernforbund, Miljøagentene, Natur og Ungdom, Framtiden I Våre Hender and Utviklingsfondet 
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threat of global warming” (Regnskogens tilstand 1/2005). These practical problematic matters 
will not be discussed in this thesis, instead, it is the political processes and especially the 
NGOs involvement is of interest. Before discussing RFs role, a short introduction on political 
actors and regulation connected to international rainforests will be outlined: Evidently, the 
protection of the rainforests is a concern which has to be taken up on a global level, because 
environmental protection is important to the world’s environment, and secondly because 
global trade and industries have much of the responsibility for the forests that are cut down. 
The UN organization “Food an Agriculture Organization” FAO, has sustainable forestry as 
one of their main issues, and produces an annual outline on the “State of the World forest” 
(FAO report 2007). However, there is little international legislation regulating forestry.   
But since global trade can be seen as a significant reason why the rainforest are chopped 
down faster, international trade unions can be vital regulators. An example is the European 
Union, which lately established stricter regulations of tropical timber import from Burma (EU 
Council Regulation (EC) No 194/2008: 4). This article banned import from Burma, and this 
legislation will be valid for Norwegian import.  
The Norwegian Ministry of Environment has also not too long ago released a new public 
procurement policy putting a ban on all use of tropical timber in public buildings (Sustainable 
Public Procurement - The Norwegian Action Plan 2007 – 2010:23, 33). Their policy plan 
states that "Tropical wood shall not be used neither in the building itself nor in materials used 
in the building process" (ibid). According to RF, this can give Norway a leading role 
internationally on banning tropical timber (RF interview 2). However, the ban is only valid 
for publically buildings, leaving out industrial and private ones which probably are much 
more significant. Additionally, it must be mentioned that the Norwegian government decided 
to spend more resources at saving rainforests after the Bali conference  (Office of the Prime 
Minister Press release No.: 160-07) 
 
6.1.2 RFs general approaches to the issue  
In order to reach the aims of strict regulations hindering deforestation of the world’s rainforest, 
RF make use of three superior political measures:  
a) Supporting concrete projects in cooperation with native people  
b) Work to accomplish necessary changes in policy and practices of governments, 
international organizations and private enterprises  
c) Mobilizing and encouraging people’s engagement national and international” 
(regnskog.no 2) 
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These three strategies are focused at different levels, one at the helping the weakest people, 
one at targeting the powerful actors, and one at mobilizing general society. 
Further, RF describes that their campaigns that seek to: “address the underlying causes of 
rainforest destruction, and change the policies and practices of governments, 
intergovernmental bodies and private enterprises” (regnskog.no 3)  
 
Political structures seem to be perceived as underlying causes of deforestation, and indicate 
that much of RFs efforts are on lobbying at political and private instances. Underlying causes 
of deforestation that RF points out are e.g. cattle breeding, timbering business and the export 
of timber, industrial agriculture, development of infrastructure and weak governmental 
control25 (Regnskogens tilstand 1/2005:22, 34). Of these, the timber business is the most 
significant contributor to deforestation (ibid 2005:51). As a limitation for this thesis, the 
details of how RF approaches and tries to change private enterprises and industries related to 
the use and import of timber originated from rainforests is the most central. Various 
Norwegian industries import a lot of tropical timber in order to use them in production of 
various products, and can be thereby be targeted by RF. Governmental regulation of such 
import is, as mentioned earlier, not completely shaped or implemented. Moreover, RF is also 
concerned about how Norwegian investors intervene in the cutting of rainforest by investing 
in unsustainable arrangements. These aspects will not be taken up in this thesis.  
The specific Norwegian industries RF Norway put the centre of attention on, and what 
strategies that are apply in order to intervene in the regulation of these industries will be the 
main attention in the second half of the outline on RF. Firstly, I will take up some general 
thoughts and strategies RF take when they approach these industries. 
 
RFs General approach towards private industry 
As stated in RF s̀ own portrayal of significant political means, only one (b) pointed directly at 
changing private enterprises. Within RFs web pages, there is not much focus on private 
industry, so it does not seem to be of great importance at first glance. Instead, the emphasis is 
put on cooperation with other local NGOs and people of the rainforests in developing 
countries, and the mobilizing of people and societies in Norway and internationally for the 
case of the rainforest.  
                     
25 The causes vary with the different areas; The Amazon, Africa and Asia. For more in-depth explanations on 
causes connected to the areas see Report: Regnskogenes Tilstand 2005.  
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However, when approaching Norwegian companies and industry, the goal is basically to 
apply pressure on them to prevent them of making use of rainforest material or to engage in 
exploitative investments in rainforest areas (RF interview 1). The motivation for working 
towards private companies is augmented with both the importance of achieving actual 
environmental results since industries are significant contributors to deforestation, and the 
significance spreading information and values about the importance of the rainforest in 
private and public sector (ibid). Moreover, the core attention is directed at the “largest, most 
well known and worst companies”, but also at the public owned companies, mainly because 
these are the most visible in society (RF interview 1). This will be evident in the description 
of RFs engagement towards different Norwegian industries. The organizations approach 
towards companies appears to be dominated by a sceptical and confrontational attitude. This 
implies that to engage in direct partnerships is not a much of an outspoken issue for RF. My 
informants emphasised that they are not engaging in partnerships or collaboration projects 
with companies in order to receive funding (RF interview 1, RF interview 3). RFs principles 
declare that partnerships are not an option for RF, but my informants pointed out that “there is 
a difference between partnerships and having contact and dialogue”, and that dialogue and 
cooperation can be important to influence industry from within (RF interview 2). This 
difference is important, especially since partnerships usually involve some sponsoring and 
transaction of money, while dialogue might not have this material issue as a main objective. 
However, the last year, employees at RF have noticed increased interests from industry for 
cooperation and dialogue (RF interview 2). Many companies have contacted RF lately, some 
with proposals of sponsoring or collaboration, like for instance travel agencies, banks and 
timber companies (ibid). Because of this trend, there was some discussion internally in RF on 
how to react to this issue, but a clear standpoint and a detailed internal policy do not seem to 
be agreed upon (RF interview 1). Thereby, in some cases, a kind of cooperation and even 
funding still can be relevant. For instance, one of the employees mentioned that RF has 
cooperation with the package recycling company “Emballasjeretur” (in English: “package 
return”). Regarding the fact that recycling is an important environmental issue, it is 
unproblematic for RF to cooperate with this company. The deal between “Emballasjeretur” 
and RF was that if 65% of all the packaging was returned, the company would donate an 
amount of 750.000 NOK in 2007 to RF to save rainforest in Brazil (regnskog.no 4). This 
money is delegated by RFs to their partner organizations in Brazil and the indigenous people 
fighting for the protection of their living areas (ibid). On “Emballasjereturs” web pages, their 
commitment to the rainforest issue is visibly presented, and it is explained that they are 
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sponsoring a partner organization of RF26in Brazil to protect the rainforest there 
(grontpunkt.no). Moreover, due to the cooperation with RF, an internal conversation started, 
questioning if the origin of the packing for the cartons were un-sustainable, and an 
investigating of their sub-suppliers was carried out (RF interview 2). 
RF also have co-operational agreements with “Sunkost”, a health-food chain, and “Cultura 
Bank”, a bank that is environmental engaged and e.g. invests directly in preventing 
deforestation (RF årsmelding 2004:16). The Sunkost co-operation entails that the finance the 
health-food chain collects in their “project rainforest” campaign goes directly to RFs effort at 
protecting rainforests (RF årsmelding 2005:20). Similarly, the money collected from those 
customers that establish a “rainforest account” at Cultura Bank is directly transmitted to RF 
(ibid). This funding does not make a huge impact on RFs economy, but it is essential that 
some of RFs funding are generated from outside public institutions, due to governmental 
funding rules (ibid). 
 
Noticeably, this cases show that RF is prepared to make expeditions and collaborate with 
some special companies, but only if their main business is something that is environmental 
friendly, like e.g. recycling. A main internal rule in RF is that “cooperation can only happen 
with companies that RF not could encounter in a conflict” (RF interview 2). One of the 
employees also mentioned an instance where a Scandinavian business wanted to sponsor RF, 
but when some employees discovered that the business had financed other projects that RF 
were critical towards; the deal was broken (RF interview 1). To uncover such information is 
essential for RF when businesses and companies are contacting them, but such investigations 
require a lot of effort (ibid). One of the employees mentioned that it would be an important 
task for the organization to engage more in developing dialogues with different industries, 
since more funding would be positive (ibid). 
 
General strategies and actors involved 
In response to the question on how RF conceives the consequences of its own performance, 
focus was both on what direct environmental results their campaigns have, and the indirect 
effect of spreading information to society, industry and politicians (RF interview 1). Since it 
                     
26 RFs logo is not visible on any of the companies web pages, but a commercial which has been sent on national 
tv is available, where the rainforest is displayed while it is proclaimed: “We wanted to make the climate gain of 




several times was pointed out that direct partnership with companies was not a primary option 
RF, a diversity of other agents seemed to be more significant. My first informant presented an 
outline of different agents or organized areas that are central to RF27: 
“Parliament politicians, the governmental apparatus and departments, consumer 
organizations, architects, media, other international environmental organizations, 
international rainforest organizations and certification” (RF interview 1) 
The fact that the list contained such diversity indicates that RF has various techniques of 
working towards their goal. It can thus give the impression that network-building in different 
areas is central, as will be elaborated later.  First I will take a closer look at some of these 
actors and impressions on how RF relates to them: 
 
As described earlier, the classical technique for regulating companies and private industry 
towards more sustainable practices is to engage indirectly by lobbying and contacting 
politicians, governments and departments, to make them establish rules and regulate the 
private business area. Even if the tendency for many NGOs might be to work less towards 
public institutions and more towards business, my first RF informant clearly pointed out state 
institutions as fundamental (RF interview 1). Besides, public institutions (NORAD) are RFs 
main financial supporters. The Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
are the main institution lobbied at in order to make them establish stricter regulations, but also 
politicians and other ministries are targeted depending on the issue of concern (RF interview 
3). RF also cooperates with other environmental NGOs and WWF on lobbying and 
monitoring the efforts of Norwegian government (RF årsmelding 2005:15). Furthermore, 
legislation is a central issue for RF, pushing the government to implement stricter rules and 
regulations. For many years, RF has struggled to pressure the politicians and government to 
implement prohibition on an import of rainforest timber (RF interview 2). According to my 
informants, law against import would be the best solution, especially since none of the 
certification possibilities apparently are good enough (ibid). In 2005, the government decided 
to make a report on how such an import ban could be implemented, and this task is still under 
development (ibid). The government ranked in 2006 “to develop and follow up an action plan 
for the import of tropical timber” as one of their 19 environmental aims (Stortingsmelding 26, 
2006-7). Employees at RF have ongoing contact with the government on this process, and are 
expecting some accomplishments soon (RF interview 2). As mentioned earlier, the 
                     
27 This was the outline given at the first interview, but more actors appeared at later interviews.  
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government managed to ban the use of tropical timber in public buildings, but there is still a 
long way to go in order to prohibit all import. Generally, RF representatives are proclaiming 
that “the Norwegian government has done too little and too slow”, and are uncertain if the 
undertakings that will appear will be good enough (RF interview 2, RF årsmelding 2006:22). 
Moreover, other legislations are important for much of the organizations efforts, especially 
the laws concerning rights to product information. As we will se later, RF confront companies 
with these laws, and they have even taken them to court.  
 
Another classical technique for NGOs is to use media to spread information, and to thereby 
mobilise society in order to compel both politicians and private companies to take action. 
Moreover, to spread information and engagement through contacting and creating projects for 
schools and pupils is also important to keep contact and create interactions with society (RF 
interview 1). At RF’s web pages, there are many pages especially designed to help school 
children and youths, both by presenting information and ready designed campaigns 
(regnskog.no 5). RF has here established a teaching programme that can be employed in high 
schools. The programme is connected to the curriculum in geography, natural and social 
science, and combines reflection and practical action in a manner that the students can take 
part of the survey in the timber campaign (ibid). Young people often have a special interest 
for the rainforest with its animals and indigenous people, and sometimes school classes’ or 
teachers contacts RF for information and help on their projects (RF interview 1).  
 
Since the protection of the rainforest is an international issue, international cooperation is 
essential, and RF is mostly engaged at an international level. RF is part of an international 
Rainforest foundation network, where the UK, the US and Japan also has national branches. 
These national branches of the Rainforest Foundation are cooperating on international cases 
like lobbying towards the World Bank to change their forestry policy in the democratic 
republic of Congo, and criticising the forestry statistics of FAO (RF årsmelding 2005:5). In 
the case of Congo, RF supported the local indigenous population’s complaint on the World 
Banks inspection panel, resulting in a new investigation of the World Banks involvement in 
forestry there (RF årsmelding 2006:22). 
It must be emphasised that contacting and cooperating with local communities and NGOs 
internationally are the most significant issues for RF. When dealing with rainforest issues, the 
first step is contacting and establishing partnerships with local communities and NGOs in the 
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countries with endangered rainforests28. Such partnerships are often commenced when social 
anthropologists who later are employed by RF carry out fieldworks. After partnerships have 
been established, RF supports these local communities and the local projects they have 
established financially (RF interview 1). To investigate these partnerships in more detail 
would be interesting, but will not be a main focus in my thesis.  
 
Confronting companies and private industry, certification of environmental friendly product 
or companies is also cited as a possibility to directly regulate companies. The Nordic 
environment marking (Svanemerket) is an example of a certification scheme that RF 
considers as positive and effective (RF interview 1). However, RF is unconvinced about the 
effectiveness of “Forest Stewardship Council” (FSC) which is an international certification 
system for sustainable timber material (RF interview 1). Shortly described “FSC is an 
international association of members consisting of a diverse group of representatives from 
environmental and social groups, the timber trade and the forestry profession, indigenous 
people's organizations, responsible corporations, community forestry groups and forest 
product certification organizations“. (fsc.org) 
The certification should ideally guarantee that the timber companies that obtain certified by 
the FSC standards are chopped in a sustainable ways, but there are divided positions amongst 
international environmental organizations on the success of this certification system. RF takes 
a sceptical stand, because their investigations of FSC assert that their standards are not high 
enough, and might not even be followed up (RF interview 1). In RF s̀ newsletter an article 
describes a case where FSC has certified a timber company (Forrestal Venano) which 
according to the article several times chopped trees illegal in Peru (Nytt fra Regnskogsfondet 
3/2007:10-11). Hence, both the standards setting and control on following up of the standards 
might be too loose (Regnskogens tilstand 1/2005:56). My first informant underlined that the 
idea and intentions of FSC were positive in the beginning, but that the rules for certification 
now have become too loose (RF interview1).  
In RFs report on the conditions of the rainforests, it is argued that the “international 
environmental movement has focused too much on certification systems and too little on 
politically reforms in each country containing restrictions on import” (Regnskogens tilstand 
1/2005:54). Furthermore, it is argued that most of the timber is chopped in an unsustainable 
way, and that market mechanisms cannot solve all problems (ibid). Another example of a 
                     
28 Brasil, Peru, Indonesia, Malaysia , Papa Ny Guinea, The Democratic Republic of Congo (www.rainforest.no 
3). 
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problematic “Malaysian Timber Certification Council” (MTCC) became heavily criticized by 
Malaysian NGOs and by Greenpeace (RF årmelding 2004:14, Regnskogens tilstand 
1/2005:49). RF supported and listened to the local organizations in this case, and labelled 
MTCC as “green washing of deforestation” (ibid). Comparing these two certification systems, 
it seems that RF are completely negative towards MTCC, but see some possibilities in FSC 
and have an ideal of making FSC a better system (RF årsmelding 2006:23). 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning when describing RF approach towards Norwegian business 
that RF are also concerned about Norwegian investments in rainforest countries (Regnskogens 
tilstand 2005:52-53). RF therefore cooperates with other monitoring agencies in order to 
disclose cases of Norwegian investments in unsustainable projects, like e.g. the investments of 
national oil-fund (RF årsmelding 2006:23) 
 
6.1.3 The timber campaign  
To get a clearer view on techniques and mediums RF employ to reach their goals and how 
they build networks, a closer look at how they operate when carrying out campaigns aimed at 
regulating industry can be illustrating. When I asked the organization to present a case of a 
campaign towards a Norwegian company or industrial area, the “Timber campaign”, was 
suggested at the first interview. Since there does not exist too much written material on how 
the campaign works and which strategies are chosen, much of the information here is 
generated from interviews, reports and web-pages. I will here focus on RFs strategies and 
give some attention to reactions from other actors. 
The Timber campaign is aimed at stopping or hindering Norwegian businesses from 
importing, using and selling products made of timber originated from rainforests (RF 
interview 1). Three business areas that make use of imported rainforest material are targeted: 
the boat producers, the construction material business and the furniture business (RF 
interview 3).  
The knowledge RF obtain on rainforest and rainforest material is essential for the campaign, 
and this knowledge encompasses more than the damaging effects of rainforest over-
exploitation. More important, a detailed overview on wooden timber material originated from 
rainforest that is imported to Norway is crucial for the practical side of the campaign. Based 
on information from the international “red list” 29 and the overview of endangered rainforest 
                     
29 “The IUCN Red List is the world's most comprehensive inventory of the global conservation status of plant 
and animal species. It uses a set of criteria to evaluate the extinction risk of thousands of species and 
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three types, RF formed a list naming the 92 rainforest timber types that are distributed or sold 
in Norway (RF interview 3). The list is available on RFs web pages, the most well known of 
these 92 tree types might be Mahogany and Teak. When monitoring and targeting the 
different business areas, this list was primer to RFs investigations.  
 
A central tool for carrying out the monitoring of companies is Norwegian legislation and 
official laws: In 2005 RF started to take advantage of the new “Environmental Information 
Law” (RF Årsmelding 2005:4). This law that might be unknown for many30, grants  
“All citizens the right to claim information both from official authorities and private industry 
about conditions that are significant for the environment. A premise for that the 
environmental information law shall function for its purpose is that the public uses it actively”.  
(LOV 2003-05-09 nr 31) 
Particularly in order to force companies elaborating and sharing information about their 
products and where the materials for the products originate from, this law can be drawn on 
both by consumers and RF. Additionally, RF have occasionally sent official complains to 
“The Complaints Board for Environmental Information” on companies that refused to share 
information on material matters (Klagenemda Årsmelding 2006). In these cases RF have been 
granted support by the public instances, but in one case they had to take it further and go to 
the courts (RF årsmelding 2005:4). One such case in 2005, Norwegian tree importers denied 
to share the information requested even if Complaints Board for Environmental Information 
gave RF approval of the right to claim that information (Nytt fra Regnskogsfondet 1/ 2006: 
10). Because of that RF threatened the companies to go to the courts (ibid). The companies 
even suggested an agreement where RF would have to pay the companies if they published 
the material (Nytt fra Regnskogsfondet 1/ 2006: 10). In 2006, these companies however gave 
in and handed the information to RF, and the court was cancelled (Nytt fra Regnskogsfondet 
3/2006: 12). The access to this information made it easier to see where the imported timber 
was originated from and to which Norwegian companies it was sold (ibid) 
 
Actors involved in the campaign: At the same year that RF was established as an independent 
NGO, the timber campaign was launched as collaboration between RF and six other 
                                                                
subspecies….With its strong scientific base, the IUCN Red List is recognized as the most authoritative guide to 
the status of biological diversity”. 
(cms.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/species/red_list/about_the_red_list/index.cfm) 
30 As stated: “Klagenemda has the impression that the law and the complaint possibility not are well known 
amongst people…” (Klagenemda årsmelding 2006: 4) 
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Norwegian organizations31 (RF Årsmelding 2004:14). Four of these are other environmental 
NGOs, and since RF is a foundation and do not have volunteer members and local 
organizations in other parts of Norway, these NGOs are significant in order to engage 
volunteers and reach out to different parts of the country. The two others are governmental-
connected organizations; to be precise the “Norwegian Consumer Council” (Forbrukerrådet) 
and the “Organization for Environmental Consumer Advising” (Grønn Hverdag) (ibid). These 
organizations have special knowledge about consumer rights, and also have a special link to 
consumers all over the country, especially the Norwegian Consumer Council (administrated 
under the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs) which is a vital and acknowledged 
organization representing the interest and the rights of consumers.  
It seems that RF might have influenced on the consumer council on the issue of rainforest 
material. After a brief interview with them and after a look at their web pages, they give the 
impression that their data is based on information from RF. Moreover, they have taken the 
stand that “no products that originate from unsustainable timbering should be available in the 
Norwegian market” (Forbrukerrådet interview). The contact between RF and the consumer 
council is not too regular, they meet about 3 times a year where they discuss the updates on 
status of tropical timber on the Norwegian market, and strategies for how to get the updates 
published (ibid). The consumer council publishes the updates from RF on their web pages, in 
addition they publish links to the consumer rights (in particular the environment information 
law and the product control law) can be found there (ibid). There are however not a great 
number of requests from consumers on this information (ibid). 
The exact roles the different actors play in this network are not formally organized. They 
arrange meetings and seminars sometimes, but the contact between them is mainly by mail 
and telephone (Forbrukerrådet interview). Additionally, as will be revealed later, RF also 
makes contact with other actors which could be connected to their issue or have a say on the 
different industrial areas.  
Thereby, the timber campaign started and is carried out through a network of different 
organisations, actors and individuals which got involved (it might still expand and include 
more actors). It was representatives from RF who took initiative to contact the other actors, 
and RF is in charge of the coordination (RF interview 1). 
 
                     
31 Regnskogfondet, Forbrukerrådet, Naturvernforbundet, Framtiden i våre hender, Grønn Hverdag, Natur og 
Ungdom og Foreningen for internasjonale vann- og skogstudier 
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6.1.4 Approaches towards the different industries targeted  
In addition to targeting governmental policy and the ethical problems of using of rainforest 
material in public buildings, three Norwegian industrial areas are addressed: These are 
controlled and monitored by RF, and can be divided into the boat industry, the furniture shops 
and the construction material industry. All these business areas have shops and companies 
that are making use of imported rainforest material. It seems that they responded differently to 
the attempt of RF to influence them. Comparing them in the analysis, the reactions and 
especially the differences in their reactions, might point towards conditions for RF to enrol 
their agenda. 
 
The construction material industry:  
Traditionally, this is the industry where the most timber from rainforest is sold in Norway 
(Regnskogens tilstand 1/2005:51). According to the coordinator of the timber campaign, the 
construction business has been the easiest to influence, and it has been the area where the 
timber campaign has had most success (RF interview 3). Moreover, it is on this area of 
business that RFs efforts of monitoring Norwegian companies has been the most 
comprehensive, and it was the first area RF stared to work towards (ibid) 
After three years, the actors behind the timber campaign decided to conduct more 
investigating on the construction shops (RF interview 3). The “construction material 
investigation” which has been central in order to document and get an overview on which 
ones of the construction material companies that make use of rainforest timber was therefore 
initiated in 2003. Primary, RF structure a detailed survey containing questions about materials 
and the origin of materials, which is sent out to several environmental organizations and to 
school children or other volunteers all over Norway, who help carrying out the survey by 
confronting various companies that might use rainforest material (RF interview 1). The 
volunteers visit the shops and companies nearby the region they live, ask them questions and 
inspect the shops (Forbrukerådet interview). Additionally, local offices of the consumer 
organization occasionally assist conducting the survey (Forbrukerådet interview). Sometimes, 
private companies try to avoid this survey, but due to the “environmental information law” 
mentioned earlier, volunteers who ask for information have the law on their side. When the 
volunteers have collected information on different companies, the completed surveys are sent 
back to RF (RF interview 1). Further, when information is gathered from all over the country, 
the RF coordinator evaluates and composes a report based on the results, including a summary 
of the companies that uses the most rainforest material (ibid). The same investigation is 
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carried out every fall, and every year “the worst company” is pointed out, like in a 
competition, and is named “the rainforest villain” (ibid).  
 
Publishing the investigation is also a vital task (because it is aimed at consumers), and here 
RF receives assistance form the Norwegian consumer organization, who regularly publish the 
newsletters that RF send them on their web pages (Forbrukerrådet interview). Exposing 
company’s unsustainable practices by informing the public and the consumers can generate 
pressure for self-regulation of the companies. Negative reputation is not something a company 
will appreciate since it can generate disadvantages in competition. Such shaming processes as 
mentioned above and attempts to activate consumer power can be seen as using market 
mechanisms and taking advantage of market competition. However, my informant 
emphasized that RF always attempts to engage in dialogue with the companies came before 
shaming them, in order to give some sort of “warning” to give them the possibility to change 
their attitudes (RF interview1).  
 
The consumer guides and Reactions from Industry: Since 2004 RF has promoted the 
information from the surveys as “consumer guides”, which are providing advises directly to 
the consumers on which products and shops they should avoid. The guide is built on the 
results of the company investigations. The different companies are divided in three groups: 
the worst companies that sell a lot of rainforest material, the medium cases, and the best 
companies that do not sell any products of rainforest material and have actively taken a stand 
against the use of tropical timber. In 2003, the first consumer guide was made, but it was quite 
short and focused on which products consumers should avoid in furniture, boats and 
construction material, and it did not state which companies and shops consumers should avoid 
(regnskog.no 6). The next year (2004), was the first year that the conduct only regarded 
construction shops (a conduct on furniture shops was made independently), and the 
investigation was expanded to include 65 shops (RF interview 3). The strategy for achieving 
publicity was changed a bit, and the focus was on the identifying the best and the worst 
companies (regnskog.no 7). That year, the company “Bo Anden” was one of the largest 
suppliers of rainforest parquet, and according to RF investigation the company actively sold 
products with incorrect information (ibid) Because of this, the company was handed over a 
“diploma”, stating that the company had contributed with the “demolishing of 155 000km2 
rainforest” (ibid) 
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As mentioned earlier, this industrial area seems to have been the easiest to change. An 
example of this can be one of the largest outlets of construction material “Byggmakker” was 
in 2003 and in 2004 mentioned as one of the worst companies. This company changed its 
policy as early as 2004 after much pressure from RF, and decided that their suppliers are 
economically responsible if they deliver material from rainforests (RF årsmelding 2004:14). 
Thereby, the company took the responsibility further and also involved sub suppliers. In 2006, 
these improvements got registered and the company rose and found its place among the best 
companies, and received praise from RF since they changed (regnskog.no 8). However, in 
2007, the company was disappointingly ranked in the medium level because some of the 
shops in the chain had sold rainforest material (Byggevareundersøkelsen 2007:2). The 
company has now stated on their web pages that they want to take environmental 
responsibility, hence it seems that they have been influenced by RF. Lately, Byggmakker has 
even produced an informational brochure about tropical timber, containing practical advices 
on material that can be used instead of tropical timber32. 
 
Other companies have on the other hand been on the worst list of RF for all these years.  
An overall impression of the consumer guides from 2004-2007 is that it is the largest 
companies that have changed the most and taken RFs complains seriously, even if some of 
them have changed a bit from year to year. Additionally, it seems that the small independent 
companies and shops that are the most difficult to change. In 2005, 2006 and 2007 especially 
the web-shops were ranked lowest. In 2007, an exception was made on one of the leading e-
shop for parquet in Norway (RF interview 1). This company was “shamed” as the worst 
company in both 2004 and in 2005, as the timber campaign documented that this company 
had the highest use of rainforest material in Norway (ibid). But in 2006 the company decided 
to stop all their import of rainforest material, and in 2007, the company was on top of the list 
and got praised by RF as one of the best companies (ibid) This one is of the cases where RF 
declare that the timber campaigns have had success (RF interview 1 and 2, Rf årsmelding 
2006:22) 
 
Cooperation with architects: RF has further taken other means than the investigation and 
publishing of the consumer guides into account in order to change the industry and spread 
knowledge and attitudes. When targeting the construction business, RF made contact with the 
                     
32 Byggmakker Brochure Available at: 
http://www.byggmakker.no/./?module=Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=2751 14.6.2008 
 66 
“National Association of Norwegian Architects” (NAL) and other architect organizations33, in 
order to establish cooperation with them (RF interview 2). RFs motivation for a dialogue with 
this profession interest organization was the assumption that architects have an important say 
in the construction material business, since their work includes decisions about what (timber) 
materials they are going to make use of in their projects. In 2005, RF criticised interior 
designers and architects for not taking the problematic features of using rainforest material 
seriously, and even promoting dark wood which often originates from rainforests 
(Regnskogens tilstand 2005:51). An article in RFs newsletter described how an interior 
magazine and art galleries had praised a designer villa without knowing the problematic 
issues connected to the mahogany façade (Nytt fra Regnskogsfondet 2/2005:3-5). Later, RF 
and Norwegian architects started cooperating in order to stop the use of rainforest material in 
the Norwegian construction industry.  
When I contacted NAL, my informant stated that the use of rainforest material has not been a 
central topic for the architect organizations (NAL interview). However, the NAL section for 
environment “Ecobox” has promotion of environmental design as main subject, especially 
focusing on low energy consumption buildings (ibid). The issue of sustainable material is 
only a sub-issue for Ecobox, and has not been a main topic (ibid) 
The dialogue between RF and different architect organisations resulted in an informational 
brochure especially directed at different types of architects (that often are in charge of 
advising, ordering and using wooden material) (RF interview 2). This brochure was 
distributed to all Norwegian architects and other central actors in 2005 (RF årsmelding 
2005:18). Containing information about why it is important to conserve the rainforest (why 
architects should not make use of rainforest material) and alternative material suggestions, the 
brochure was meant as an information guide for these professions (RF interview 1). Since it 
can be difficult to know where the construction material originates from due to lacing 
information from material industries, the detailed information about origins of different 
timber material is significant (Gulv & Grønne Skoger 2006: 8-9). At the last pages, an 
overview over the names of the 60 different types of rainforest material available on the 
Norwegian market is given (ibid: 16-17). The brochure further informs that there is no law 
against import of rainforest material yet, but that sustainable development is set to be a goal in 
the plan- and construction law, and that documentation of martial can be demanded through 
                     
33 In addition, Norske Interiørarkitekters og møbeldesigners landsforening (NIL), Norske landskapsarkitekters 
forening (NLA), and RIF – Rådgivende Ingeniørers Forening  
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this law (ibid:13). Architects are thereby encouraged to make use of the law, by demanding 
information and setting environmental standards (ibid). 
 
The furniture and parquet industry:  
Also in this industry RF claims to have reached far with their campaign, positive changes 
have occurred the last years (Regnskogens tilstand 1/2005:51). This industry often overlap 
with the construction material industry, since many companies sell both furniture and 
construction material. It will therefore not be given much attention here.  
Additionally investigation tactic applied on the construction business is also applied on the 
furniture industry, and consumer guides that name the worst and the best shops on garden 
furniture are published every spring since 2004.  
Also in this industry there are different reactions from the companies that RF approach. A 
short glance at the consumer guides on garden furniture shows that there are some companies 
that are the worst every year. Tree of the shops, “Ballerud Hagesenter”, “Plantasjen” and 
“Hodnebø” have been rated in the worst list every year from 2004 to 2008. The consumer-
guide summarized from 2008-survey on garden furniture and targeted the company 
“Plantasjen” as the worst one (regnskog.no 9). This shop has during the last years been 
criticized for using rainforest material, but this year they have used even more than the last 
surveys show (ibid). This result was published in some newspapers, and the owner of the 
company even stated that this critique is important, and that they want to improve on this 
field34.  
In the 2008 consumer-guide RF has in the last sentence named the shops and companies that 
have taken a stand against tropical timber (regnskog.no 9). Thereby, not only the worst 
companies are named but also the best ones.  
 
The (leisure) boat industry:  
As the last of the business areas targeted by the Timber Campaign, RF began in 2003 to 
investigate boat companies, and started by producing a report on the use of tropical timber in 
the boat industry (RF interview 3). The report “rainforest timber in Norwegian waters” (2003) 
informed about the scale of tropical timber in leisure boats, the problematic features 
connected to this use and suggestions on alternative materials (regnskog.no 10). Companies 
that construct and sell leisure boats and especially yachts often make use of tropical timber 
                     
34 Aftenfosten 2.5.2008  “Plantasjen is rainforest bad boy” published at 
aftenbladet.no/english/englishnews/article633982.ece (14.6.2008) 
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material like Teak and Mahogany, which mostly originates from the military dictatorship of 
Burma (Regnskogens tilstand 1/2005:51). The import of these materials for the use in the 
production of leisure boat increased the last years, and 2004 was a record of import of Teak 
from Burma (ibid). 
Since the investigation on the boat industry started later, it is not as comprehensive as on the 
construction material industry, and a basically research involving volunteers all over Norway 
is not elaborated on here (RF interview 3). Instead, the efforts on monitoring, investigating 
and contacting boat companies are mostly carried out by the Timber Campaigns coordinator 
at the RF office (ibid). According to this coordinator, the boat industry and especially those 
companies that construct luxury yachts, has been the most difficult to influence and change 
(RF interview 2). This might be due to conservative attitudes and assumptions that Teak (a 
rainforest wood type) is the only material that can be used and looks good inside luxury boats, 
and the boat companies have denied that the problematic features of using Teak is of any 
concern for them (ibid). Moreover, the producers of boats have taken it for granted that 
customers only want Teak, and before the last year no producers have offered any alternatives 
to boats with teak (Båtliv interview). 
 
The monitoring of the companies and media publishing to pressure the industry has been the 
most significant efforts of RF (RF interview 3). In order to make the boat companies change, 
RF has not only contacted them directly, but also worked much towards media to make them 
publish the critical facts about the industry. Moreover, RF has not simply aimed at publishing 
practical information about the use of tropical timber in the boat industry, but my informant 
also stated that they have attempted at commercializing the information to get attention, like 
e.g. targeting Norwegian celebrities that own boats with rainforest material (RF interview 1). 
Direct protest against the industry also occurred. On boat exhibitions where boat companies 
presented their new models to consumers, RF arranged demonstrations where actionists 
marked their position with a banner on a boat at the exposition and inspected the boats for 
material (regnskog.no 11). A brochure giving information on tropical timber was also handed 
out to the consumers and boat produces participating on the exposition (ibid). The activists 
participating were mainly from an environmental youth organization (called “Nature and 
Youth”) that cooperates with RF on the Timber Campaign (ibid).  
 
Dialogue with Boatlife: Moreover, RF focused its target on the largest Norwegian boat 
magazine (Båtliv). RF started sending them monthly updates on the situation and a lot of 
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information (båtliv interview). The magazine employee I spoke with stated that RF is largely 
informing them on this issue and that the journalists often write articles based on the data they 
receive (ibid). In addition, an information brochure on the use of tropical timber in boats was 
created by RF and was distributed to 19 000 people that subscribe on the boat magazine (RF 
årsmelding 2004:14). 
Lastly, RF has also taken use of the Environmental information law. A case displayed on RF 
web pages describes that RF sent a complaint to the Complaint Board for environmental 
information, because some Norwegian boat companies did not answer their request for 
material information (RF åremelding 2006:23). After some time, the company handed the 
information to RF (RF interview 3). 
 
Reactions form industry: As the situation in Burma with the monk’s strikes in 2007 received 
media attention media worldwide, the pressure on the boat industries employment of material 
originated from Burma escalated, and RF initiated a boycott of Teak (Nytt fra 
Regnskogsfondet 4/2007: 16). Even if the boat industry has been the most difficult to 
approach, the situation of the conservative boat industry seems to be changing the last year 
(RF interview 3, Båtliv interview). Many alternatives to Teak are now being taken into 
account and the interests for alternatives seems to increase (ibid). A quick search on the web 
pages of “Båtliv”, a Norwegian boat magazine, shows that many individuals have posted 
questions about alternatives to Teak, however mostly for practical reasons (batliv.com 1). The 
consumer’s interests on alternative boats can be due to the fact that they haven’t had any 
options earlier years, but since the producers now are presenting their wooden types, the 
awareness has risen (båtliv interview). At the boat magazine web site, there are even some 
articles commenting on the environmental problems of Teak utilization in the boat industry, 
particularly since it was documented that most of the Teak Norwegian boat producers make 
use of are from Burma (batliv.com 2). 
As many people have indicated, it is particularly the last year (2007) that alterations in the 
attitudes of the boat-manufacturer companies occurred, and some companies have completely 
changed their mind on the issue (Båtliv interview, RF interview 3). The company “Viksund” 
has for many years been bothered by critics and environmental activists, but lately there has 
been communication between Viksund and RF, and Viksund is changing course and are 
attempting to use other materials than Teak (especially Norwegian wood types) (ibid). At 
Viksund web pages, a new environmental friendly boat model without any rainforest material 
is introduced (viksund.no). Here, the owner Rune Viksund expresses: “The process that has 
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taken us to where we are today on the environmental side, has taken about a year. The whole 
time we had dialogue both with environmental organizations and our sub-vendors, and we 
are now proud of our result” (viksund.no)  
 
Similarly, the boat producer “Windy Boats” have also earlier been very conservative, but 
during the last year have changed totally and are now producing boats with alternative 
materials to Teak (Båtliv interview). This boat producer was one of the companies that 
refused to share information with RF in 2006, but after RF and got support on an official 
complaint to the Complaints Board for Environmental information and the company had to 
give in (RF årsrapport 2006:23). So now also Windy boats are promoting their environmental 
engagement as well:  
“Windy has been working systematically to eliminate the use of tropical and IUCN 
red-listed woods, and teak decking. Both the Chinook and the Triton employ steamed ash in 
place of teak, with tropical wood interior and exterior finishes replaced with sustainably-
sourced light oak. (windy.no) 
 
The general first impression might therefore be that the boat industry the last year has 
accepted the problematic feature of making use of Teak during the last year, but there are 
nevertheless many exceptions, with boat companies that still deny the problematic features of 
using Burma teak, and these two mentioned companies might be seen as forerunners. Three of 
the largest Norwegian boat producers have not taken up this issue (regnskog.no 12). It has 
been hard to obtain information from the tree importers and those boat producers that make 
use of Teak and Mahogany originated from Burma.  
Why this change of attitudes in the boat industry has occurred can have many causes, one of 
them external pressure (rf interview 2, båtliv interview). An aspect here could be that the sale 
of leisure boats has increased. One effect of increased sale can be that the consumer group 
buying boats has changed the last years, not only including people with special interests but 
also a people with a generally larger interest for environmental questions (båtliv interview). 
The coordinator of the timber campaign also pointed out that the change was not only 
escalating due to the media attention it got when the situation in Burma worsened, but also 
because of a new EU legislation (mentioned earlier) which now being shaped (RF interview 
3). The legislation, which will also affect Norway, concerns banning the trade of Teak and 
other products from Burma. Hence, the boat producers/companies will soon not get any 
choice but search for alternative types of wood (ibid). Still, when and how this law will be 
implemented is another question.  
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6.1.5 Summary RF: Main points and strategy  
Summing up, RFs agency for regulating industries that can cause harm to the rainforests is 
both to push central actors to establish stricter regulations nationally and internationally, and 
to pressure industries towards becoming stricter and more conscious on what material they 
chose. In order to achieve a stricter regulation of import to Norway RF works both towards 
making government enact stricter legislations, an to institute more responsible attitudes 
amongst of producers and consumers. RFs efforts towards government have not been given 
much attention in this thesis, but the general impression is that RF perceives it as significant 
but slow. RFs strategies when approaching Norwegian industries directly is to pressure the 
industries from outside and not engage in direct partnerships. Techniques RF make use of is 
to first collect information on the industries use of tropical timber, then monitoring the 
industries, contacting different relevant actors, creating informational brochures for industry 
and consumers, sending out newsletters in order to spread information and naming and 
shaming campaigns of the worst companies. The environmental information law has been 
crucial for RFs efforts on accessing data.  
Many different actors are included. One of the aims of RFs efforts and the Timber Campaign 
is also to inform and educate Norwegian society, in order to make people conscious about the 
connection between the consumption of wooden material and the threats of the rainforest and 
their habitants. The published material timber campaign has created discussion and attention 
in the media, and by this informed society and consumers.  
Exactly what effect the campaign can have on the regulation, or self-regulation, of industries 
is hard to measure and is not the aim for this thesis. Even so, it seems that many of industries 
that the RF has targeted have felt the pressure and stopped using tropical timber. As can be 
seen on their web pages, some of the companies who have changed their attitudes the most 
(Byggmakker, Viksund and Windy) now promote themselves as environmental forerunners 
since they decided not to make use rainforest material.  
This chapter has not taken a main view at how RF efforts towards international actors, but it 
was notices that they support indigenous people of the rainforest at pressuring significant 




6.2 The World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) 
6.2.1 Structure and history: 
WWF, World Wide Fund for Nature (earlier World Wildlife Fund), was started in England 
1961 by the biologist Sir Huxley, and is now one of the largest international environmental 
NGOs (Strømnes & Selle 1996: 21). In Norway, a national branch of WWF was established in 
1970, organized as a foundation with supportive members (ibid). At their Norwegian office in 
Oslo there are about 30 employees, most of them educated in natural science, especially 
biologists (WWF interview 1). 
WWF can be characterized as an NGO concentrating on classical environmental issues, and 
their aims have developed from mainly protecting threatened animal species (conserving 
biological diversity) to more general environmental protection (Strømnes & Selle 1996:146). 
WWF-Norway has defined its three main goals as to protect the world’s biodiversity and 
ecosystems, to secure sustainable use of natural resources and to combat pollution and 
overconsumption (WWF årsmelding 2006:2). Practically, significant areas for WWF-Norway 
are the biodiversity in the ocean and coast, lakes, forests, rivers and mountains (ibid). 
Financially they are dependent on support from private businesses/ persons and public 
institutions (especially the Ministry of Environment) (ibid: 21).  
 
Focus issue: Marine protection: Similarly to the protection of the rainforests, the protection of 
the marine environment, the species and the eco-systems of the oceans are global issues, and 
there are ongoing international political discussions on how regulation of harmful industries 
that affect the marine sector should be carried out. These discussions and the actors involved 
will be taken a closer look at when three significant industries that WWF approach are 
outlined later.  
The marine sector is one of WWF internationals six core concerns. For WWF Norway, the 
marine sector is one of the two major areas of attention, especially since Norway is a country 
with a long coastal area and has long traditions on utilizing marine resources (WWF interview 
3). Traditionally, the issues of marine pollution and the protection of environment beneath the 
ocean surface have not really been taken seriously, because of attitudes and beliefs like 
“oceans take care of the pollution themselves and washes it away” (WWF interview 3). These 
attitudes seem however to be changing (ibid).  
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6.2.2 WWF-Norway general approaches to the issue:  
The environmental problems concerning the marine sector are according to WWF poorly 
managed fishing , Shipping, Oil & gas, Pollution, Aquaculture (wwf.no.1). Solutions to these 
problems, presented by WWF Norway on their web pages are “sustainable fisheries, shipping, 
protected areas, environmental friendly fish breeding and the “clean coast” volunteers oil 
protection. (wwf.no.1) 
The variation of solutions presented here specifies how they apply supplementary techniques 
and a mixture of strategies in confronting the different problematic industries involved. 
Moreover, to cover the marine protection WWF has created a programme called “Endangered 
Seas Programme” (havmiljøprogrammet), which started as a climate project in 2006 (WWF 
årsmelding 2006: 6). This programme is portrayed as a reaction to the fact that there is a 
global agreement on danger of the climate threat, but that there still is little practical work 
done to deal with this problem (ibid). One aspect of the programme is to inform the public 
about the climate effects and the necessary solutions, and it includes six individual 
programme areas: Pirate Fishing, High Seas Legal, Shipping, Tuna, By-catch and Southern 
Ocean (WWF interview 2). Another important issue is that the international waters, which are 
not bound to a specific national juridical framework, not are regulated and are suffering from 
environmental damage and pirate fishing (ibid). 
Different industries can be connected to their marine programmes, and the industries I have 
chosen to focus at are oil production, offshore and shipping companies, and fish-farming 
business. How WWF approach these three industries and which strategies they apply to make 
them change, is the main focus in this chapter. Moreover, each of these industries has several 
large and resourceful actors connected to the regulation process, and the empirical material 
there will therefore be given more space than the case of RF. 
 
WWFs General approaches towards private industry 
As one of the most well known environmental organizations, WWF is often conceptualized as 
an example of an solution-oriented organization, engaged in dialogue with business for 
example in the creation of FSC (Arts 2002: 31).  
My informant stated that “to achieve actual results, cooperation with companies in diverse 
business areas is more important than ever” (WWF interview 1). Further, WWF often join 
forces with e.g. Bellona, which is the Norwegian environmental organization that has most 
experience with establishing business partnerships (ibid) 
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The information presented within WWFs web pages affirm the importance of establishing 
dialogue and partnerships with different private industries, and the link is presenting private 
companies as “companions” (.wwf.no 2). At these web pages, the organizations relationship 
and position towards business are described in great detail and in a very open manner. It is 
stated that “Private companies are therefore one of the most important sources of finance” 
(ibid). All the companies that WWF are engaged in partnerships with are listed at the same 
web-page (additionally the public supporters are listed below). In admitting that they have 
several partnerships with companies, there is of course a focus on positive effects, and main 
argumentation on this approach is that it is based on a conviction that dialogue and 
partnership are essential to achieve actual environmental friendly results and projects. In my 
first interview, it was stressed that it is important to engage in dialogue especially with large 
companies, since they are big polluters and have other negative environmental effects (WWF 
interview 1). As mentioned earlier, WWF is also dependent upon financial support from both 
private and public institutions to manage their projects. 
 
Practically, the partnerships between WWF and different companies are based on academic 
technical collaboration (WWF interview 1). Most of the employees at WWF are educated 
biologists, and the specialized competence and knowledge they cover are essential to some of 
the projects that have been created. By using their knowledge base and establishing concrete 
projects, which the companies can be invited to participate in; WWF wants to avoid a 
bargaining situation which can lead to a loss of power (WWF interview 1). In order to have 
clear internal guidelines for partnership projects WWF make use of standardized models 
summarized in 11 rules for partnership projects (.wwf.no 2). A quick review of these rules 
shows that point 1, 2 and 3 are emphasizing dialogue as a proper tool to create efficient, goal 
oriented and constructive outcomes (ibid). The two next points explain the practical reasons 
for partnerships (environmental effects, communication and financing), and requests that 
industries should take more responsibility and establish more transparency (ibid). Point 6 and 
7 points out the positive symbolic effects the companies engaged in partnerships can have, 
both towards business areas and society (ibid).  
These rules give the impression that there have been internal discussions and are moral 
dilemmas connected to the partnership approach. In my first interview, the informant 
underlined that WWF have restrictions regarding which companies they want to engage in 
partnership projects with. Especially oil companies are never considered to be partners, 
because their business can never be linked with environmental friendliness (wwf interview 1). 
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This might be seen in the three last points (9, 10, & 11); where WWF declare what 
partnerships they want to steer clear of in order to avoid the danger of “green washing” 
(.wwf.no 2). However, this does not signify that WWF refuses to talk with oil companies, 
indeed employees of WWF often do (ibid). In those instances it is important to WWF to 
prevent the possibility of “green washing”, and my informant stressed that “no company can 
pride themselves with the WWF panda logo if they don’t really deserve it” (wwf interview 1). 
WWF have clear ideas on how good partnerships should function, and “the ideal partner is a 
leading company in its area which is not only supporting WWF, but also is carrying out 
environmental improvements in their own operations” (WWF årsmelding 2006: 17).  
At the same time, WWF has an aspiration to be the most attractive partner organization for 
private business (WWF årsmelding 2006:17). A tendency which WWF has noticed is that it 
has become easier to negotiate with business actors, much due to the climate issue (WWF 
interview 2). Many companies now contacts WWF in order to get advice or to propose 
partnerships (ibid). 
 
General strategies and actors involved 
Even if their main focus when approaching private companies is direct partnerships, it does 
not exclude that other agents and networks are considered:  
The State: When describing the approach of WWF, my informant often referred to “The 
Norwegian model”, as the cooperation between the state, private business and NGOs (wwf 
interview1 & 2). Further, he stated that “our most important means is to influence the 
politicians, because they set the laws” (WWF interview 2). Lobbyism towards politicians, in 
order to make them create official laws that regulate private business towards more 
sustainable practises is thereby a crucial task (WWFs årsmelding 2006:18). E. g. an essential 
victory for WWF was when they managed to make the politicians change the law regarding 
how close the ships can go to land, to 40 nautical miles (WWF interview 2). But the process 
was slow; it took over two years to accomplish the new regulation rules (ibid). My informant 
seemed to be disappointed with the government’s action and regulation, and referred to an 
illustrating story: 
”A Norwegian Oil Company got permission from the government to search for oil in an area 
outside Norway, and by this the government chose to ignore a comprehensive report from the 
Ministry of Environment warning them from doing this In this case, WWF and Bellona 
discovered this report and published it, and this created a lot of debate. In this case it is also 
striking that all the work that the directorate did would have been for nothing if not the NGOs 
had discovered and published them” (WWF interview 1). 
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However, WWF lobbying is directed not only at politicians, but also different ministries, like 
the ministry of Environment, the ministry of Trade and Industry and the ministry of Fisheries 
and Costal Affaires, depending on the issue (WWF interview 3) 
 
The international level: WWF is one of the largest and most well known international 
environmental organizations. The Norwegian office is thereby part of an international 
network. This is reflected in that when WWF Norway engage in partnerships with Norwegian 
companies, those contracts often get internationalized if the company has enterprises or 
offices in other countries (WWF interview 2). Collaboration between the companies and the 
national WWF organizations of different countries can then be established (ibid). Such 
international partnership contracts are ideal for WWF, since environmental differences they 
can create are at a wider scale (ibid).  So even if I am trying to study WWF Norway, the 
international factor is imperative. In addition to international partnerships with companies, the 
Norwegian organization has created projects together with WWF in other countries, and 
especially projects in developing countries (that receive financial support from the NORAD) 
(WWF interview 2). E.g. WWF Norway has established a project in Georgia together with the 
WWF organization in this country, sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ibid).  
 
Society based programmes/projects: Similarly to RF, WWF also has an educational 
programme for schools and teachers. Another programme that has proved successful is the 
“clean coast programme” (“Ren kyst”). It was established in 2005 in collaboration with the 
“Emergency Preparedness Centre of North Norway” (NordNorsk Beredskapssenter) and “The 
Norwegian Coastal Administration”, and Norway is the third country where WWF has started 
this programme (WWF årsmelding 2005:13). Motivations when this programme was started 
stressed that the emergency preparedness in case of ship accidents and oil spills along the 
coast was insufficient (WWF interview 2). Essentially, the project therefore educates 
volunteers in cleaning the coast in case of oil spills, in order to reduce the environmental 
consequences of oil spill accidents (WWF årsmelding 2005:14). Furthermore, the project aims 
to establish and strengthen deposits of equipment, and also to give environmental motivated 
individuals and organizations the possibility to engage them selves in practical environmental 
work (WWF årsmelding 2005:14). For these reasons, the programme arranges several courses 
in order to train/educate volunteers. These courses are funded by different companies and 
public institutions, especially insurance companies (ibid). The oil-spill problem that WWF 
had anticipated materialized in the Fedje-accident 12.01 2007, and has after this instance it 
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obtained more attention (WWF interview 2). But although the Fedje-accident showed the 
importance of such preparedness programmes, WWF is disappointed that the politicians have 
not prioritised this issue (ibid).   
Connections to the media are also important, especially since the publishing of their opinions, 
knowledge and values is essential for WWF as for most NGOs (ibid). This might be important 
not only to spread information to society, but also to create connections and relations to 
society by being a visible and recognized NGO. WWF also has collaborative projects with 
other Norwegian NGOs. 
 
6.2.3 Case: marine protection and three industrial areas targeted:  
I will now turn to some cases which describe how WWF approaches and tries to influence the 
regulation of three different industries that are causing environmental damage on the oceans. 
The main focus will be on which strategies WWF has chosen on the different industries, and 
some reactions from companies on WWFs enquiries and requests. Since the tree industries are 
quite different and WWF have taken different approaches towards them, I will spend more 
space on describing each of them instead. Due to the limited space this thesis has, I will not 
have the possibility carry out a comprehensively investigation the industries themselves since 
they are quite huge and involving a lot of actors and recourses, and my focus will be mostly 
on WWFs relation to the other actors and how the partnerships develop. Moreover, the 
shipping industry will be described more in-depth and given more consideration than the other 
two industries, depending on where I gathered most information. 
 
6.2.4. Shipping:  
Norway is one of the leading countries in international shipping industry (NSA interview). 
Even if shipping is perceived as the most environmental friendly transportation method, there 
are many environmental problems connected to this industry, like pollution and emissions of 
CO2 and NOx and destruction of natural eco-systems because of emission of ballast water 
(.wwf.no 3)Since shipping is a global industry, the UN specialized agency for the marine 
issue, “International Maritime Organization” (IMO) is a central actor on creating regulative 
frameworks for the shipping industry35  
                     
35 The relation between IMO and the other actors is that “IMO develops and adopts global regulations on safety, 
security and the prevention of marine pollution from ships, while its 167 Member Governments are responsible 
for enforcing the regulations once they adopt them. But it is the shipping industry and its fleet of over 50,000 
ships which is ultimately responsible for compliance with these rules and for developing complementary 
initiatives” (IMO report 2007: 1) 
 78 
Moreover, it is essential to establish international regulation of the shipping industry for the 
reason that:  “The ownership and management chain surrounding any ship can embrace 
many countries and ships spend their economic life moving between different jurisdictions, 
often far from the country of registry. There is, therefore, a need for international standards 
to regulate shipping - which can be adopted and accepted by all”.  (.imo.org) 
Clearly, since the shipping industry is international and causing environmental effects 
globally, international regulation is necessary. However, such regulation is difficult not only 
because of the voluntary aspect, but also because shipping industry is not part of the Kyoto 
agreement (WWF interview 2). 
 
WWFs solutions: Dialogue and cooperation for international regulation:   
WWF main approaches to environmental issues are as mentioned earlier a solution- and 
dialogue oriented. Therefore, WWF have engaged in dialogue with many different actors in 
the Norwegian shipping industry, and established partnerships with various shipping 
companies (WWF interview 3). Moreover, WWF has a close cooperation with the Norwegian 
Ship-owners Association (NSA), which is an important actor functioning as a mediator 
between the companies and national/international legislation (WWF interview 3). WWF and 
NSA have engaged in a cooperation agreement which aims at discussing how a set of rules 
should develop and additionally try to influence the shipping companies to comply with the 
rules (NSA interview). In a similar vein as WWF, NSA is also preoccupied with making the 
shipping industry more environmental friendly, however WWF is generally more impatient 
and want stricter regulations (interview NSA). Therefore they often arrange meetings together 
and the dialogues between them has mostly been positive, but in some instances WWF try to 
push NSA take more comprehensive environmental steps (ibid). Particularly, WWF has in 
some instances functioned as an environmental policy advisor for NSA and helped them 
develop an environmental policy entailing a “zero emission” vision (ibid). The main message 
in this policy is the vision that “Norwegian shipping and offshore contracting industry shall 
not release environmentally harmful emissions into the sea or the air” (NSA environmental 
policy 2007:1). Practical solutions to fulfil this vision are shortly described to promote better 
international regulations through IMO, and focus on environmental friendly technical 
solutions (ibid). International regulation and innovative technologies are thereby the two key 
strategies for NSA. If technological solutions are competitive and are not too costly for the 
companies, a set of official rules would not be necessary (NSA interview).  
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Moreover, NSA views themselves and the Norwegian shipping industry as international 
environmental forerunners, and participates together with WWF in the IMO discussions on 
international regulation, especially the “Marine Environment Protection Committee” (MEPC) 
(NSA interview). Since Norwegian companies are one step ahead on their environmental 
standards, they have a competitive advantage especially if the international regulation gets 
stricter (ibid). NSA are therefore working closely together with representatives from the 
Norwegian government especially the Norwegian Maritime Directorate and the Ministry of 
Environment on this issue, and are sharing the view that the international regulation should be 
strengthened and more stringent (ibid). The reason why NSA is willing to cooperate with 
WWF on these issues is that NSA regards WWF as competent on the field:  
“WWF is a competent organization, they choose subjects that they engage deeply into, 
WWF Norway has e.g. chosen ballast water as a focus area….In addition, they have an 
employee who has worked in the shipping industry on board on a ship, so they know how 
ships function and what is reasonable to do on a ship. That gives them more competence and 
makes them a more important dialogue partner than other environmental NGOs that don’t 
know anything about ships and propose unrealistically claims.....like e.g. Greenpeace that are 
perceived as very extreme, and are always repeating the same argument without noticing the 
positive changes that are happening36” 
(Interview NSA).  
Thereby it is due to WWFs special expertise on the field that the organization gets 
possibilities to take part in significant discussions on regulations of the shipping industry. 
 
A partnership case: WWF  and WWL:  
Some companies go further than the international legislations, and spend a lot of money on 
conducting research and developing new technological solutions, in order to stay one step in 
front and get the competitive advantage (NSA interview). Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics 
(WWL) which is Norwegian largest shipping company is one of these forerunners (ibid).  
The first example my primer informant from WWF stressed when I told him about my thesis, 
was WWFs partnership with WWL. WWF has engaged in partnerships with other shipping 
companies also, but this one is noticeably the largest project and a case they were quite 
satisfied with (WWF interview 3). As discussed in the previous section, partnerships with 
companies have to be connected to one of the environmental programmes WWF have 
established, and this partnership is based around “Endangered Seas Programme” (ibid). 
                     
36 However, the informant from NSA added that the initiative and pressure from Greenpeace in 1999 on the issue 
of the chopping and deconstruction of old ships in east Asia where the environmental and health conditions were 
horrible, created reactions in the industry and international solutions on the issue came on the agenda in NSA 
and IMO (NSA interview) 
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According to WWF, the cooperation started because WWL obtained information about the 
Endangered Seas Programme, and therefore contacted WWF (WWF interview1). A 3-year 
contract was signed, which was renewed in 2008 (ibid). WWL is now one of the many 
supporters of this program, and is described by WWF as an “environmental partner” (wwl 
environmental report 2006: 17).  
The purpose of the partnership for WWF is first and foremost that WWL support WWFs 
efforts and the endangered seas programme financially (WWF interview 2). However, the 
underlying principle is obviously not only to receive funding, but to create actual 
environmental gains. Pushing and motivating the company to develop environmental friendly 
technologies a fundamental task for WWF as stated in the previous sections. Some of the 
technological environmental friendly innovations that WWL has created will be mentioned in 
next section. 
Moreover, an essential part of the contract is that the company and its employees have to 
commit them selves to improve their environmental efforts (WWF interview 2). 
Arrangements carried out by the partnership therefore include activities like seminars, where 
WWF deliver lectures for the employees (ibid). Because WWL is an international company, 
WWF Norway also tries to establish collaborations between the WWF offices in countries 
where WWL have enterprises, so that they can arrange seminars and establish local projects 
(WWF interview 2). Moreover, WWF demands that WWL also has to set standards for the 
businesses and sub suppliers they depend upon (ibid).  
For WWF, this seems to be an ideal partnership, because WWL is both a leading company in 
its area, supporting WWF and they are also carrying out environmental improvements in their 
own operations. However, the partnership is now international, and the connection between 
the WWF Norway and the Norwegian branch of WWL is only a part of this picture. Because 
of the partnership, the company is allowed to use the Panda symbol to promote its 
environmental profile (WWF interview 1). 
 
The partnership described by WWL: WWL claims to be a leading company on taking 
environmental problems seriously international, and they strive to stay ahead of 
environmental legislation (WWL interview). Further, WWL produce annual environmental 
reports that states that they are aware of the responsibility that such a position entails, and that 
they actively work to reduce the environmental impact of its business operations and strives to 
use energy and natural resources sensibly (WWL årsmelding 2005, ibid 2006). At their web 
pages, it is stated that: 
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“As a sponsor of WWF's High Seas Conservation Programme, Wallenius Wilhelmsen 
Logistics will strengthen WWF's Global Marine Programme in its work to improve high seas 
conservation and governance, including the creation of High Seas Marine Protected Areas 
and the promotion of good environmental performance within the shipping industry”  
(.2wglobal.com).  
The partnership thereby contains both a practical aim at helping WWFs efforts and a 
symbolical aim at promoting environmental attitudes. In 2005 the annual environmental 
report described the partnership with WWF is as a sponsorship that is serving to strengthen 
the company’s leadership role within the industry with regard to environment (WWL 
environmental report 2005:3). The symbolical value of the partnership seems to be regarded 
highest here. Moreover the personal connection between WWF Norway and WWL is not too 
essential, because the programme WWL sponsor is international (WWL interview). However 
the learning aspect of the partnership also emphasised: “another benefit of the sponsorship 
generates from WWFs knowledge and experience “(wwl environmental report 2005:3). 
Described further,  
“Corporate sponsorship will also enable an environmental information exchange 
where WWF and Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics share knowledge about shipping and 
marine conservation. Close cooperation not only will lead to increased understanding of how 
to improve environmental performance, but to smarter solutions to preserve marine life  
(.2wglobal.com ) 
The learning aspect and the sharing of knowledge appear to be important here, but it is hard to 
find out exactly what WWL has learnt. This might be because WWL has had an 
environmental conscious approach before the partnership with WWF, and that other 
organizations like IMO have important roles (WWL interview). My informant from WWL 
explained that “WWF helps us identify where the problems are and what we can do….They 
help us organize and prioritize what is important to do….The other side is that they are an 
important element internally in the enterprise…that the employees can agree upon” (WWL 
interview).  
In this manner it turns out that WWL also make use of the partnership to obtain practical 
environmental advices, and that the expertise of WWF to some degree is significant. 
At WWLs environmental report from 2006, the evaluation and information of the partnership 
is focusing on the “High Seas Conservation Programme”, which is created by WWF and 
where WWL is the sole sponsor (WWL environmental report 2006:33). The high seas are the 
oceans which lie beyond the national jurisdiction of any country, and are therefore 
ungoverned (ibid). According to the report, WWL and WWF are “helping the international 
community to establish a regulatory framework needed to govern the high seas” (ibid. 
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2006:33). A major achievement in 2006 was winning IMO approval to establish mandatory 
ship routing and expanded shipping lanes along the northern coast of Norway, reducing the 
risks of shipping accidents (ibid). 
Except for the sponsoring of WWFs programme, specific actions that WWL has taken on the 
environmental front are according to their own reports to raise the environmental awareness 
through seminars and workshops, both in the industry, with the supply chains and internal at 
the workplaces and for the employees (WWL environmental report 2005:14, ibid 2006:34).  
Not least, WWL has undertaken many technological improvements in order to be better than 
other companies and thereby get a competitive advantage (NSA interview). WWL is stressing 
their technological solutions and innovations, and promote a list over the company’s practical 
environmental objectives, including e.g. reduction of fuel consumption and other technical 
solutions, and the planning of a zero-emission concept vessel (WWL environmental report 
2005:20). Another much outspoken technical improvement WWL has developed is connected 
to the ballast water problematic (WWL interview). As direct environmental consequence of 
shipping business, organisms are moved with the ballast water, which can be dangerous for 
the natural environment where they are released (ibid). In order to handle this problem WWL 
has developed a special cleaning system which is built into all of their new ships (ibid). Such 
technological innovation can also be ordered and used by the smaller shipping companies, 
which not have the recourses to research on innovations themselves (NSA interview) 
 
After collecting date from interviews and reports from this partnership, it is hard to find 
exactly what the results of the partnership are. Two reasons for this: Firstly, since the 
partnership is international, there have been many different practical achievements in the 
countries where the partnership is active. In Norway, WWL has carried out many 
undertakings in their own business, but not necessarily because of the partnership with WWF.  
Secondly, the empirical material focuses on both symbolically and practical results, but do not 
specify how the results where achieved. E.g. WWL write in their reports much about what 
results the programmes they are sponsoring have achieved and less on what active efforts 
WWL has carried out on this programme apart from the funding. Moreover, it is impossible 
with this empirical material to measure if environmental values have spread in the industry 
nationally and international. 
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6.2.5 The problematic oil industry 
The petroleum industry is Norway's largest industry and as also mentioned in the context 
chapter a main income source for the country.  
Compared to the shipping industry the oil industry is to a higher degree a national industry, 
with much of its activity in Norwegian areas especially the North Sea, thereby causing 
environmental effects on the ecosystem in Norwegian oceans and the coast line. Consequently, 
this industry appears to be more dependent on national legislation and regulation than 
international. At WWFs web pages about the Marine sector, the problematic consequence of 
oil industry in the North Sea is one of their main issues. The pollution this business creates is 
only one problem, another that WWF emphasize is the negative effects for marine culture and 
species that oil spills and oil drilling causes in vulnerable areas (WWF årsmelding 2005:12).  
The topic of concessions for oil searching activity along the Norwegian coast has been a hot 
environmental debate in Norwegian politics the last years. It is the Norwegian government 
that has the main responsibility for this regulation and granting the oil companies 
concessions37.  Environmental organizations have demonstrated heavily against this, and 
pledged the government to establish “petroleum free zones” in special vulnerable areas. In 
2005 WWF engaged seriously in this discussion, and produced a report (containing 
knowledge and scientific information drawn from Veriats and Havforskingsinstituttet) that 
presented a scientific based suggestion on zones that should be petroleum free (WWF-
Norway report 2005, WWF årsmelding 2005:12). Specially highlighted, the area outside 
Lofoten is important to protect since it contains an important biodiversity, and is a significant 
area for the spawning season for the codfish. 
 
Dialogue attempts: When it comes to the partnership strategy WWF is promoting for creating 
actual environmental changes, that alternative is not applied to the oil sector. However, even 
if WWFs internal principles states that they cannot receive financial support or agree on 
partnerships with oil companies, WWF has earlier engaged in some dialogue attempts in order 
to influence them (WWF interview 2). Especially, WWF have been preoccupied with 
hindering oil companies to get allowance to drill in biological vulnerable areas and were 
active in the oil search discussion promoting “petroleum free zones”. When this issue was up 
to discussion nationally in 2005, WWF contacted and advised both Statoil/Hydro and the 
government to not take the risk of oil-drilling in some areas of the Norwegian coast line 
                     
37 The system for awarding drilling licenses that the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is carrying out  is quite 
complicated, and can be studied at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/Oil-and-Gas/Licensing-
rounds-on-the-Norwegian-Contin.html?id=481292 
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(WWF interview 3). But the oil companies, e.g. Statoil/Hydro did not want to listen to that 
suggestion at all (ibid). Moreover, since the government decided not to prohibit the oil 
companies to search for oil or establish any petroleum free zones, the oil companies had the 
law on their side (WWF interview 2). Still, representatives from WWF have several times 
contacted Statoil/Hydro in order to influence them to change their minds, without much luck. 
(ibid).The response has mainly been symbolically and “empty talk” and the work WWF had 
done to prepare and present issues to them has been meaningless (WWF interview 3).  
 
Reactions from industry: First of all, it appears (according to WWF) that many oil companies 
like Statoil/Hydro does not admit that their industry causes much damage (WWF interview 3). 
Actually, they have promoted the North Sea as example on their decent operations, and 
express that the 40 years of oil drilling hasn’t caused any setbacks for the ocean (ibid). WWF 
on the other hand, have a totally opposite impression, claiming that much of the oceans 
ecosystem is totally damaged. Since the NGOs and the oil companies obviously totally 
disagree on this fundamental question and are on opposite sides in the debate, it is clear that a 
partnership would be difficult. 
Instead of taking the NGOs advices directly, Norwegian oil companies invested millions in 
“propaganda”, promoting themselves as environmental friendly (WWF interview 3). A quick 
look at some of their web pages gives the impression that they are doing a lot to protect the 
environment. Actually their main posted item on their web page (at 14.05.08) that “In 
StatoilHydro, we have a clear goal to ensure sustainable development and help improve the 
environment” (Statiolhydro.com). This and more examples can easily give the impression that 
one of their aim actually is to somehow help the environment. Obviously, this can be 
perceived as an attempt of “green washing”. 
Moreover, the oil companies are blamed for having too strong connections to the Norwegian 
bureaucracy and politicians, especially with the Ministry of Oil and Energy, and are 
frequently criticized for being part of alliances between the top directors and bureaucrats 
(WWF interview 3). These strong connections are obvious per example in the forum 
“KonKraft” established to strengthen the Norwegian oil industry, which brings together top 
executives from the industry, from oil companies, research institutions, employer’s 
organizations and the government (St.meld. nr. 38 (2001-2002) > 8 Petroleumsnæringen). 
Thereby, the oil companies might get the possibility to influence the regulatory suggestions 
that the ministry would give on oil concessions.  
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Transparency problems: The indications on cooperation between companies and public 
institutions above point towards that it can be hard for NGOs to access or intervene in those 
processes. As mentioned earlier, working politically in order to establish laws that regulate 
areas along the Norwegian coast, and thereby prevent oil companies to establish activity in 
vulnerable areas is a main issue for WWF. My informant emphasised that in addition to not 
getting much attention from the industry on this issue, the access to information was also 
difficult (WWF interview 3). WWF has therefore put efforts into creating more transparency 
in both oil industry and in the decision-making processes concerning regulations that take 
place in governmental institutions (ibid). Both my informant stressed that WWF can be 
viewed as a lobby organization, and connected to this issue they have sent requests and letters 
to different governmental institutions (ibid). For instance WWF has struggled to get access to 
the professional documents estimating oil drilling consequences for fish and environment 
which was used in the concession negotiations of the Norwegian shelf (Årsmeld.2005:12). 
Since some of the information on the governmental negotiations not was made available for 
the public, WWF sent an official complaint to the Parliamentary ombudsman for public 
administration and got in allowance lastly (ibid). Based the effort of accessing information, 
WWF have also written articles blaming the government for being undemocratically and 
keeping secrets. 
Actually, since WWFs experience trying to influence oil companies is that negative, WWF 
has concluded that is often is a “not waste of time and resources to talk to these companies” 
and decided to not spend much more time on contacting them (wwf interview 3). Further, 
since dialogue was out of the question and the companies not seem to be interested in 
listening to WWFs advices, other strategies to change the oil business are applied. 
Another solution connected to oil pollution in what WWF promotes as their” clean coast 
programme” (mentioned in previous chapter), which is aimed at reducing environmental 
damage when oil spills occur. It is kind of reactive in relation to the damages oil industry can 
cause, since it is not aiming at changing industry and preventing accidents, but at finding 
solutions when accidents happen. 
In WWFs annual report from 2006, there is not much written on how the “petroleum free 
zone” suggestion was embraced by the government, only that the government’s suggestion 
somehow looks similar to WWFs suggestion but has serious shortages (WWF årsmelding 
2006:6). The struggle on oil drilling concessions can be said to be largely won by the oil 
companies, getting grants for oil drilling, despite the heavy protests from environmental 
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organizations. Early in the interviews, when I asked my informant to describe areas where 
WWF has not succeeded, the oil industry was pointed out (WWF interview 1). 
 
6.2.6 Aquaculture industries (fish-farming) and fisheries:  
Norway has a long coast and old fishing traditions, and fish has traditionally been a major 
export resource of the country. Modern fish-farming is a well developed national industry, 
and as one of the country’s most valuable export industries. It is producing around 500 000 
tons of salmon and trout each year, and the industry has an annual value estimated to be 
around 12 billion NOK (1.5 billion Euro) (WWF-norway report 2/2005:5) The last years, the 
fish- farming business has been object to much critique especially for environmental problems 
they cause. WWF are concerned with different problematic issues the fish-farming businesses 
are causing, the most well known of them problems caused by escaped farm-breed fishes, 
causing disturbances in the natural ecosystems and spreading diseases (WWF interview 3). 
 
WWFs National efforts on the issue:  
WWF produced in 2005 the report “on the run – escaped farmed fish in Norwegian Waters”, 
where problematic environmental consequences are scientifically described (WWF 
årsmelding 2005:12). The aim of producing the report was that “the report should serve as a 
wakeup call for governments to better manage their fish farming industries, and indicates to 
the fish farming industry that changes in its attitudes and practices are needed” (WWF-
norway report 2/2005:4). The report suggests five solutions for a stricter regulation; “Better 
management at fish farms, individual tagging of farmed fish, fish farm free zones in 
vulnerable areas, Risk assessments when farming new species, Consumers should ask for eco-
labelled fish” (Ibid). These suggestions include that both the companies, the government and 
consumers should be involved in creating better regulative mechanisms. A significant issue 
for WWF was to pressure the government to establish a commission for controlling industry, 
where different actors from both private and public should work together (ibid). After much 
pressure from environmental NGOs the government appointed the “Aquaculture Escape 
Commission” (RKA) (set up by the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs) in the summer 
of 2006 (WWF interview 3). This commission is aimed at dealing with the farmed-fish 
escaping problem and at establishing and following up a stronger regulation of the fish-farms, 
specifically following up the zero-escape vision of the Ministry of Fisheries and Costal 
Affairs (RKA årsmelding 2007:4). Representatives from both companies, scientific 
institutions, FHL and WWF participate in the commissions efforts of ensuring a better 
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understanding of escapes and helping identify measures that can prevent them from occurring 
(ibid). 
 
As can be seen above, WWF cooperates with (of towards) significant actors on the regulation 
of the aquaculture industry. An important actor and sometimes collaborator of WWF is the 
marine culture employers-organization “The Norwegian Seafood Federation” (FHL). FHL is 
preoccupied with two environmental issues: the environmental challenges in own industry 
(especially fish-farming) and the industries that are harmful to fishing industry itself like the 
oil spills, transportation or radioactivity (FHL interview). Interesting to this thesis is also that 
they are opposing and taking stand against that oil companies should be allowed to search for 
oil in vulnerable areas of Lofoten (discussed in last section).  
According to WWF, the fish-farming industry have tried for a long time to deny that they 
caused any environmental problems, arguing for example that they are such a small industry 
and their effects are limited (WWF interview 3). Moreover, “FHL attempted for some time to 
avoid the problematic discussion and not take WWFs opinion into account” (ibid). On some 
issues, and especially in the discussion of MSC certification, WWF (and FHL have disagreed 
completely (WWF was positive and FHL negative) and criticised each other (.wwf.no 4). 
However, FHL admit that the watchdog role environmental NGOs have had has been 
important to the industry, pushing it towards better levels (FHL interview). FHL has lately 
engaged in close dialogue with different environmental NGOs, including WWF.  
Additionally to having dialogues, both representatives from WWF and FHL are appointed as 
members of the governmental commission dealing with escaped fish (FHL interview). 
Moreover, dialogue has not only been focusing on environmental improvements in own 
industry, but WWF and FHL have also cooperated on demanding a better governmental 
emergency preparedness in case of oil spills (FHL interview) 
Mostly the environmental director of NLH had a positive impression of WWF pointing out 
that their professionally work has been important, but that they sometimes have “been too 
loud and exaggerated some things in the media” (FHL interview).  
 
 A national partnership:  My informant from FHL stated that Norwegian companies are taking 
environmental standards more seriously, upgrading equipment, and setting higher standards 
for themselves (FHL interview). The 9.of September 2005 WWF Norway made a formal 
complaint on the Norwegian company Marine Harvest (which is the world's leading seafood 
company and largest producer of farmed salmon) for breaking the pollution law (.wwf.no 5). 
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Since this confrontation, the dialogue between WWF and Marine Harvest has become 
friendlier, and in 2008 they signed a partnership agreement (WWF Interview 3). Because this 
partnership is quite fresh, I did not have time to gather much information on it. At a press 
release, MH described the partnership as a result of years with dialogue:  
- We have through several years had WWF as a dialogue partner in raising important 
issues in fish farming. We are formalizing our cooperation with WWF-Norway in order to 
increase the fact-based understanding of the aquaculture business “   
(.wwf.no 6)  
 
According to this statements the aims for the partnership is to learn from each other and 
increase understanding and knowledge through dialogue, but the financial sponsoring of 
WWFs research on aquaculture was also essential (WWF.interview 3). 
MH further partnership describes that their shared environmental objectives are: 
- Protection of marine and freshwater biological diversity.  
- Significant reduction of the ecological footprint and environmental effects of MHs 
operations.  
- Minimize climate change impacts from fish farming activities and processing.  
(.wwf.no 6) 
 
Since the partnership is quite new, these objectives are quite vague, not telling too much about 
how they are going to be fulfilled. However, it is assumed that environmental issues might 
develop further through the partnership, and the secretary general (CEO) Rasmus Hansson of 
WWF-Norway commented optimistically that 
-Through this agreement, Marine Harvest and WWF-Norway will reduce the impact of 
Marine Harvest production on the environment and the industry as a whole while ensuring 
the economic sustainability of the production. 
(.wwf.no 6)  
Thereby, it is assumed that the partnership will increase the self-regulation of the company. 
Practical results of the partnership that can be conducted so far, is that WWF is going to 
receive financial support in order to get conduct research and create programmes on the issue 
of fish-farming (WWF interview 3). Moreover, WWF will set standards and deliver 
environmental demands to MH which they have to act in accordance with (ibid). For MH, 
WWF will functions as an environmental advisor, in addition to giving symbolical value of 
priding their company with the panda symbol (ibid).  
 
International regulation: MSC:  
At the same time as taking efforts on changing Norwegian industries, WWF also participate in 
international situational processes on this issue. Similarly to the Forest Stewardship Council, 
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there also exists a certification option on fisheries called “Marine Stewardship Council” 
(MSC). “The MSC is an independent, global, non-profit organisation whose role is to 
recognise, via a certification programme, well-managed fisheries and to harness consumer 
preference for seafood products bearing the MSC label of approval “(.msc.org 1). Even if 
MSC Principles and Criteria at this stage only apply to wild-capture fisheries and not to 
aquaculture, this might change in the future.  
Inspired by the FSC, WWF international was actually one of the actors who took initiative 
and started MSC in 1996 together with Unilever (Guldbrandsen 2005:399). WWF Norway 
support this certification possibility, and has since 2004 worked to make Norwegian fisheries 
accept and engage in this labelling (wwf årsmelding 2004:7). But especially the first years, 
there were a lot of scepticism towards MSC. The Norwegian” Fishery and Aquaculture 
Industry Research Fund” made a report, criticising MSC for being voluntary and not 
connected to the Norwegian government, and that thereby international and not Norwegian 
criteria guide the certification (FHF prosjekt 261054 2006:1). The control was criticized for 
not being good enough, and a Norwegian alternative certification was discussed (ibid). It was 
especially thought that the Norwegian public fishery-administration was the best in the world 
and that MSC therefore not was necessary (FHL interview). Additionally, FHL felt that MSC 
was not making an effort to watch out for illegal fishing, which is a serious issue for FHL and 
Norwegian fishing industry (FHL interview). However, after some discussions with MSC, 
WWF and Greenpeace, FHL changed their minds, and in 2007 the Norwegian fishery industry 
and FHL decided to apply for MSC certification on many types of Norwegian fish on the 
behalf of companies (FHL interview). Usually, it is the companies themselves that apply, but 
in this case the interest organization took on this task (ibid). The reason why they changed 
towards a more positive attitude was that they saw that this certification functioned well on 
the market (ibid). Thereby, FHL and the Norwegian fishing industry seem to have accepted 
the standards that MSC are setting, but FHL has also lately engaged in the international 
discussions inside MSC (ibid).  
 
Another international effort that WWF has developed, which is more connected to fish-
farming, is the international discussion forum “Aquaculture Dialogues”. (.worldwildlife.org 1). 
Through a series of roundtables, WWF here works with farmers, retailers, NGOs, scientists 
and other aquaculture industry stakeholders worldwide to develop standards for certifying 
aquaculture products (ibid). It is thereby an effort to connect different actors and make them 
develop standards based on the different knowledge and preferences of the different actors. 
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This forum was initially started by WWF international, and aims to be a meeting place 
between industry and other interests of stakeholders in order to create environmental 
regulations in fish (in this case salmon) industry (ibid). Representatives from WWF Norway 
and from FHL also participate on some of these international dialogue meetings, especially 
the “Salomon Aquaculture Dialogue” (FHL interview). The goal of the salmon aquaculture 
dialogue is to “Develop and implement verifiable environmental and social performance 
levels that measurably reduce or eliminate key impacts of salmon farming and are acceptable 
to stakeholders. Recommend standards that achieve these performance levels while permitting 
the salmon farming industry to remain economically viable” (.worldwildlife.org 2)  
This dialogue has a professional standard, and the issue is to find solutions that both the 
industry and other stakeholders can agree upon (FHL interview).  
  
Obviously, regulations on aquaculture industries have to be carried out both national and 
international. WWF has made contact and are cooperating with many of the most significant 
national actors like FHL, and participates together with them in order to influence national 
companies, governmental decision-making on aquaculture, and international regulative 
schemes like MSC. It seems like the Norwegian aquaculture industry has become more 
willing to take up environmental problems connected to own industry and not only criticizing 
other industries that pollute the oceans. 
 
6.2.7 Summary WWF: main points and strategy 
WWFs strategy for engaging in regulation (of industries polluting the marine environment) is 
based on a dialogue- and problem-solving approach. Clearly, WWFs main tactic (except 
lobbyism at political instances) is to engage in dialogue and cooperation with powerful actors 
(like large companies, governmental institutions and interest organizations) nationally and 
internationally. It seems that WWF international has a tradition of bringing different actors 
together in discussion forums (like the MSC and the Aquaculture Dialogues) in order to create 
agreements and solutions.  
Additionally, dual partnerships between WWF and single companies are a much used strategy. 
These partnerships are based on sharing professional knowledge and are focused at 
developing practical sustainable solutions. Through conversations with the companies, WWF 
gets the opportunity to influence them directly and pressure them to implement higher 
standards and to regulate themselves according to environmental goals they shape. The 
industries WWF approaches are quite large and comprehensive, and a high degree of 
 91 
knowledge and insight into the industries is significant. Possibilities and restriction that the 
choice of strategy give will be further discussed in the analysis. 
Industries reaction to WWFs efforts differ, the shipping industry seems to be the easiest to 
cooperate with, the aquaculture was easier the last years, and the oil industry was the most 
difficult. An obvious reason for that is that the oil industry is counted as the most 
environmental problematic industry since its main activities are very pollutant. It also appears 
that it is more unproblematic to cooperate when the industries acknowledge the critique from 
WWF, and when the companies not only recognize government or scientific institutes as 
relevant actors.  
At my last interview with WWF, my informant stressed that to accumulate information and 
crave for transparency in political processes is imperative for WWFs effort, and WWF has 
sometimes struggled to access information that would enable them to intervene in the 




















6.3 Summing up differences and similarities between the NGOs 
Before going deeper into an analysis, I will sum up some of the general similarities and 
differences between the two NGOs seen in light of the context chapter. A closer discussion on 
the advantages and disadvantages choices of strategies can provide will be given in the 
analysis chapter. 
 
Objectives for targeting Industry: The most obvious differences between the two NGOs are 
their focus areas, goals and philosophy: RF has a more concentrated issue, concerning only on 
the protection of rainforests, while WWF has a wider and larger focus area of environmental 
protection, taking both forest, ocean, land and air pollution into account. This is also obvious 
when the two NGOs are targeting business actors: RF is targeting smaller industries and has 
one aim: to convince the different business not to make use of rainforest timber. WWF on the 
other hand is targeting the largest industries in Norway, and has not as specific aims, but are 
attempting to influence companies on several environmental issues: changing both their 
general attitudes and their production methods/technology towards more environmental 
friendly. Thereby, RFs regulative request to the industries might be easier to implement or 
reject, while WWFs might contain many diverse and specialized regulative requests. 
Another difference is that RF has not only the goal to protect the environment for its own sake, 
but also a heavy focus on the rights and well-being of the native people living there. Thereby, 
RF is more oriented towards human rights, and this implies that RF might have a less classical 
approach to environment protection than WWF. Lastly, even if both organizations are 
preoccupied with conservation, WWF have a focus on developing modern technology and can 
thereby be said to be more in line with the ecological modernization ideology. One might also 
interpret that WWFs objectives are more practical while RFs more political.  
 
Business areas targeted:  My research question was concerned about how the NGOs approach 
industries, but before going into the differences of the strategies it must be emphasised that 
the industries they approach are quite different, and therefore be hard to compare to each 
other. The industries RF is concerned about are far smaller than the ones WWF works 
towards. Moreover, the comprehensive industries that WWF target give seem to be more 
politically organized as they often have own interest organizations that promote and lobby 
their business politically. 
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Concerning the organization structures, both NGOs do not have classical democratic 
structures with a volunteer membership base, but are organized more like foundations. They 
were not the result of grass-root mobilization and are quite young NGOs, WWF was 
established in the 1960 and RF in the late 1980s.  
WWF seems to encompass a more bureaucratic organized approach when targeting 
companies, with established rules and standards for the cooperation. Since RF s main strategy 
is to avoid direct partnerships, their approach might be more open to creativity. For example, 
they take the consumers and their potential power into account.  
Another similarity in the organizational structures is that both NGOs are professionalized, but 
different academic professions dominate the two NGOs: WWFs staff is dominated by 
biologists and people with specialized natural science education, RF on the other hand, 
consists mainly of social anthropologists and people with social-science background. This fact 
may be important because professions can function as carriers of different discourses which 
can have significant impact on how the NGOs understand and solve problems, for example on 
how they present “their working partners” within their web pages: RF presents their partner 
organizations and local NGOs in countries with rainforest, while WWF on the other hand 
presents their partners in private businesses. Such interpretations show which knowledge they 
see as relevant, while RF find the indigenous local knowledge in the rainforest areas 
important, WWF mainly focus on the specialized knowledge of biologists and natural 
scientists. Moreover, RFs sceptical approach towards powerful private and political actors 
(like large private companies of the World Bank) might be due to critical assumptions on 
power and politics embedded in social science. 
Thereby, these two NGOs are examples of un-classical way of organizing NGOs. By 
organizing as foundations, the NGOs are not voluntarily ruled, and an argument for choosing 
this organization form is that democratic decision-making is a slow and ineffective process. 
Explained by the professionalized society, centralization, and specialization we can generally 
see a change in civil society and NGOs, which also implies that volunteers and un-specialized 
members become less important.  
Moreover, the NGOs are oriented towards practical problem-solving, especially WWF, and 
what relevance their organization has for democracy seems not to be an important issue. And 
last but not least, their relations to society also seem to be professionalized. Both of the 
organizations did not have many active volunteer members that mattered much for the 
organization itself. Instead, they had established programmes that volunteers could participate 
in, where the volunteers could function as more practical resources (working force).  
 94 
 
Areas where RF and WWF agree of disagree: On the certification issue, RF are more sceptical 
while WWF often make use of and support such systems, as can be observed in the issue of 
FSC. This is connected to the fact that WWF described its own approach as dialogue-and 
problem-solving, thereby focusing at opportunities cooperation can create. Connected to the 
FSC discussion, RF criticised WWF for being too concerned on the protection of nature in 
establishing protected areas, forgetting the local people depending on the use of these areas 
(Rapport Regnskogens tilstand 2005:22).  
Nationally, RF and WWF have cooperated in lobbying towards the government, and are 
clearly agreeing on that the government should implement more policies on environmental 
protection, and embed this issue in e.g. the aid policy. 
 
The understanding and adaptation to globalization: Clearly, these NGOs are not grown out 
from a Norwegian context, but are national branches of international environmental 
organizations. Because of this, they can be conceptualized as global actors and as parts of 
international knowledge networks. Thereby, they encompass global aims, and are not merely 
focused at the solving environmental problems in Norway, but also at rising global 
environmental standards and regulating international corporations. It seems that both the 
NGOs have realized that they need to work more directly towards private industry to achieve 



















7. Analysis and conclusions: 
Having adaptive theory as research approach, the process of writing has moved back and 
fourth between theoretical and empirical sampling. In this chapter I will confront my 
empirical observations and the main theoretical and contextual propositions outlined in the 
previous chapters with each other, in order to discuss the initial research question of the thesis. 
Selecting theoretical and empirical information and limiting the information and thoughts 
generating from this study has been a complicated concern. The main research question was 
concerning conditions for the NGOs to intervene in regulation, and there certainly are various 
ways of examining and answering this issue. My research question indicated two fields that I 
have concentrated my research on: the NGOs own choices of strategy, and political contexts. 
The analytical examination will therefore in the first hand concentrate on investigating what 
regulative capacities the NGOs can encompass by comparing the strategies they have chosen 
with theoretical assumptions. Thereafter, I will examine how various contexts create 
conditions for NGOs as regulative actors, and take a more theoretical discussion into account. 
Lastly, I will sum up the main contributions of my thesis and the conclusions I have generated 
throughout this research. 
 
The examination will be discussed in light of a wide regulation perspective that encompasses 
a focus on actors and relationships between actors. The main assumption that united the 
theoretical contributions on regulation was a broadened perception of regulation. The word 
regulation is often connected to the following up of formal legislation (like e.g. Carter (2007). 
But to regulate, as a verb, can also be understood as decisions on what standards another actor 
should follow, and such decisions can also be created socially and indirectly. Especially 
Braithwaite & Dahos (2000), Gunningham (legal pluralism) (1998) and Black (2003) argued 
that regulation is more than following laws, but can be any mechanism that constraint 
behaviour. Consequently, these conceptions are based on a deeper (Foucault 2002) 
understanding of power, that power is not something you can possess and use, but that it is 
created through social acting. Regulating then can include the process where the regulative 
standards are developed. Especially in those processes many actors can be included. At the 
same time, it can be difficult to find out where the standards emerge from, when many actors 
and discourses involved in such dialogues. Clearly, the aims of the NGOs are largely to 
constrain the behaviour of companies and promote new standards, and since they cannot 
command these standards, other means based on convincing various actors to agree with the 
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standards are significant. Thereby, to engage in dialogue with a range of actors can enhance 
the possibility for enrolling their agenda into networks and give power to the standards the 
NGOs promote. 
It is important to underline that this thesis is not aiming at comparing regulative mechanisms 
and pointing out which ones are functioning the best. It seems to me that many people and 
scientists take stands for or against state / private regulation, but it seems that that public 
governmental regulation still is the most significant, and that it cannot totally be replaced by 
other mechanisms. Although, to open up for a more fragmented perspective on regulation, 
might give a better understanding of why regulation is such a complicated matter, also for the 
state. As Ayers & Braithwaite (1992), Gunningham (1993) and Black (2003) argued, it is 
important to transcend the regulation - de-regulation debate, and focus on how mixtures of 
public and private regulation occur. 
Lastly, a critical comment on a broader perspective on regulation might be the classical 
argument that conceptions might loose their meaning if they are broadened too much (like the 
discussion on the conceptions of democracy, corruption and so on). There is a tendency that 
many conceptions broaden their meaning, especially when they are influenced by more post-
modern perspectives on power. The concept of regulation might have been dominated by 
jurists, and therefore been connected to interpretations of law. But since regulation is such an 
important political tool, like in my case for the protection of the environment, a more political 
and power-based understanding of regulation might be necessary. Moreover, underlying the 
discussion on regulation are normative questions on whose responsibility it should be to carry 
out regulation. 
These perspectives will be taken into account when I now turn to the analysis of how the 
NGOs have attempted to regulate companies directly, pressure stronger self-regulation or 
pressure the state to regulate the companies. 
 
7.1. Regulatory capacities and main strategies chosen 
In this section I will analyse what restrictions and possibilities the main strategies of the 
NGOs can generate. This part of the analysis will thereby start at the empirical level. First, an 
outline on the NGOs regulatory capacities will be presented, which will indicate how the 
NGOs generally attempt to intervene in regulation. Thereafter, their strategies for more 
directly pressurising or regulating industries will be discussed and compared with the model 
that was presented in the theoretical chapter. Since the approaches of the NGOs obviously are 
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different but they also encompass similarities, comparing the two NGOs, their campaigns and 
ideals is essential in order to find out what limitations and possibilities the strategies give.  
 
7.1.1 General regulative capacities: 
As described in the theory chapter, I chose to put weight on a “translation theory of power”, 
whereby power is conceived as enrolment of actors, implicating that actors can exercise 
power by enrolling their agendas and discourses into networks. Since the NGOs can not make 
use of command and control regulation like governments, this power concept enables me to 
analyse how they more indirectly can influence in regulatory processes.  
A starting point when carrying out an enrolment analysis is to conceptualize the actors 
regulatory capacities: As Black (2003) pointed out, the main weight should in line with an 
enrolment analysis be put on actors, their regulatory capacities, the regulatory function which 
they could perform, their interrelationships, and the way in which they are or could be 
enrolled within a regulatory system. Consequently, an issue here is examining how the NGOs 
generally can take part in different regulation mechanisms, not only direct industry regulation. 
I will therefore first outline what capacities the two NGOs seem to make use of in order to 
enrol other actors into their aims. The discussion about their regulatory capacity will focus on 
the actual or potential possession of resources, which according to Black (2003) can be 
information, expertise, financial resources, authority and legitimacy, strategic position and 
organizational capacity:  
 
WWF s regulatory capacities: 
The expert knowledge seems to be the base for their regulative capacity, as many of my 
informants also stated. WWF can thereby fit in the description of a professionalized NGO 
(Jansen & Mydske 1998), by entailing a staff with strong and specialized knowledge that 
determine their NGOs approach and activities. Connected to the fact that the employees 
mostly were educated in natural science, their core concerns were functions of ecosystems, 
effects of pollution, threatened species etc. Moreover, and as emphasised by the informants 
from WWF, their specialized knowledge also inhabits a detailed problem-solving approach 
searching for environmental solutions, which is an advantage when cooperating with 
companies. The representatives from the industries in two in my of cases (shipping and 
aquaculture) emphasised the professional aspect of WWF as positive, and seemed to respect 
and listen to their advice because of that.  
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My empirical materials specify that WWF resemble more an expert organizations than a 
voluntary organization. A problematic aspect of this is that WWF can lose their mobilization 
potential by becoming too professional, and thereby lose some of their legitimacy. 
Mobilization potential in society is perceived as the main power potential of social 
movements, but as NGOs are more complicated, specialized and fragmented, their 
trustworthy knowledge seem determine their actions to a higher degree than their chance of 
mobilizing. However, WWF has established a well organized program where volunteers can 
participate in cleaning oil spills. But even if the programme functions well and the 
mobilization of the volunteers can be important when disasters strike, the volunteers in that 
programme seem to be perceived more as a practical resource (working force) and not as 
valuable inspirational sources of the organization.  
Another problematic aspect of the professionalization is that it might decrease their legitimacy 
in society, especially if the NGOs start getting perceived as a part of the centralized elite. 
Many studies claim that the power of NGO is drawn from legitimacy and sovereignty in 
society (e.g. Princten & Finger 1994). However, since NGOs aims generally not are to earn 
money, but to improve environmental conditions, they might contain a moral advantage over 
state and industry. It was exactly the legitimacy and symbolic value of the Panda logo that 
made companies interested in establishing partnerships with WWF. A problem for WWF is 
that the NGOs legitimacy in society can decrease along with their involvement with 
companies, because they then can become associated with classical environmental bad guys 
that not really care about humans or environment but only raising capital, as reflected in many 
critical assumptions on CSR.  
When it comes to authoritative capacity, WWF evidently has less authority over companies 
than the government, maybe especially in Norway where the state is strong and expected to 
regulate. But in the partnership cases, the agreements include that WWF should have a say on 
the efforts of the company. However, WWFs consensus approach might limit the 
organisations authority and autonomy to take clear stands and demand strict standards. When 
engaging in dialogue with companies, the NGO probably has to adjust the language towards 
fitting more with “ecological modernization”, and cannot demand that the company should 
implement regulations that heavily affect their production or capital income. E.g. WWF 




Lastly, it seems that a significant capacity for WWF is that the organization can make use of 
is the strategic position. Compared to central actors WWF cooperates with like large 
companies and the Ministry of Environment, WWF obviously enclose less human and 
financial recourses. But the concept of capacity it is not only covering financial and human 
capacities. It also counts that WWF is one of the largest and most well known international 
environmental organizations, which provides a special transnational capacity. As described in 
the case of WWL, the transnational aspect of WWF was central to the establishment of the 
partnership. Thereby, WWFs internationality can grant the organization a strategic position in 
the situation of a globalised industry. When the national WWF organization in one country 
establishes a project or a partnership, it can spread and involve the national WWF 
organizations in other countries. Connected to the “green trend” and the competition of being 
the most environmental friendly industry, environmental NGOs entail a strategic position 
because they can then, with their knowledge and legitimacy base, advice and help companies 
or corporations to improve themselves on the environmental field. 
 
RFs Regulatory capacities:  
Also the employees at RF emphasized their expert knowledge as an essential capacity that 
guides their efforts. But contrary to WWF, the knowledge that RF contain is based on social 
science, especially anthropology. This fact might explain why RF seem to be more concerned 
about political processes and human rights than simply achieving environmental gains, and 
conceive the task of protecting the environment as a moral obligation for the sake of humans 
and indigenous people. Connected to that implication, the information RF obtains is not only 
based on educational professional knowledge, but is obtained by investigating and monitoring 
various industries and the legislations connected to them, and through connections and 
dialogue with their partner organizations of indigenous people in rainforest countries. This 
mixture of expertise gives the organization the advantage not only enclosing knowledge on 
the subject, but also an insight into global political processes and an overview on other actors 
that are or could be involved in rainforest protection matters. With this knowledge capacity, 
RF can receive some authority as experts on the field and in addition can make use of their 
insights to bring cases on the agenda and pressure significant actors. 
However, and in the same vein as with WWF, the professionalization could generate a 
legitimacy problem. Similarly to many newer NGOs, RF does not have a large base of active 
volunteer members participating in the decision-making of the organization. The organization 
can thereby be blamed for being too bureaucratic and even undemocratic, and such critiques 
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can influence their legitimacy in society. Still, RF might encompass more mobilization 
capacity that WWF, since RF directs more attention to societal forces by actively approaching 
and mobilizing individual consumers. Moreover, the issue of protecting the rainforest is well 
known and many people seem to agree on the normative argument that we should take care of 
the rainforests. In the same vein as most NGOs; RF receive legitimacy because the 
organization is essentially aiming at improving environmental and human conditions, and not 
at achieving power or earning money for themselves. Additionally, the legitimacy the 
organization has in society might also be enhanced by RFs ties to indigenous agricultural 
communities (because the organization thereby not can be blamed to take “a white mans 
stand” on issues connected to “3.world countries”).  
Since RF has only the protection of the rainforest as main aim, this specialization provide the 
organization authority on the field. The informants (who not represented RF) relied on the 
information RF presented to them, and it appears that many actors eventually agree on RFs 
normative claims. However, as will be discussed more in detail later, the organizations 
authority is dependent on getting attention in media and by other actors. 
Like most NGOs, RF also has less financial recourses than industrial actors. But RF might 
have an advantage by covering a limited interest field and therefore can go deeper into that 
environmental area. Because RF is the single organization in Norway that is focused only at 
saving the rainforest, their arguments and information are often valued. Additionally, RF is 
also covering a global field with partner organizations in many countries, which enables the 
organization to get an overview on what is happening globally. Further, RF can enhance the 
strategic position by actively building networks and include various actors into their agenda. 
In these networks, like in the timber campaign, it is RF who takes the initiatives and organizes 
or activates the other actors. 
 
NGOs capacities and regulatory processes  
Summing up, it seems that the two NGOs contain similarly main capacities. They both 
contain regulative capacities in the mixture of their knowledge base, their legitimacy and their 
strategic positions.  
In line with the translation theory of power, it must be kept in mind that actors might be 
enrolled in the regulatory process at different stages; in the information gathering process, in 
the information dispersal and verification, in the function of imposing sanctions and in 
performing the regulatory functions (Black 2003).  
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As I perceive it, the most potential stage for the NGOs are in the information gathering 
processes, since their knowledge base and the legitimacy of their knowledge seem to be one 
of their main regulatory capacities. My empirical investigation indicate that the NGOs 
suggestions are often taken into account by both governments (like when participating in 
committees) and by companies and industries that want to improve their environmental 
reputation. But in many cases, the standpoints of NGOs might also be excluded from 
regulatory processes. Their capacity to enrol other actors into accepting their aims is 
obviously dependent on that the other central actors conceive the NGOs knowledge as 
relevant. 
As Braithwaite & Drahos (2000) emphasised, NGOs can have a special potential by creating 
models (to set standards that other follows), and by acting as model mongers. The modelling 
part can describe some of the actions of both my cases, as the NGOs made use of their 
knowledge to suggest new ideas and other regulative standards that others in some case 
followed. Apparently, WWF made use of complicated knowledge to promote alternative 
standards to industries, the government and interest organizations. In some of the cases, their 
standards got implemented like in the case of the escaped fish committee that eventually was 
established by the government. On the other hand, the standard WWF suggested for the oil 
industry on petroleum free zones did not seem to receive much accept. Similarly, RF also 
promoted stricter standards based on the knowledge the organization contain. Especially, RF 
struggled to make state, society and industries accept the perspective that “no one should 
make use of rainforest material”, and promoted suggestions on alternative materials. In the 
same vein as with WWF, some of the standards or models got more or less implemented by a 
number of actors. Interesting here is that it was harder and took more effort for the NGOs to 
make the state implement the standards than convincing many of the private actors.  
Additionally, both NGOs seem to have taken advantage of a competitive situation in industry. 
RF attempted to increase the competition of being the best company through their consumer 
guide releases, and WWF by encouraging good companies to advance their competitive 
advantages. The capacities of knowledge connected with a strategic position are significant 
here, and their efforts can resemble the model mongering techniques. In competitive and 
uncertain situations, the NGOs can promote their models to various actors, and especially if 
the competition of being the best company is in play; the chance for that NGOs models get 
implemented by some of the actors is enhanced. This seems to resemble what happened when 
the situation in Burma escalated, and RF promoted that companies should use alternative 
materials instead of supporting the oppressive regime by buying material from it. However, it 
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is uncertain that all the companies will participate in the competition, and that the standards or 
models that one company implement will influence the whole industrial area.  
It seems thereby that the NGOs attempt to take part in both the information gathering and in 
the information verification stages of the regulatory process, but the chances for succeeding in 
these attempts varies a lot.  
 
Lastly, the NGOs sometimes appear to have the capacity to regulate and sanction industries 
more directly, in other words, they attempt to take part in the “imposing sanctions and 
performing regulatory functions” part of the regulatory process. In the “naming and shaming” 
campaign of RF the organisation attempted to sanction the companies that were the worst by 
worsening their reputation among consumers. WWF with their partnerships attempt to 
perform regulatory functions when checking that the companies they cooperate with follow 
up the standards they agreed on. With these strategies the NGOs might enrol different actors 
into their agenda and thereby increase their chances for performing regulatory functions, and 
these strategies will now be discussed more comprehensively. 
 
7.1.2 Strategies for directly regulating industry  
Much of my empirical investigations point at how the NGOs have attempted to regulate 
or/and sanction the industries more directly, and pressured them to improve the companies’ 
self-regulation. In order to impose regulation at companies they have tried to enrol their 
standards into industry, by making use of different strategies. The strategies they have chosen 
will here be compared to the model outlined in the theoretical chapter. The discussion will 
take up if they really have changed or indirectly regulated attitudes of private industry 
towards more environmental friendly practices, and what conditions and limitations their 
choices of strategy has given. In other words, do the NGOs manage to create learning by 
enrolling their agendas and discourses into networks? In attempting to answer this question, 
the limitations and possibilities that the strategies contain will become apparent. 
As conceptualized in chapter 4 the two main approaches towards companies is either keeping 
them at a distance or cooperating with them. Applying this model to my empirical 
investigation, RF can be perceived as representing the Watchdog approach; pressuring 
companies from outside, and WWF the partnership approach; changing the companies from 
within.  
Compared and summarized, it seems the different approaches encompass diverse limitations 
and possibilities. However, the empiric material illustrate that the NGOs can apply a mixture 
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of strategies, depending on the business area they approach. This will be taken into account 
afterwards. 
The model compared with my empirical findings, highlighting limitations and possibilities 
can be summarized as following:  
 
Watchdog (from without)                                                Partnership (from within) 
Punishing worst practice                                                  Rewarding best practice 
+ Involving more actors, information flow to society      +  Effective concrete results 
+ Innovative political tactics                                             +  Environmental gains 
+ Forcing attitude changes and transparency                    +  Changing attitudes within                                                                              
-  Does not reach un-known companies                            -  Compromising –lowering demands 
-  Depended on external factors/interest                            -  “Green-washing” 
 
This model opens for a closer look at the opportunities, limitations and challenges of enrolling 
the agenda the two strategies can give:  
 
The partnership approach: Best practice 
WWF seem to be preoccupied with attempting to enrol their agenda into business and 
industry, and the main strategy they have chosen is partnerships and dual relationships with 
industrial actors.  
My primer informant emphasised that it was better and more effectual to establish positive 
relations with industrial actors and through positive dialogue learn from each other, than 
being enemies. For WWF, the aim with partnerships is not only to earn money but also push 
the companies towards implementing more environmental friendly attitudes and technology. 
By focusing on improving or developing more efficient and environmental friendly 
technology, the partnership is much in line with the “ecological modernisation” ideology. As 
the partnership with WWL and the dialogue with the aquaculture industry indicate, there have 
been some technological innovations, but it is unsure how much WWF really contributed here. 
It seems that the partnerships main function is that WWF receive funding for researching on 
environmental situations in the oceans (so that they also can give the companies advice on 
what matters are most urgent), and that WWL receive moral/symbolical support. 
As mentioned in the theory chapter, some theorists (especially economists like Elkington) 
embraced partnership strategies and connected it to deliberation and the positive effects of the 
two-sided dialogue. However, it is unclear how much effect such dialogues can have, as it 
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cannot be measured. With this partnership case, it is uncertain if WWF really has enrolled the 
environmental concern into the company’s actions, especially since WWLs informant 
confirmed that the company’s environmental engagement started before the partnership. Still, 
the same informant assured that WWF had assisted the company by defining what 
environmental concerns that were the most urgent. In addition, the identity issue of being an 
industrial forerunner on the environmental front is clearly important to the company, and 
receiving moral support from an environmental NGO can have enforced this identity. The 
mechanism of “best practices”; rewarding those industries that are taking the environmental 
issues most seriously, and thereby enhancing the best companies’ competitive advantages, 
comes into play here. A problem here might be that the good practice of WWL not will spread 
and change the attitudes in the whole industry, because the company might not want other 
industries to catch up with them and thereby loosing their competitive advantage.  
The problem that companies might only implement standards symbolically at the outside and 
not internal is likened to the prevailing danger that partnership might contribute to green-
washing. This seems to be a topic that WWF has attempted to deal with by establishing 
internal rules and guidelines for partnership building. Nevertheless, almost all industrial 
companies are somehow causing environmental effects, and how much regulative changes 
they really implement and how much of it only is a symbolically implementation varies 
strongly. Moreover, cooperating with industry and focusing too much on complicated but 
efficient practical results can give the outcome that the path of “ecological modernization” is 
chosen on behalf of conservation. The danger of co-optation due to the partnerships, on the 
other hand, might not be too high since the partners actually not had much contact with each 
other. 
A problematic issue that has been indicated here is if the partnerships really create social 
learning. In the cases of WWF, the social learning might have been taking place mostly 
amongst industrial actors. In addition to engaging in partnerships with companies, WWF also 
collaborates with the industries’ own interest-organizations (like FHL and NSA), which in 
some cases can be quite powerful. Individuals, consumers and other “weaker actors” are also 
addressed by WWF, but mainly not viewed as partners but more as practical work force that 
tasks can be handed to. The partnership strategy can thereby also be conceived as another step 
away from the NGOs origin in civil society and more as a professional agency (WWF can 
however from the beginning can be conceived as an elitist organization), and the social 
learning might be taking place in amongst industrial actors. The companies can learn from 
each other and make use of each others innovations. Moreover, in the forums (like in the 
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salmon-dialogues) where various actors are connected they can together with WWF come up 
with standards that they all agree upon. By these means, WWF intervene in significant 
international webs of influence and in dialogic webs with industry, because with the 
partnership strategy WWF engage in cooperation with mostly powerful and professional 
actors like big companies, resourceful interest or labour organizations, ministries and research 
institutions. When WWF engage in dialogue with these actors, they will probably have to 
compromise a lot. Compared to the modelling issue of Braithwaite & Drahos (2000), it seems 
that the standards that WWF are pushing often are developed in cooperation with industry. 
Therefore, it is a limitation for the partnership strategy that the standards in some cases might 
not be strict enough to really make differences. 
 
My empirical material designate that it was easier to establish partnerships with some 
industrial areas than others. The shipping industry and companies were easier to approach and 
more willing to cooperate with WWF than oil companies. Obviously, this was not simply due 
to WWFs internal rules and norms which reject the possibility of cooperate with the oil 
business. Larger contexts can also influence this. Norwegian legislation and government 
regulations are more significant to the oil business and provide a firm framework for action 
and possibilities, which at the same time might give the oil companies less responsibility for 
own actions (they just follow the rules). The shipping company WWL on the other hand, 
expressed that Norwegian legislation and government not was significant for the company, 
since its business and activity is carried out at an international level. Because international 
legislation on shipping and pollution is not too developed yet and are mainly voluntary, WWL 
attempt to be in the forefront internationally and therefore engaged in a partnership with 
WWF to improve their reputation. Moreover, the informants from both the shipping company 
and the industry interest’s organization NSA expressed that they acknowledged the arguments 
of WWF, and that they assumed they could learn from each other. 
The fish-farming industry might be a medium case. Similarly to the oil industry, their industry 
is quite dependent on Norwegian legislation and regulation. Actors in this industry have 
however been more willingly to engage in dialogue and listen to the advices of WWF than 
actors from the oil industry.  
The reasons why some industries have taken WWFs demands into account seem to be both 
that the organization hold a practical solution-oriented approach, and that they seem to “talk 
the same language” by focusing on technological innovation and projects that not disturb the 
production of the company too much. WWFs capacity to enrol their agenda by taking a 
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partnership and dialogue is therefore much dependent on that WWF manage to translate 
environmental friendly solutions as economical efficient, and in addition there has to be 
competition in industry making companies perceive WWFs knowledge as relevant. 
 
The watchdog approach: Worst practice 
The watchdog approach is obviously more sceptical towards cooperating with industry and 
companies. Contrary to WWF, RF is focusing on penalizing “the worst practises”, and forcing 
the companies to take the issue seriously and spreading some kind of fear into the business 
area.  
Two central conditions for the monitoring and the naming and shaming process are that there 
exists transparency in industry and that national legislations enable RF to access information. 
If the access to information is not sufficient, RF employees endeavour to increase the 
transparency. A limitation of that strategy is that it can take a long time and a lot of labour to 
pressure companies, and that they might eventually ignore all of RFs efforts. In some of the 
examples however, it seems that this strategy has functioned quite well and the naming and 
shaming campaigns have had some effects. The example of the boat companies Viksund and 
Windy boats are illustrating, since they first denied that the use rainforest material was of any 
concern for their business, but later changed attitude after much pressure. Here it seems that 
RF managed to enrol their agenda, because the boat companies finally agreed and made RFs 
agenda a part of the companies “new environmental friendly policy”. Of course, other factors 
influenced this change additionally, but the effort of RF probably was one vital factor.  
Important to add here is that when the situation in Burma escalated, RFs argument that “no 
Norwegian company should support the dictatorship by buying rainforest material from there” 
was emphasised and acknowledged in media and society. Thereby, the success of their efforts 
can to a large degree be dependent on what the popular issues in public media are and on 
receiving publicity. When the press coverage on Burma escalated, the journalists turned to RF 
for receiving information and suggestions on alternatives.  
 
Since the main approach of RF is not to engage in dual dialogues, but to pressure the worst 
companies from outside, their strategy has to include innovative political tactics for making 
their arguments heard. Central parts of their strategy are therefore to contact and engage a 
wide range of actors and agents from different sectors, and to build networks in order to create 
pressure on private business. The Timber campaign was such a case where diverse actors 
were enrolled; and included consumers, the consumer’s rights council and architects. 
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Consequently, an informal network encompassing both public and private actors was created, 
and the issue of protecting the rainforests might have been enrolled into a wider range of 
actors. When a many people seemingly agree on RFs statements, the pressure on companies 
for self-regulation increases. Moreover, the “naming and shaming” campaign enables RF to 
enrol their agenda into a wider level of society by including and approaching additionally 
actors than merely the companies themselves. A positive aspect of including many actors is 
that it reduces development costs and maximises reform opportunities by transmitting many 
models through political networks.  
Still, it must be added that my informants noted that some kinds of dialogue, like contacting 
and warning the bad companies, always is carried out before naming and shaming. 
Cooperation with especially environmental friendly companies is also established. Moreover, 
and in addition to pressuring from the companies from outside, RF always include 
suggestions of alternative models in their confrontation with companies. As can be observed 
in the brochures developed in cooperation with other agents, suggestions on how to avoid 
rainforest material by making use of other materials are central. By producing these brochures 
together with architects, companies and other actors, RF might also have enrolled private 
actors into their agenda and made them carry out labour for them. However, the main gain of 
taking a watchdog position is that it enables the organization to pressure stricter standards on 
private industry. 
 
In the construction and furniture industries, the consumer guides seemed to have impact on 
some companies. The case of Byggmakker, the company appeared to change after RFs 
pressure, and started promoting its new environmental friendly attitude. Even if the 
companies reasons for promoting environmental friendly attitudes probably are financial (to 
increase their competitive advantage), the company still is carrying out efforts that comply 
with RFs agenda.  
However, other companies did not change at all even after being the worst companies in the 
investigations and consumer guides for many years. These companies seem often to be the 
smallest and most unknown ones. Opposite the partnership strategy, the watchdog strategy is 
targeting the worst companies, and these might also be the most affected if shamed in media. 
But companies that not are well known among consumers, might not have a large reputation 
to protect, and can therefore ignore the threats of shaming.  
The limiting aspects of the watchdog strategy are that the processes can take much time and 
depend on external factors like interests in media or current global situations. Moreover, there 
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might be some different internal culture in the different business areas limiting RFs efforts. 
While the boat industry contains a more limited range of customers and workers, the furniture 
industry includes a wider range of customers, and in addition professions like architects and 
interior designers. Additionally, since the profession that RFs employees are based and the 
knowledge they contain on might seem irrelevant for the employees at the companies. 
However, and contrary to WWF, RF might be less dependent on the willingness of the 
industry itself, and can therefore develop stricter standards without compromising.  
 
Discussion on the model: 
Seen together, a main practical difference between the two strategies is that they affect 
different industrial actors. RFs watchdog approach enables the NGO to punish and pressure 
the worst and largest companies in each industry, but they might not reach the un-known ones. 
With WWFs approach, the worst companies are not easy to change, but companies that in the 
first hand agree on changing towards more environmental friendly are easier to cooperate with. 
The partnership strategy can therefore be blamed for not dealing with the industries that are 
damaging the environment the most. On the other hand, the watchdog approach is dependent 
on consumer and media interest, and small invisible companies can therefore avoid being 
affected. WWF is also more dependent on an already competitive situation, while RF to a 
larger degree attempts to increase the competitive situation.  
Moreover, a difference is that since RF has to compromise to a lesser degree than WWF, and 
the standards RF promote can be stricter. In the case of FSC certification this is obvious, 
because while WWF seem recognize the standards as good enough, RF is criticising the 
standards for being too weak.  
Connected to the current CSR trend”, it seems that the ideology of “ecological 
modernization” is central and has gained popularity not only among industries but also NGOs. 
A problematic feature here is thereby that this trend might give the impression in industry and 
society that everything can be solved by advancing technology. Especially WWF are taking 
up this tread, focusing on technological innovations and taking a problem-solving approach, 
making it easier for them to discuss with companies. The companies might thereby choose to 
focus on new technology instead of regulating the most damaging areas of the industry. RFs 
agenda on the other hand does not include any technological environmental innovations, but 
focus more on political and legislative solutions.  
Clearly, both strategies contain limitations and possibilities, and choosing one depends on 
what matters are conceived as the most crucial. 
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The strengths of both the strategies are that they both can result in the spreading or enrolling 
of the NGOs agendas into networks. Comparing the strategies the two NGOs have chosen, it 
appears that they are influenced by dissimilar professions containing ideas about what actors 
are important or morally correct to cooperate with. While WWF focus on partnerships with 
companies with the aim of achieving concrete environmental gains, RF take a watchdog role 
because they have aim includes engaging society in order to create political changes. Taking 
this to an edge, it can be claimed that the strategies can mainly give two different 
environmental gains: the partnership strategy achieving practical environmental gains by 
helping develop environmental friendly technology, the and watchdog political environmental 
gains by engaging and enrolling different sides of society and pushing environmental norms 
on both producers and consumers. Thereby, the cases might also confirm that environmental 
problems have to be solved both political and technical, and that it is important to include 
perspectives from groups containing different professions. Both the partnership and the 
watchdog strategy also contain limitations. The partnership strategy contains the danger of 
green-washing and the difficulties of dong anything about the worst companies. The 
watchdog strategy depends on much hard labour and the interest of society and consumer. 
 
However, even if the model that I have presented (which is a mixture between theoretical and 
empirical statements) appears to be fitting, such a generalized model naturally misses some 
significant points. A noteworthy feature of NGOs is that they due to limited material 
resources are flexible and they can apply a range of strategies on diverse areas. This is 
reflected in my empirical research, and illustrates that the two cases empirically cannot be 
firmly put into one of the main categories. The partnership strategy is not always considered 
by WWF (especially in the case of the oil industry and even if other environmental NGOs do). 
Instead, lobbying, engaging volunteers and approaching media are vital strategies applied to 
influence oil business. And RF did engage in partnerships and cooperation with some 
companies which had sustainable matters as main aim (like recycling). The differences 
between industries that somehow affect environmental destruction are huge, and therefore 
various strategies have to be adapted to various situations.  
The duality of either close cooperation or confrontation can further be loosened because 
strategies can move from one to another. Apparent in the well-known example of “Brent 
Spar”, Greenpeace went from confrontation to partnership with Shell. A similarly situation 
seems to have taken place in the case where WWF first were confronting the aquaculture 
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company Marine Harvest, and thereafter (after some years with dialogue), engaged in a 
partnership. 
 
Furthermore, the strategies might be categorised otherwise. Especially certification systems 
like FSC and MSC are not easy to place into one of the main strategies, and many theoretical 
approaches have lately attempted to describe the certification trend with various conceptions 
and measures. They are not dual partnerships between two actors, but are still a kind of 
cooperation between producers, NGOs and other actors. Thereby, the systems often develop 
through discussions where various actors compromise on standards. There has been much 
appraisements and critique on such certification systems. RF takes a sceptical stand, and 
argues that certification system easily can be misused, and must be closely monitored. The 
critique of RF further include that because the certification processes rely on voluntarism and 
governmental institutions not are involved, the monitoring is not followed up in a perfect 
manner. WWF on the other hand, clearly perceive certification systems as problem-solving 
possibilities, and is both supportive and involved in the creation of various certification 
systems. However, the certification solutions seem to be growing and expanding to different 
areas, and it can be hard to monitor them and know which ones that are the most serious. 
 
Creating social learning?  
Lastly, it can also be added that the partnership-watchdog model does not really capture what 
many of the theories (especially Princten & Finger 1994, Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, Bendell 
2000) note as the most noteworthy contributions by environmental NGOs: their ability to 
create innovative solutions and models and thereby social learning. Because the model mostly 
is concerned with describing the rationality of the relation between NGOs and companies, the 
innovative outcomes of the relation might come in the background of that discussion.  
Creating social learning can as described in the theoretical chapter be a vital achievement of 
NGOs in order to establish environmental solutions. Moreover, that can be connected to the 
information dispersal and verification stage of regulatory processes. How the NGOs strategies 
connect different actors and create networks that enable the actors to learn from each other is 
therefore central to investigate. Here, the two NGOs seem to focus on different actors: while 
RF generally try to include many different and also weaker actors (like consumers, 
individuals, architects, journalists, consumer organizations) against “the enemies” which are 
the bad companies, WWF strive more to make friends with the “strongest actors” (like large 
companies, significant labour organizations and governmental Ministries) and influence them. 
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In that way, the NGOs might enrol their agenda into different areas, RF more into consumers, 
architects and companies, WWF more into industrial actors and companies. By enrolling 
these actors into their agendas, the NGOs might have encouraged learning on environmental 
matters to a broadened field of society. However, with the enrolment power concept I cannot 
really say where the power emerges from and who is influencing who. Also the NGOs 
probably get influenced by the other actors in the network, and might end up carrying out 
their agendas. In the cases where NGOs take part in governmental committees, it can be 
argued that they carry out labour for the government. Moreover, and as mentioned earlier, 
when compromising too much with other actors they might loosen their strict regulative 
models or standards. However, with a deliberative assumption that social learning happen 
when various actors are included in networks, it can be argued that both strategies can 
contribute to some increased learning on environmental issues. A more wide spread 
understanding of environmental issues might further make it easier to shape and implement 
regulations that more actors agree upon. The information dispersal is as mentioned earlier also 
a central issue in regulative processes.  
 
In this thesis it has been important for me not to confirm a certain model and promote one of 
the strategies as the best. Many economists have promoted the solution-based partnership 
approach, while others have been quite sceptical against it. My comment on this is that it 
probably is positive that not all NGOs use that same means. It is important that civil society is 
varied and that it is open to creativity, because in order to create innovation or social learning, 
a multitude of ideas have to exist.  
Both strategies can create environmental gains and regulatory changes. In order to achieve 
environmental gains, the two strategies might even fulfil each other, one helping industries to 
improve their self-regulation, the other pressuring the worst companies to completely change 
their policy and accept or implement new regulatory standards. In promoting stricter self-
regulation, the two strategies also can complete each other, one being carrot (partnership) the 
other whip (watchdog).  
 
This section has discussed how NGOs can make use of different strategies for interfering in 
the regulation of industry, especially pushing companies towards self-regulation, and taken up 
and what possibilities and limitations these strategies can give. In this presentation, it is 
apparent that the conditions for carrying out the strategies also to a great extent dependent on 
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political contexts. I will therefore more comprehensively take up the discussion on how 
various political contexts generate conditions or limitations for the NGOs to interfere. 
 
7.2. Contextual conditions for Ngo involvement: 
Much of the discussion on NGOs strategies and power has indicated that their possibilities for 
intervening in the regulation are not only dependent on what strategies they chose, but also on 
how their approach is accepted taken into account by the other central actors. Particularly the 
government, international actors and the industries themselves are essential. Moreover, what 
political contexts that surround the regulation of industry influences what actors that can 
participate in standard setting- and implementing processes. After revising my theoretical and 
empirical material, it seems to me that the NGOs are operating inside and between three 
general political contexts: The Norwegian state, the global arena and the political markets. 
These contexts generate conditions and restrictions for the NGOs to intervene in industrial 
regulation. 
 
7.2.1. Political markets and why some industry areas are harder to influence 
As the chapters on CSR and regulation indicated, business actors have become exceedingly 
important in regulating industry, and they are important targets for environmental NGOs. My 
cases have indicated that the “green trend” in business has made it easier for the NGOs to 
regulate and sanction the companies more directly. However, my cases illustrate that how 
much responsibility the companies are willing to take and how they interpret CSR varies 
massively. If the companies do not perceive CSR as relevant, it might also be more difficult 
fro NGOs to reach them. Reactions from different industries to demands of the NGOs 
campaigns have already been pointed out in the strategy discussion, and some industries are 
clearly more difficult to reach for the NGOs than others.  
 
The industrial areas that the two NGOs are approaching are quite different. WWF are 
approaching much larger and resourceful industries, which also are strongly connected to the 
Norwegian government. These industries also have their own interest organizations, and a 
ministry to relate to (especially the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, and the Ministry of 
Fisheries and Coastal affairs). However, WWF had quite different effects on the three 
different industry areas approached. The Aquaculture industry was resilient in the beginning, 
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but changed after much pressure and after many discussions with WWF and other actors in 
diverse forums.  
Not surprisingly, the oil industry, was the most difficult to influence. The oil industry has as 
pointed out on the Norwegian context chapter been a main problematic area for environmental 
politics, because it is very harmful to environment and at the same time a major income 
source for Norway. Since the industry is bringing income and development to the country, its 
importance to state and society is high, and this might decrease the pressure for self-regulation. 
Still, it is interesting how many oil companies spend many resources on promoting that they 
take corporate responsibility, and even produce annual reports on their environmental 
advancements. As my informant stated, the oil companies listened to the NGOs suggestions. 
But eventually, they did not really take WWFs demands into account and the efforts WWF 
had put into that case did not give much results. Instead, the oil companies produced their 
own policy which probably is less regulative and more symbolically. The company thereby 
chose to develop its own interpretation of CSR and environmental protection. When it comes 
to “best practices” it is hard to imagine that some oil companies really can become 
“environmental friendly” (even if Statoil/Hydro tries to promote them selves as more 
environmental friendly than other companies, because of technology). Imagining a 
certification possibility for this industry is also hard.  
 
In the case of RFs timber campaign, some of the boat companies changed their minds on 
material usage after much pressure, even if they first did not consider that other alternatives 
were possible. In this way, the standard they implemented was not a technological 
advancement, but a new alternative. The industries that RF target are in addition to being 
much smaller than the ones WWF approach, more directly dependent on individual 
consumers. For the large companies, the threats of boycott campaigns and public sanctioning 
connected to the “naming and shaming” strategy can be alarming. Reacting to RFs demands, 
taking environmental responsibility and shaping a CSR policy can thereby be a strategic 
option for many companies. However, many of the companies RF targeted chose not react to 
that threats. This might be because the pressure among consumers and in the media not 
appears to be high. Moreover, if there is not much competition of being the most responsible 
company, there seems to be small chances for making companies change voluntarily.  
Obviously, many of the companies do not recognize that regulating their own industry for the 
sake of the environment is any of their business. Additionally, companies might consider that 
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it is the government’s responsibility to regulate, and they therefore await the regulation to 
appear from above.  
 
Clearly, they the industries encompass various interpretations of CSR and what their own 
responsibility should be, and this affects their interests for taking the NGOs suggestions onto 
account. However, companies’ interpretations of CSR and what environmental responsibility 
they should take themselves can change after pressure, like the case of the boat industry 
demonstrated. 
 
7.2.2. The Norwegian state:  
Many theorists has pointed at that the role of the government has become exceedingly vague, 
and that the command and control regulation has lost much of its confidence (Demirag 2005, 
Rhodes 1997 etc.). As described in chaprer 3, new forms of regulating and governance 
develop in response to government failures and the hierarchy ineffectiveness. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out in chapter 5, the Norwegian state can be perceived as more active and inclusive 
than other states (Dryzek 2003). Since the government is more visible, goes more into many 
aspects of society and “takes care of everything”, an assumption could be that these theories 
on new governance and regulation forms would be less fitting in the Norwegian political 
context. Additionally, both the informants form the NGOs and many of the other informants 
expressed that they would favour more command and control regulation by the government. 
The political culture in Norway can be said to have a strong belief in state regulations, giving 
them a high degree of legitimacy. Therefore, many answer to the normative question on who 
really should have responsibility protecting the environment; would be the state. 
Traditionally, dissatisfaction with governmental actions can be a driving force for civil society 
action, and NGOs (like the two NGOs I have investigated) usually put main efforts at 
pressuring governmental legislative changes. However, and perhaps in Norway more than 
other countries, the government has to a higher degree been viewed as a collaborator more 
than an enemy. The NGOs in my cases are closely connected to the state, not only since they 
generate their main funding from there, but also because they are cooperating with Ministries 
and governmental institutions. Moreover, both the NGOs work closely together with the 
Ministry of Environment and participate in governmental established committees. Thereby, 
the state facilitates much of the NGOs efforts. In the case of the Timber campaign, RF relies 
on public legislation and institutions like the complaints board, the information rights and the 
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consumer organization. These public institutions enable RF to carry out their investigations, 
and increases RFs legitimacy when confronting companies.  
Similarly, WWFs participation in the escaped-fish committee enabled WWF to take part in 
the standard setting and controlling processes of aquaculture enterprises. 
It is thereby not odd that the informants from the NGOs expressed that improving legislation 
would be the best solutions to regulate business, and stressed influencing politicians and 
bureaucrats through cooperation and negotiation as their most essential task. Both NGOs 
carried out projects attempting to influence and lobby at the government in order to pressure 
the establishment of stricter and more legislations.  
Paradoxically, at the same time as they favoured command and control regulation by the state, 
they expressed negative experiences with their campaigns targeting stricter legislations. They 
stressed that the government should be more active, both in the regulative processes and in 
cooperating with the NGOs. It was also mentioned that the important environmental task of 
monitoring and controlling the Norwegian companies should be an assignment preformed by 
the government and not the NGOs.  
However, the dissatisfaction might not simply give growth to protest but also to searching for 
other solutions. My investigation illustrates that NGOs attempt to regulate and sanction 
industry more directly, not only indirectly by approaching governmental legislation. In so 
doing, it can even be argued that the NGOs and the state seem to switch positions and tasks. 
While the state is directing focus towards changing attitudes in the society (“symbolic policy”) 
the NGOs are directing more focus at the business regulation. 
 
Lastly, as the case with the oil business illustrate, the government can also exclude NGOs 
from regulatory processes. My informant from WWF statements pointed towards that the oil 
companies are difficult to influence and regulate because they mostly rely on governmental 
official legislation to justify their business, and further because the oil business has strong 
connections with the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. The democratic problem of an active 
bureaucracy is obvious in this case, whereby alliances between powerful bureaucrats and 
industrial interests can overrun governmental politicians and civil society. One explanation 
for this can be connected to the segmented form of the Norwegian government, which opens 
for alliances between ministries and industries, and on the other hand organizes the 
environmental NGOs into one segment together with the Ministry of the Environment. If the 
NGOs only cooperate with this ministry, their influence on governmental regulative processes 
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are limited. My empirical materials indicate that the NGOs mainly relate to that Ministry, but 
that other ministries and politicians also are contacted.  
Moreover, it can be assumed that the government can distract the NGOs by inviting them to 
participate in committees that not really take up the most important environmental issues. 
Thereby, the context of a strong and active state can heavily influence what regulative 
processes the Norwegian NGOs can participate in. 
 
7.2.3. The global context:  
Even if the State provides some central conditions, the cases I have described are also taking 
part in a global context, which further contributes with significant conditions for the NGOs. 
As described in the theoretical chapter (especially by Braithwaite & Drahos 2000), 
environmental politics and regulation are often undertaken at a global level, and no single 
player brings out globally regulatory change alone. Since international politics lacks a firm 
global legislation and often is described as anarchistic, there might be various opportunities 
for different actors to involve themselves. In both cases, a significant goal for the NGOs is to 
ratchet up global regulatory standards. Both NGOs are concerned about global aspects, 
because they realize that environmental problems cannot be solved nationally. Even if their 
campaigns often have a national focus, the aims are global, and they therefore are part of or 
build global webs of dialogue. The popular slogan “think globally, act locally” seem to have 
inspired both the NGOs. E.g. the timber campaign is practically directed at Norwegian 
industry and consumers, but overall main aim is to raise the standards of significant global 
economical and political actors that intervene in the cutting of the rainforest.  
 
Moreover, and as has come forwards in some of my cases, international legislative regulations 
can often be more significant to the NGOs than national, and he NGOs also make large efforts 
to intervene in global regulative processes more directly. WWF concentrated on contacting 
and working with global actors in the fields of shipping and aquaculture industry, because 
international legislation and regulation might be more important for those industries. WWF 
expressed that a central aim is to establish global partnerships with companies that operate on 
a global scale, because the effects then are larger. The fact that representatives from WWF 
Norway participated in the discussions along with governmental officials and powerful 
companies in IMO, demonstrate that the organization is taking part of important global webs 
of dialogue.  
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RFs main efforts are also on the global field, and they take part in international regulation 
especially by taking a critical stand on the UN reports on forestry, confronting the World 
Bank or monitoring various industries.  
 
The arguments presented by especially Vogel & Kagan (2004) and Braithwaite & Drahos 
(2000), pointed out that globalization of regulation could actually lead to better environmental 
standards and include wider arrays of actors. These arguments are contrary to many 
environmentalists’ claims that are sceptical towards globalization and often pledge for 
stronger governmental command and control like in my cases. 
Comparing this to my case studies, it is striking that the oil industry, which is strongest most 
connected to the Norwegian state and legislation, was the most difficult to change and 
influence. 
 
Comparing contextual features 
The CRS trend in industry makes many industries more open to listen to suggestions from the 
NGOs, and globalization might increase the competition of being the best company. These 
contextual tendencies might increase NGOs possibilities of intervening in regulation, 
especially self-regulation of industry and in global business regulation. However, the 
Norwegian political context with a strong and active state might decrease some of the 
importance of CSR and self-regulation, because national command and control regulation still 
is thought to be most essential. On the other hand, the Norwegian government also generate 
possibilities for the NGOs by inviting them to participate in committees, but this might also 
connect them too much to the government and decrease their autonomy of being critical to 
state efforts, and the government can influence when the NGOs can interact.  
An essential and general contextual condition for NGOs intervention is transparency in the 
industry and in the regulative processes at governmental level. This seems to me to be the 
most important issue that unites the two cases. For both the NGOs, the access to information 
and the public rights to claim information from the industries were significant.  
 
Multiple regulation mechanisms in a Norwegian context? 
Even tough the government not has been a main focus in this thesis, it is impossible to avoid 
this significant actor, and to take up the discussion if the new regulatory theories really are 
relevant to the government’s environmental policy in Norway. A presumption that has been 
repeated both in the context chapter and in the theoretical chapter is that the government alone 
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cannot conduct the regulation of industry alone, and that we therefore have to look further 
than the command and control mechanism of regulating. This is a problematic presumption; 
both since this has been the classical way of understanding regulation that is the government 
that carries it out, and since many actors normatively perceive it as the government’s 
responsibility to regulate. 
Since my thesis is based on a wider concept of regulation and governance and theories that 
give room for a more significant role for the NGOs as regulatory actors, these theories also 
have to be critically discussed. Especially since these theories on different forms of 
regulation seem to emerge from countries like Australia (like Gunningham, Braithwaite) 
Canada, the Netherlands, which contain other political organizational context than Norway, it 
is not certain how these theories fit with the Norwegian context. The countries that the new 
regulatory theories originate from can compare to Norway be described as more liberalistic, 
and this political context might not fit with the Norwegian case (Dryzek 2003, Bortne, Selle & 
Strømsnes 2002). Since the government is penetrating and regulating many aspects of the 
society, its regulative role might be more significant than in other countries. As Dryzek (2003) 
pointed out and as my case studies show, the government is also regulating the NGOs, and the 
connection between them are sometimes so strong that they barely can be termed non-state 
actors. In establishing committees where the NGOs are allowed to participate, and being the 
main funder of their activities, the government can strongly influence and regulate what issues 
the NGOs should take up. In some instances, like when WWF gave up the oil industry and 
spend much work at the escaped-fish committee, or when the government is funding most of 
RFs activities, it can be argued that the NGOs might be working for the government and not 
have autonomy to take stand against the state. Still, according to my empirical investigations 
it seems that the NGOs have some authority and autonomy and are suggesting stricter 
standards both to private and public institutions, and that they due to especially due to their 
specialized knowledge and position can enhance various regulative mechanisms, both 
command and control and self-regulation. 
Moreover, it is not only the national political contexts that are affecting regulative 
mechanisms, but also the global and aspects of regulation and environmental protection. 
Much of the industrial regulation is taking place in an international level, and regulative 
processes here are characterized by multiple processes and mechanisms. 
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7.3 NGOs and regulative mechanisms 
An assumption marking this thesis is that many actors can be included in diverse stages of 
regulation processes. The two NGOs I have investigated take part in regulative processes by 
making use of diverse means and relate to various contexts. Since the NGOs contain potential 
features like international connections, legitimacy, the ability to set the agenda, the ability to 
relate to different actors, autonomy and capacity to come up with alternatives, they can make 
use of means and ways of influencing that other actors cannot. NGOs can thereby take 
significant roles as actors in various regulatory mechanisms and at different stages of 
regulations. How much they get involved depends both on what strategy they chose and on 
the contexts where the regulative processes take place. These two factors can produce various 
conditions and limitations, which have been discussed earlier. 
The discussions so far have attempted to answer it by comparing my material with the 
theories I have chosen. My thesis was meant to be mostly descriptive, but underlying 
assumptions are closely linked to theory, especially theoretical discussions about changing 
conditions for regulation and governance. Since I have studied two quite different cases, I 
have generated a foundation for looking at more general implications of perceiving the NGOs 
as participants in regulation process. After comparing the strategies and the contexts of the 
two NGOs, I will therefore now turn to a short theoretical discussion combining the two case 
studies with theories regulative mechanisms and conflictingly tensions inhabited in those 
theories. 
 
As Gunningham & Rees (1997) amongst other outlined, a wider understanding of regulation 
opens for the possibility to view various regulation mechanisms where NGOs can play 
significant roles: Especially pressuring companies towards self-regulation, monitoring 
strategies, mechanisms to facilitate public involvement, information based strategies have 
shown to be vital to both the NGOs. With such an understanding, contributions by NGOs can 
enhance both stricter governmental regulation and self-regulation of industries, acting as 
third-party regulators, but also acting as direct regulators:  
First, the two NGOs I have investigated seem to act as mediators between state regulation and 
private industry, especially in some cases where they inform the industry on what 
environmental legislation they have to follow. Because the control part of the command and 
control mechanism is difficult for the public officials to follow up, the NGOs here can 
function as controllers, monitoring that companies follow the rules. Moreover, the NGOs 
pressured the government to establish stricter regulations (commands), sometimes even in 
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cooperation with industrial agents that favour regulations that are fair and easy to relate to. 
WWF engaged in both creating a stricter legislation on escaped salmon from fish-industries, 
and in creating better control mechanisms. In this case, they can participate in both the 
shaping of the formal standards and in the controlling of that the regulations are carried out. 
RF also actively pressure for stricter governmental regulations, and on the other hand made 
use of official information rights to control the companies. Thereby, the NGOs can have 
influence in both the standard shaping process and the controlling process of regulation. 
Secondly, the NGOs in my cases can be seen as more direct regulators, since they promote 
alternatives models and standards and attempt to pressure industry directly. Moreover, both 
WWF and RF demanded higher environmental standards and pressured the companies to 
formalize and implement these standards. However, the cases with the boat industry (RF) and 
the oil industry (WWF) confirm that in many instances the NGOs did not succeed. 
  
When it comes to variations of regulation types, my cases illustrate that the NGOs are 
attempting to intervene in as many regulative mechanisms as possible, combining various 
strategies and approaching various actors. Since NGOs are weak actors compared to states 
and companies, they would of course make use of any possibilities they get, even if they 
chose a main strategy. Moreover, their main motives are not to earn money or stay in power, 
but to create environmental gains (even if NGOs clearly also want to increase power and 
resources). Clearly, also the command and control regulation can be heavily influenced by 
various agents, especially in the standard setting and in the controlling process. Thereby, the 
categorisation of state or self-regulation with their main actors is not so easy to settle with, 
because the regulation mechanisms sometimes influence each other and various actors can 
take part in all of the mechanisms. A paradox here is that both the NGOs and some industrial 
actors argue that they would favour more governmental command and control regulation, and 
they also seem to conceive the state as having the ultimate power to create changes.  
 
Another presumption that was pointed out in the theoretical chapters is importance of 
conceiving how private and public regulations depend on each other and interact with each 
other (Ayers & Braithwaite 1992, Gunningham 1993). Even if I have not studied the pubic 
regulation in this thesis, it seems quite clear that even though the Norwegian government has 
a lot of capacity, the command and control mechanism is not enough. Because the industry 
develops so fast, and because of globalization, government does not seem to have the capacity 
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to follow up, they depend more on private forms of regulation. The government thereby also 
has to recognise the importance of the NGOs assets.  
Moreover, and as suggested by e.g. Rosenau & Czempiel (1992) and Burris, Drahos, Shearing 
82005), informal lines of authority might empower citizens and involve more actors. When 
more actors are involved, the chance for create collective learning between public and private 
actors might be enhances, and networks open up for new possibilities, ideas, and thereby 
create inter-organizational learning. When industries, consumers, civil society and 
governmental participants meet, they can exchange experiences and develop new ideas and 
regulative standards that they can agree upon. In my case studies, it appears that in some 
instances, the NGOs have pushed forward such deliberative arenas for inter-organizational 
learning, like in the instance of the “aquaculture dialogues” that WWF has established, which 
is a meeting place between various actors. Another instance might be how RF has mobilized 
various actors for achieving stricter legislations and regulations. These efforts of including 
more actors in decision-making processes might be the most significant contribution that the 
NGOs make, because if the standards that the NGOs want to promote should have any effect, 
they have to be approved and enrolled into a wider layer of actors.  
 
A problematic concern linked to the various regulation forms and the actors participating is 
that since they are indirect, it can be hard to observe how power is created and where it 
emerges from. Even if the critical democracy issue not has been a major discussion in this 
thesis because it would be too comprehensive, I will have to make a note on it. The 
democratic problem, connected to Rhodes (1997) and the critical assumptions on “self 
organizing inter-organizational networks” is that they create governing without government 
and central guidance. Both the two cases describe how the NGOs take part of different 
networks that span the boundary between private and public sectors. Mapping these networks 
can be difficult, since they often not formally map themselves, but function through more or 
less informal relations and agreements. My study has however demonstrated that the different 
strategies chosen, establishes networks in dissimilar ways, but that they include public 
institutions, private companies, interest organizations and consumers. The case of RF might 
however include more actors from different layers of society. A problematic feature that 
Rhodes pointed out on such networks is that they might not have the same accountability and 
transparency as government, and because they are loosely organized it is unclear where 
decisions are made. Clearly, it is true that it not is easy to map who participate and how power 
emerges in these networks, and it has therefore also been difficult for me to measure how 
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much effect the NGOs have had. On the other hand, both the NGOs were to a great deal 
working to enhance transparency in both public and private sector, so that their and other 
weaker actors get the possibility to involve them selves. By increasing the information on 
public duties and rights to both consumers and producers, the NGOs might have enhanced the 
insight into legislation. Thereby, in opposition to Rhodes (1997), it could be argued that 
network governance can empower civil society, since it opens up for participation. As stated it 
the theoretical chapter, citizens could regain control of government through participation in 
networks as users and governors. 
On the other hand, a problematic feature is that such networks might develop own policies 
and resist steering, which could further be problematic connected to democratic theory. But 
this feature might not be too relevant in the Norwegian cases, since the government is 




The aim for my thesis was making a research on how environmental NGOs can intervene in 
the regulation of environmental harmful industry. It is now time to conclude on the research 
question and point out the main general thoughts and arguments I have obtained through 
carrying out the research in this thesis, and suggest what contribution my thesis can be. 
 
First and foremost, my research has demonstrated that the NGOs can make use of a range of 
strategies in order to take part in various stages of regulation or self-regulation of industries. 
Protecting the environment is a very complicated and complex issue, both practical and 
political. Therefore, there exist a multitude of approaches and actors with various ideologies 
that focus on different issues and solutions. It seems to me that there are no obvious solutions, 
both practically in what environmental issue is the most important (even if it in these days is 
popularly understood that climate change is the one environmental problem we have), and 
politically in dividing responsibilities and deciding on policies. Moreover, stricter regulations 
of environmental harmful industry, which is a fundamental task, can also be solved in various 
ways, like by promoting stricter governmental regulation, self-regulation of the industries and 
working to establish global regulation. 
Solutions both have to consider means and aims, and the two NGOs I have investigated have 
chosen dissimilar strategies reflecting what they conceive as an essential environmental aims 
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and proper means. The capacities for the NGOs to intervene in regulation are generally based 
on their knowledge, their strategic position and their flexible approach which make it possible 
for them to relate to and cooperate with many actors at different levels. When it comes to 
pressuring for stricter industry self-regulation, WWF aims at solving practical environmental 
problems by establishing dual partnership and enrolling their standards into companies 
directly, while RF seem to focus more on creating political and publically pressure to force 
the companies to implement RFs standards. Both of these choices can create limitations and 
possibilities for them to pressure or enrol their standards on industrial actors. The main 
limitations of both strategies might be that they can only focus on one issue and that they can 
get too dependent on cooperation with other actors.  
 
However, it is not always right to catalogue NGOs into the categories of partnership or 
watchdog strategies, because they make use of various strategies and adapt the choice of 
means to the context they are approaching. As pointed out above, regulation of industry for 
the protection of the environment is not an easy task with one solution, and one strategy might 
only solve only one part of the problems. Additionally, the examination of the NGOs has 
demonstrated that the complexity of environmental protection is reproduced in their 
approaches and that traditional conceptions of what environmental NGOs are or should be do 
not always fit with the reality. Being limited by practical resources, the NGOs have to work 
creatively in order to pressure changes, and approach various actors or set up alternative 
models. They are not organized as grass-root organizations in the traditional conception, but 
are more professionalized and function as more or less independent actors in between state, 
society, industry at both the global and national level. Noticeably, there are moral and 
practical dilemmas that can appear if connecting too strong bonds too either state or industrial 
actors, and it is therefore central for the NGOs to strive to keep their autonomy. Similarly to 
the critique of NGOs developing towards more bureaucratic organizing, being too engaged in 
earning money for their projects can furthermore formalize the NGO and make them appear 
as strict organizations or companies, and this is a danger that the NGOs seem to be aware of.  
 
My argument is therefore that it is not necessary to decide on one best strategy for 
environmental NGOs, but that a pluralistic civil society where actors chose dissimilar 
strategies is significant in order to create learning at a range of areas and between various 
other actors. My research indicates that these unlike strategies can cover different areas, and 
an assumption I have made is that they somehow can fulfil each other, one giving carrot the 
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other using whip on companies. Moreover, the two NGOs I have investigated have different 
conceptions on what the environmental problems are and how solutions should be carried out. 
While one of them are focused on solving practical environmental issues and therefore 
engages in partnerships, the other one is more occupied with changing political and industrial 
structures and therefore engage in political pressure campaigns. Both these tasks are important 
in order to protect the environment. 
Consequently, I am also arguing that a more pluralistic understanding of how to carry out 
environmental protection and of what actors that are or could be involved is necessary in 
order to understand how various actors can contribute. My research might here have 
contributed by showing that the two NGOs attempt to take part in various stages of regulatory 
processes (information gathering, verification and imposing sanctions and performing 
regulatory functions) and that they take part in various regulative mechanisms. 
 
Concerning the theoretical debate I have taken up in this thesis on “new mechanisms of 
regulation”, I argue that these theories can help describe my cases by taking various 
mechanisms and actors into account, but that they can miss some vital contextual features by 
focusing too much on the practical features of the actors. In my cases, the political contexts 
where the NGOs operate inside are characterised by many problematical issues which 
influence their conditions to take part in regulation. Particularly, the Norwegian state inhabits 
some structures that can make it easier for NGOs to intervene by inviting them to participate 
in committees, but simultaneously the government can also exclude the NGOs like in the case 
of the oil-business. Besides, it seems that the government is perceived as the single legitimate 
regulator by many actors. The NGOs expressed that constitutional (command and control) 
regulations of industries, both national and international are the most desirable for protecting 
the environment, and to influence those in public positions is therefore a main aim for the 
NGOs. Thereby, their alternative strategies aiming at manipulating and increasing industrial 
self-regulation can be perceived as a second choice. This second choice seems however to 
become exceedingly significant, because state led regulations and implementations of 
publically legislation are durable processes. As well, effectual state regulations on all 
industries that affect the environment (almost all industries have in some way negative 
environmental effects) appear to be impossible.  
On the other hand, the NGOs I have examined are operating within different political contexts; 
between the Norwegian and the global, and relate to the policy of the markets. These contexts 
limit the importance of the Norwegian state in some instances (e.g. the shipping industry), and 
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generate additional possibilities and limitations for the NGOs. The green trend in industry 
makes it easier for environmental NGOs to perform regulatory functions or sanction 
companies directly without going through the government or official legislation, but 
limitations are that the industries might not really implement the agendas of the NGOs, and 
that the NGOs can lose some of their legitimacy.  
Lastly, especially in the global context, other conditions for the NGOs to intervene in global 
business regulation are appearing. The main problematic aspects of globalization that many 
have pointed out is that it gets more difficult to get an overview on what is happening and 
monitoring the actions of various industries. Another aspect is that globalization of industry 
can create more competition between companies and between states of implementing the best 
standards. My cases have indicated that NGOs can take advantage of that competition, by 
helping the best companies to promote and regulate themselves, and by increasing the 
competition between companies. Moreover, there are many attempts of international 
cooperation and dialogue for establishing better global regulations, like my cases exemplify 
by establishing forums, international certification mechanisms, and cooperation between 
indigenous people and international organizations. These attempts can contribute to raise 
environmental standards in several countries. Even if many NGOs are sceptical to 
globalization, it is clear that they still make a large effort on pressuring and establishing 
international regulatory frameworks. Here, NGOs can play central roles because of their 
strategic capacities of being independent actors in between the local, the national and the 
global field. Due to these capacities, their arguments and standards are also taken into account 
by powerful international actors and by significant forums that discuss global business 
regulation like UN organizations. However, global business regulation is a huge field, and a 
limitative aspect is that this complexity is difficult to grasp and that one NGO only can take 
part in a narrow field.  
Additionally, globalization can further make distances appear shorter, and the NGOs can 
emphasise the attitude that the regulative actions we take locally can have effects globally.  
 
 
In addition to promoting a more pluralistic understanding of how NGOs can take part in 
regulation, an obvious argument is that a wider understanding of relevant actors and the 
interaction between them is vital when investigating environmental politics and regulation. 
The government and the large international corporations and institutions might appear to have 
the main say, but when looking closer and perceiving power as the possibility to enrol 
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agendas into networks, there are many actors that can participate in shaping standards and 
regulative frameworks. My research has illustrated that NGOs can play significant roles in 
various stages of regulative processes, and especially in verifying and spreading information 
and new standards. Compared to the classically most important actors; the State and the 
industry itself, the NGOs have other capacity and power bases that enhances their influence 
potential. As I perceive it, they have more flexibility, a different form of legitimacy and a 
specialized knowledge that gives them a strategic position compared to states and companies. 
Even though the government in the Norwegian political context is stressed as the central 
regulator, its role and significance might become more fragmented and dependent on other 
actors due to industrial globalization and the importance of international regulations. As well 
consumers, various governmental or non-governmental organizations, the media and 
individual companies can contribute in regulative processes. In my cases, important efforts of 
the NGOs where that they included various actors into taking part in environmental 
discussions on solutions and responsibilities. With the flexibility and legitimacy the NGOs 
contain they are able to communicate with various actors, and they can thereby connect them 
and broaden the networks where environmental issues are discussed. Achievements of NGOs 
efforts thereby depend on their ability to come up with new standards and to mobilise or enrol 
various actors into their agenda. In both my cases, the NGOs enrolled or integrated the 
environmental protection issue into different informal networks, which indirectly or directly 
participated in pressuring and implementing stricter regulation/self-regulation on 
environmental harmful industrial activities. They might therefore have been enrolled in the 
information verification stage of the regulatory processes. Moreover, spreading environmental 
consciousness is primer to implement and legitimate stricter regulations, and environmental 
NGOs are, and historically always have been, central to spreading such consciousness into 
state institutions, industry and society.  
 
It is certain that stricter standards and more regulation on various industries has to be carried 
out in order to manage the environmental problems, and that the state has a central role in 
facilitating regulations on Norwegian industries. Because technological industrial solutions 
(ecological modernization projects) cannot solve environmental problems alone, and because 
legislations are perceived as ultimate and legitimate in Norwegian political culture, the state 
still is a crucial actor for enhancing environmental protection. 
Furthermore, the state facilitates much of the NGOs efforts, and the Norwegian environmental 
NGOs alliances with state institutions are strong and take many forms (it can be cooperation 
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between NGOs and Ministries, public councils or committees). Such cooperation seems to be 
unfeasible to avoid for Norwegian NGOs, especially in the cases that concern Norwegian 
industries and even if the NGOs chose to build alliances with companies. On the other hand, 
when the alliances between the State and private industries are too strong (like in the case of 
the oil business), a power bloc is created which makes it very hard for NGOs to intervene. 
The role of the State can thereby not be ignored, and especially how the state facilitates 
various regulative mechanisms and allows various actors to become included is an essential 
issue.  
 
Apparently, shaping and implementing environmental policy and regulation of industry are 
very complicated issues with no easy answers. Different actors containing ideologies and 
knowledge systems have various perceptions on both goals and means. An important point is 
that in order to save the environment; we have to learn our way out. It is therefore significant 
that many actors can participate in the learning process, both in the shaping, verifying and in 
the implementing of regulative standards for environmental harmful industries. The 
government cannot manage this on its own; neither can NGOs, companies or individuals. The 
NGOs special role in this picture is that they can participate in various stages of regulative 
processes, and that they raise the standards, pressure both industries and government to 
implement stricter regulations, dispersal information and trigger the learning process by 

















As an evaluative comment on my own effort, I have to admit that I only scratched the surface 
on many interesting issues, both theoretically and empirically. Concerning the empirical 
material, the hardest task has been choosing and limiting the investigations and data, and there 
were many other interesting empirical threads that could have been followed up. The 
informants granted me a lot of information that I did not have time to take up in this thesis. 
Especially, much of the information pointed at various discourses about environmental 
protection, and these would have been interesting to investigate further. 
I understand that I could have used the information otherwise. E.g. Organizational studies on 
how actors conceive and react to green-washing could be carried out. There seems to be a 
large discussion and competition not only between companies and corporations, but also 
between NGOs and agencies that approve their environmental and ethical policy. Who should 
define the standards? 
Lastly, how different governments have reacted to and made use of various regulation 
mechanisms would as well be interesting to investigate, e.g. comparing regulation forms for 
example in Norway and Germany. It is important to investigate ways of understanding 
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